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PREFACE:  
aims, objectives and benchmarks 
 
 
 In this discussion I will try to understand if it is possible to talk about a 
distribution of power between constituencies and how it is, eventually, regulated the 
coexistence of a plurality of interests under the U.K. system and under the Italian law. 
In this regard, I will focus on a particular “step” of the companies‟ life, that is far from 
the physiological phase: when a company is “in troubles”. The latter term, as it will be 
explained, is used according to some UK courts‟ decisions and commentators in order 
to cover not only insolvency, but also the vicinity of insolvency and, maybe, the thought 
of insolvency. For same aspects the correspondence under Italian law could be the 
“crisis” state, but some distinctions are necessary to value the importance of the legal 
strategies connected with it. 
 Necessary, speaking about corporate power in the pathological stage of 
companies presumed to provide for a description of this power distribution between the 
actors when companies are normally carrying on business activities. 
The approach I want to suggest to perform this analysis is the so-called doctrine 
of agency problems, that can read the relationships between the various actors, beyond 
what is suggested by law, in economic terms, that is in terms of  agency costs. 
As a result, the starting point in looking for the object above is an economic one, that is 
a theoretical model that allows to understand, in principle, the relationship between 
ownership/risk and power of control and the rationales connected with these issues. 
More specifically, this ideal model is identified in a company where only the members 
risk and have the property of the company. Are also the same members to make 
business decisions. Then, the interest
1
 that is pursued is that of their ownership because 
they are solely to exercise control. Since that model does not exist in the real world, 
                                                 
1
 It should be also an internal contrast between different interests belonging to different members, causing, for 
example, a discrepancy between majority and minority of ownership, but in this discuss this issue will not be 
taken into account. 
6 
where necessary the company needs director performances and requires relationships 
with creditors and other stakeholders , necessarily a plurality of interests came into play, 
all more or less attributable to the company or related to the business. Members are no 
longer the only category to take risks and make decisions, that is to exercise corporate 
power. Consequently, the transfer of risk even head to other than members, is reflected, 
by applying the economic theory of the correlation between ownership and control, in a 
new distribution of power. 
This new scenario deals with legal strategies which are set up to prevent symptomatic 
potential corporate conflicts.  
In this discussion I want to try to understand if in the UK system and in the 
Italian law the economic risk distribution model is respected and, eventually, if  power 
is proportionate to the risk that the parties have taken, or there is a mismatch between 
interests. In this regards, it will be focus on different legal strategies: on the one hand, 
imperative rules, on the other, contractual remedies that could be seen as, respectively, 
regulatory and private responses to agency problems
2
. 
For this aim it will highlight the many aspects of the Italian and the U.K. 
corporate and insolvency law.  
Preliminary, I would say that, in doing so, this discussion will give merely some 
information of these two jurisdictions, being the purpose not to rehearse all that applies 
to every law areas, but just to outline some peculiar solutions of both the two 
jurisdictions which I will argue could be interesting in relation to the agency problems 
in troubles companies. 
By the agency costs theory and the common English theoretical legal strategies 
distinction I wish to offer, respectively, a common language and a general analytic 
framework with which functionally compare the U.K. and Italy. 
More particularly, Chapter 1 will address the functional model of agency 
relationships between constituencies of a solvent company. It will describe the main 
categories of those relationships, which in the real model of a solvent company become 
agency problems. In this regard, it will place emphasis on the justification of 
shareholders‟ power as residual claimants and on managerial agency problems, showing 
how the corporate power can be distributed between shareholders and directors, 
                                                 
2
 See R.R. Kraakman, P. Davies, H. Hansmann, G. Hertig, K. J. Hopt, H. Kanda, E. B. Rock, The anatomy of 
corporate law. A comparative functional approach, Oxford University Press, 2004, pp. 23ss.; see also L. 
Enriques (ed.), Diritto societario comparato, Torino, 2006, pp. 30ss. 
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depending on which legal (regulatory and/or governance) strategies are provided by 
legislators. 
Then in Chapter 2 I will try to read the Italian and the U.K. distribution of power 
in terms of managerial agency costs. As a result, it will focus on which interests may 
arise, directly or indirectly, in managing business activities and, consequently, which 
legal strategies and approaches are adopted by the U.K. and Italian system to protect 
those interests. 
Having define, although with no claims of completeness, the Italian and the U.K. 
distribution of management power in solvent companies, in Chapter 3 I will describe 
how the basic agency problems of the corporate form manifest themselves in troubles 
situations. In this new scenario it arises the need to protect creditors. In fact, according 
to the economic theory, if when a company is in normal business operation, creditors 
shall have no voice and it is right that the control is entirely up to shareholders, this 
justification no longer holds when risk capital, total or in part, has been lost. Therefore, 
becomes necessary to understand who, regardless any formal power, are substantially 
the “owners” of troubles companies. I will argue that in this context a reallocation of 
control is necessary, becoming creditors residual claimants. Focusing on these issues, I 
will try to explain the role of the corporate “indebtedness” in the distribution of power 
and the definition of “insolvency” with the purpose to outline to what extend creditors‟ 
protection could be take into account by legislators. 
Once I will have justified the transfer of control of troubles companies to 
creditors, it will be analysed in Chapter 4 whether the structures and rules in the U.K. 
and in the Italian system exist to protect creditors.  
The final scope will be try to verify whether, according to the legal strategies 
adopted by Italy and the U.K., the model of distribution of power is faithful to and 
aligned with the economic ones, or whether there are any inconsistencies and to what 
extend it is possible to compare or distinguish those two jurisdictions.  
Finally, I will highlight two methodological conditions: firstly, I will discuss 
only about company with limited liability, where the need to have a balance of power is 
strong; secondly, it is necessary a meaning clarification about the terms “director” and 
“creditor category” in order to define the context of this discussion.  
The term “director” refers generally to the body that has the management of a 
company; as a result, I have chosen not to address the issues and the (agency) problems 
either related to internal management (i.e. the distribution of power between  board and  
8 
managers or between executive and not-executive managers), focusing on relationships 
between “managerial power” and “out-of-managerial power”, nor connected to the 
possible presence of senior directors (i.e. the distribution of power between board of 
managers and  board of senior managers). The latter chose is made in order to try to 
simplify the comparison between the U.K. system, where a body of corporal internal 
control does not exist, and the Italian jurisdiction, where the presence of this body is 
compulsory
3
. 
The term  “creditor category” is limited to those who provide debt capital in 
order to try to highlight the relationship between the bearers of risk capital, on the one 
hand, and bearers of debt capital, on the other; moreover, the scope of this limit 
indication is try to understand whether, under the formal differences between the two 
categories, there are any substantial commonalities and connections between them when 
the company is in particular circumstances, that is a troubled company and, if this is the 
case, whether those similar aspects are or can be recognized by law. 
                                                 
3
 According to the Italian Civil Code, the senior directors‟ body is called “collegio sindacale” (in the traditional 
corporate and control model, see art. 2328, c. 2, nn. 10, 11; art. 2397ss. For the s.p.a.; art. 2463, c. 2, n. 8, art. 
2477 for the s.r.l.), “consiglio di sorveglianza (due to the dualistic corporate and control system, see art. 2409 
octies-quaterdecies) and “comitato per il controllo  sulla gestione (in the monistic system of corporate and 
control, see art. 2409 sexiesdecies-octiesdecies).  
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Chapter 1 
AGENCY PROBLEMS AND CORPORATE CONTROL 
 
Summary: 1.1. Introduction – 1.2. The problem of non-aligned interests – 1.3. 
The language of economic agency costs – 1.4 Managerial agency costs – 1.5. 
Legal strategies for reducing managerial agency costs - 1.5.1  Regulatory 
strategies - 1.5.2 Governance strategies - 1.6. Some conclusions. 
 
1.1.  Introduction 
This Chapter deals with the agency problem doctrine as the language that will be 
used to read the Italian and the U.K. distribution of power in solvent companies and in 
companies in. 
In this regard, I have outlined some aspects of this economic analysis, speaking 
about the main categories of agency problems. In particular, managerial agency costs 
have been stressed, distinguishing between, on the one hand, managerial costs which 
directly transfer value from shareholders to directors and, on the other, the indirect 
transfer of power in the same direction. 
Furthermore, focusing on the relationships between shareholders as  “residual 
claimants” and management, emphasis has been put on the role of the law in reducing 
agency costs when companies carry on business activities. 
Finally, I have described the main legal strategies by which the corporate power 
may be distributed and balance between the actors of companies in ordinary activities. 
 
1.2. The problem of non-aligned interests. 
A company has a dual nature as both an association of its members and a person 
separate from its members
4. A company‟s property is owned by the company as a 
separate person, not by the members; the company‟s business is conducted by the 
company as a separate person, not by the members neither by the directors; it is the 
                                                 
4
 P. Davies, Gower and Davies‟ principles of Modern Company Law, 2008,p. 83; D. Kershaw, Company Law 
in context, Oxford University Press, 2009, pp. 5ss;  S. Mayson, D. French, C. Ryan, Company Law, Oxford 
Press, 2009-2010, pp. 7ss. 
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company as a separate person that enters into contracts in relation to the company‟s 
business and property
5
.  
 In this regard, a company deals with the activities of three main groups of 
people: its shareholders (or members), its directors
6
 and its creditors. The law seeks to 
regulate both the relations between these three groups (for example, as against directors 
or creditors as against shareholders) and within these groups (for instance, majority as 
against minority shareholders or secured as against unsecured creditors). It also seeks to 
regulate the mechanisms by which people join, or leave, one of these groups as well as 
their rights and duties once they have joined  a group. Thus, the law is interested in the 
process by which investors come to be shareholders or creditors of a company as well as 
their legal status once they have acquired shares or lent money to the company
7
. 
Moreover, a company which runs a business will need to generate successful 
relationships with other groups of people as well, notably suppliers of various inputs 
(such as labour or components) and customers, not to mention government or the 
community in which the company operates. Although all these constituencies play a 
crucial role in either financing or carrying out the economic activities which companies 
undertake and in having a significant influence on corporate decision-making, in this 
discussion it will be focused only on the three groups we mentioned above: directors, 
shareholders and creditors. More exactly, the aim is to highlight the relationships 
between those who provide venture capital and those who provide debt capital to the 
company. It is not easy to describe the role of each of these groups, because, as it will 
be seen, companies perform many different functions and the role of constituencies vary 
accordingly. 
 
1.3. The language of economic agency costs 
The starting point of this analysis is a theoretical premise, namely that power is 
linked to risk. Assuming a company ideal model where only the members are the 
owners and make business decisions and perform duties, it is obvious that the only 
interest to reach will be those of members which are entitled of control rights as the 
ultimate repository of authority in the company. There are three principal areas of 
                                                 
5
 The leading case on the fundamental importance of the separate personality of a company is Salomon v A 
Salomon and Co Ltd [1897] AC 22. 
6
 and, to a lesser extent, its senior managers, whether they are directors or not. 
7
 P. Davies, Introduction to Company Law, Oxford University Press, 2002, p 5. 
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shareholder control: control over the company‟s constitution; control over the 
company‟s management; and control over the company‟s economic surplus. 
Otherwise, problems are generated when those who run the company do not themselves 
own the company and/or do not make business activities. Those issues are exacerbated 
if the shareholder body has poor incentives to monitor and sanction managerial 
misbehaviour. In order to give some conceptual clarity to the problems just described, 
one way could be to provide in the corporate legal world by the economic analysis of 
agency problems. An „agency problem‟ – in the most general sense of the term- arises 
whenever the welfare of one party, termed the „principal‟, depends upon actions taken 
by another party, termed the „agent‟. The problem lies in motivating the agent to act in 
the principal‟s interest rather than simply in the agent‟s own interest. Viewed in these 
broad terms, agency problems arise in a broad range of contexts that go well beyond 
those that would formally be classified as agency relationships by lawyers. In particular, 
almost any contractual relationship, in which one party (the agent) promises 
performance to another (the principal), is potentially subject to an agency problem. The 
core of the difficulty is that, because the agent commonly has better information than 
does the principal about the relevant facts, the principal cannot costlessly assure himself 
that agent‟s performance is precisely what was  promised. As a consequence, the agent 
has an incentive to act opportunistically, skipping on the quality of his performance, or 
even diverting to himself some of what was promised to the principal. This means, in 
turn, that the value of the agent‟s performance to the principal will be reduced, either 
directly or because, to assure the quality of the agent‟s performance, the principal must 
engage in costly monitoring of the agent
8
. The greater the complexity of the tasks 
undertaken by the agent, and the greater the discretion the agent must be given, the 
larger these „agency costs‟ are likely to be9. 
Three generic agency problems arise in business firms. The first involves the 
conflict between the firm‟s owners (as the principal) and its hired managers (that are the  
agents). The woe lies in assuring that the managers are responsive to the owner‟s 
interests rather than simply to the managers‟ own personal interests. The second agency 
problem involves the conflict between, on the one hand, owners who possess the 
majority or controlling interest in the firm and, on the other hand, the minority or non-
                                                 
8
 See O. Williamson, The Economic Institutions of Capitalism, 1985, pp. 47-49. 
9
 See S. Ross, The Economic Theory of Agency: The Principal‟s problem, in American Law Review, 1973, 134; 
J. W. Pratt and R. J. Zeckhauser (eds.), Principals and Agents: the structure of business, 1984; P. Milgrom and 
J Roberts, Economics, Organization and Management, 1992. 
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controlling owners. Here the non-controlling owners are the principal and the 
controlling owners are the agents, and the difficulty lies in assuring that the former are 
not expropriated by the latter. The third agency problem involves the conflict between 
the firm itself (including, particularly, its owners) and the other parties with whom the 
firm contracts, such as creditors, employees, and customers. Agency problems arise in 
assuring that the firm, as agent, does not behave opportunistically towards these various 
other principals – such as by expropriating creditors, exploiting workers, or misleading 
consumers.  
In the analysis proposed here, that is, in particular to highlight how the various interests 
are balanced between the different categories of constituencies, it will not take into 
account the second type (which refers to the internal problems of the same class, that is 
the members‟ category) placing the emphasis instead on the two other species called 
respectively managerial agency problems and financial agency problems. 
 Law can play an important role in reducing agency costs. Obvious examples are 
rules and procedures that enhance disclosure by agents or facilitate enforcement actions 
brought by principals against dishonest or negligent agents. Paradoxically, in protecting 
principals against exploitation by their agents, the law can benefit agents as much as – 
or even more than- it benefits the principal. The reason is that a principal will be willing 
to offer greater compensation to an agent when the principal is assumed of performance 
that is honest and of high quality. To take a conspicuous example in the corporate 
context, rules of law that protect creditors from opportunistic behaviour on the part of 
corporations should reduce the interest rate that corporations must pay for credit, thus 
benefiting corporations as well as creditors. Likewise, legal constraints on the ability of 
controlling shareholders to expropriate minority shareholders should reduce the cost of 
outside equity capital for corporations. Moreover, rules of law that inhibit insider 
trading by corporate managers should increase the compensation that shareholders are 
willing to offer the managers. 
  Consequently, reducing agency costs is in the interests of all parties to a 
transaction, principal and agents alike. It follows that the normative goal of advancing 
aggregate social welfare is generally equivalent to searching for optimal solutions to the 
corporation‟s agency problems, in the sense of finding solutions that maximize the 
aggregate welfare of the parties involved- that is, of both principals and agents taken 
together. 
 
15 
1.4. Managerial agency costs 
The managerial agency costs
10
 are the incurred costs when managers act in their 
own interests to the detriment of the shareholders‟ interests as agency costs. However, 
these costs do not necessarily represent value that is taken away from shareholders. 
Contractarian scholars would argue that when shareholders buy shares in a company 
they assess the scope that managers have to act in ways that incur managerial agency 
costs and reduce the price they are willing to pay for the shares accordingly. If this is 
correct then these costs are reflected in the reduced value of the shares and make it more 
costly for the company to raise equity finance. However, if such costs are not taken 
account of by shareholders when they buy the shares then the incurrence of such costs 
represents a real transfer of value from shareholders to managers. 
There are two managerial agency cost categories. The first category involves 
behaviour and business decisions that directly transfer value to managers. One of the 
main species is the so called “self-dealing”, that involves a transaction in which the 
director is on both sides of a contract: as an individual on one hand, and as a director of 
the company on the other. If a manager enters into a transaction with the company there 
is a risk that the terms of that contract will benefit the manager at the company‟s 
expense. If the company overpays for an asset sold to it by the manager or the manager 
purchases a company asset for less than it is worth, value is transferred directly into the 
manager‟s pocket. This value transfer is an agency cost. If the company loans the 
manager money at a zero interest rate this is an agency cost as the interest it could have 
obtained by depositing the funds in a bank is effectively transferred into the manager‟s 
pocket. Another direct transfer of value could be made by “management remuneration”. 
Remuneration is really an example of self-dealing: it is a transaction for employment 
services between the manager and the company. If a manager arranges for remuneration 
which is above the market rate this is an agency cost. Remuneration commands a sub-
category of its own for, as we shall see, it receives specific regulatory attention. Finally, 
                                                 
10
 According to the economists analysis, the directors of a company, which are not required to own any of its 
shares, are believed to manage the business less efficiently than if they did own it. Rather than treating this as a 
consequence of the fact that wealth owners are not necessarily good business managers and good business 
managers are not necessarily wealth owners, the analysis adopted in the shareholder-primacy view of the 
company is that the inefficiency of managers is a detriment for providers of capital, for whom the managers are 
treated as „agents‟. The role model for directors seems to be the 18th ot 19th- century steward or land-agent 
managing am estate for  a temporarily absent landlord who might be expected to return to retake control.
  
In this analysis, the efficiency losses, the costs incurred by investors in monitoring managers and the so-called 
„bonding costs‟ incurred by managers to demonstrate that they really are working in the investors‟ interests are 
known collectively as „agency costs’. 
16 
managers during their employment and as a result of the position they hold will come 
across potential new “business opportunities”. If an opportunity identified by the 
manager would be valuable to the company but the manager decides to exploit the 
opportunity personally then the value generated by the project is transferred directly to 
the manager himself. This lost value for the company is an agency cost. 
The second managerial agency cost category involves behaviour and business 
decisions that provides indirect financial and psychological benefits, but do not involve 
an immediate transfer of wealth to the director. It is the case, for instance, of “shirking 
and incompetence”. Managers as agents are employed to generate value. This requires 
that they give the company their full attention and that they work hard in the interests of 
the company. Managers who shirk their responsibilities destroy value. This lost of value 
is an agency cost. Another indirect source of indirect loss of value could be 
“perquisites”. If there might be good (business) reasons to provide a manager with 
perquisites, where the reason that drives the decision is the indirect financial or 
psychological benefit of the manager then the agency costs are incurred
11
. Finally, 
managers may be tempered to use corporate funds for projects that have poor returns 
relative to the returns that the shareholders could obtain if the funds were distributed to 
them. The motivation for investing in such projects may not be to generate value for the 
business but rather to expand the size of the business: the assets under management; the 
number of employees controlled by management. The benefits for management are 
twofold: first, managers might feel better about themselves (more important and more 
powerful) the larger the company they run and control; secondly, there may be indirect 
financial benefits as managers may legitimately claim they should be paid more the 
more responsibility that they have and the more work they have to do. 
The agency cost doctrine set out above suggest that there are two options 
available to principals (in the economic use of the term) such as shareholders to respond 
to the possibility that an agent may act in his own interests to the detriment of the 
principal. The first option would be to reduce what the principal is willing to pay. The 
second would be to monitor the agent‟s actions to ensure that he does not misbehave 
and to sanction him if he does. The first of these options would mean that shareholders, 
                                                 
11
 A real life and extreme example -where the former CEO of Tyco International Inc, a US company, was 
accused of misusing corporate funds- 
- highlights the problem of perquisites is commented by A. Hill and A. Michaels, Paw taste condemns 
Kozlowski. Report says Tyco bought $ 15.000 dog umbrella stand for chief‟s apartment, in Financial Times,  
18 September 2002.  
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rationally aware of the scope for management to incur agency costs, would simply 
reduce what they are willing to pay for the shares to take account of an estimate of these 
costs
12
. The second chance to address an agency problem is the monitoring of the agent 
by the principal. An important consideration in determining the extent to which 
management can incur agency costs is the ownership structure of the company.  
 
1.5. Legal strategies for reducing managerial agency costs 
In addressing agency problems, the law turns repeatedly to a basic set of legal 
strategies. By „legal strategies‟ we mean a generic method of deploying substantive law 
to mitigate the vulnerability of principals to the opportunism of their agents. 
These strategies can be divided into two subsets, which we term respectively, 
regulatory strategies and governance strategies. Regulatory strategies are prescriptive; 
they dictate substantive terms that govern either the content of the agent-principal 
relationship, or the formation or dissolution of that relationship. By contrast, 
governance strategies build on the elements of hierarchy and dependency that 
commonly characterize agency relationships; they attempt to protect principals 
indirectly, either by enhancing their power or by molding the incentives of their agents.   
 
1.5.1. Regulatory strategies
13
 
The most familiar pair of regulatory strategies constrains agents by commanding 
them not to make decisions, or undertake transactions, that would harm the interests of 
                                                 
12
 If a share would be worth £10 under management that could guarantee that they would not incur any agency 
costs, it will be worth £8 if shareholders estimate that management will incur agency costs worth £2 a share. 
13
 This Part is primarily concerned with restricting the ability of managers  who are given discretion to run the 
company from abusing that discretion to benefit themselves personally. We are concerned with the legal 
strategies that are deployed to regulate this managerial agency problem. However, there is a danger contained 
within this viewpoint that we need to be aware of. Excessive focus on how to control and constrain abuses of 
discretion –that is, how to ensure managers behave responsibility- may distract us from giving due regard to a 
fundamental, if somewhat obvious, observation. The agency cost problem is a product of the corporate form 
that allows assets to be managed by professional managers for the benefit of those who have funds to invest but 
do not have the skills, the time or the inclination to manage. The limited liability company with separate legal 
personality is without doubt one of the most important inventions of the modern age. To enable value to be 
created through the corporate form we must give management the freedom and authority to make decisions and 
to make them quickly; to devise a business strategy and to implement that strategy. A manager that has to 
negotiate with the owners of a firm prior to making any decision which would be binding on the company 
would not be a successful manager. Giving authority and discretion to managers is a prerequisite to value 
creation through the corporate form. 
Whilst we need to ensure that managers do not abuse their discretion, if in the quest for ensuring that 
management behave responsibly we deny management sufficient authority and discretionary freedom to do 
their job then we may destroy more value than the agency costs that are saved. Accordingly, when analysing 
and critiquing the legal strategies deployed by UK company law to regulate the managerial agency problem we 
must always bear in mind that company law must strike the right balance between reducing agency costs and 
giving managers freedom to act; the right balance between responsibility and authority
13
. 
18 
their principals. Lawmakers attempt to regulate the substance of agency relationships by 
rules
14
, which require or prohibit specific behaviours, or by general standards, which 
leave the precise determination of compliance to adjudicators after the fact. The latter, 
which prescribe behaviours ex ante, are commonly used in the corporate context to 
protect a corporation‟s creditors and public investors. Thus corporation statutes 
universally include creditor protection rules such as dividend restrictions, minimum 
capitalization requirements, or capital maintenance requirements. By contrast, intra-
corporate topics, such as insider self-dealing tend to be governed by open standards that 
leave discretion for adjudicators to determine ex post whether violations have 
occurred
15
.  
The importance of both these regulatory strategies depends in large measure on the 
vigour with which they are enforced. In principle, well-drafted rules can be 
mechanically enforced. Standards, however inevitably require courts (or other 
adjudicators)to become deeply involved in evaluating and sometimes molding corporate 
decisions ex post.  
A second set of regulatory strategies open to the law is to dictate the terms on 
which principals affiliate with agents rather than –as with rules and standards- the terms 
on which the principal-agent relationship develops internally. The law can dictate terms 
of entry by, for example, requiring agents to disclosure information about the likely 
quality of their performance before contracting with principals. Alternatively, the law 
can prescribe exit opportunities for principals, such as awarding to a creditor the right to 
call a loan
16
. 
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 In this regard, for a comparison between rule and standard regulatory techniques, see L. Kaplow, Rules 
versus Standards: an economic analysis, in Duke Law Review, (1992), 42, p. 557. 
15
 Standards are also used to protect creditors and public investors, but the paradigmatic example of standards-
based regulation relate to the company‟s internal affairs, as when the law requires directors to act in „good 
faith‟ or mandates that self-dealing transactions must be „entirely fair‟. 
16
 The entry strategy is particularly important in screening out opportunistic agents in the public capital 
markets. Outside investors know little about public companies unless they are told. Thus it is widely accepted 
that public investors require some form of systematic disclosure to obtain an adequate supply of information. 
Legal rules mandating such disclosure provide an example of an entry strategy because stocks cannot be sold 
unless the requisite information is supplied, generally by the corporation itself. 
The exit strategy, which is also pervasive in corporate law, allows principals to escape opportunistic agents ex 
post. Broadly speaking, there are two kinds of exit rights. The first is the right to withdraw the value of one‟s 
investment. The second one is the right of transfer- the right to sell shares in the market- that permits the 
replacement of the current „agent‟ –the management team in a widely held company- by a new one that may be 
more effective in exercising control. Thus, unimpeded transfer rights allow hostile takeovers in which the 
disaggregated shareholders of a mismanaged company can sell their shares to a single active shareholder with a 
strong financial interest in efficient management. Such a transfer of control rights, or even the threat of it, can 
be a highly effective device for disciplining management. 
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1.5.2. Governance strategies 
Key strategies for controlling the enterprise are the so called appointments 
rights- that are the power to select or remove directors (or other managers) are key 
strategies for controlling the enterprise
17
. A second pair of governance strategies 
expands the power of principals to intervene in the firm‟s management. These are 
decision rights, which grant principals the power to initiate or ratify management 
decisions. This set of decision rights is much less prominent in corporate law than are 
appointment rights strategies, as a logical consequence of the fact that the corporate 
form is designed as a vehicle for the delegation of managerial power and authority to 
the board of directors. Only the largest and most fundamental corporate decisions (such 
as mergers and charter amendments) require the ratification of shareholders ex post 
under existing corporation statues, and no jurisdiction requires shareholders to initiate 
managerial decisions. 
 Finally, a last pair of governance strategies alters the incentives of agents rather 
than expanding the powers of principals. These are incentive strategies. Firstly, there is 
the reward strategy, which –as the name implied- rewards agents for successfully 
advancing the interests of their principals. The more common form of reward is a 
sharing rule that motivates loyalty by tying the agent‟s monetary returns directly to 
those of the principal. The reward mechanism that is less commonly the focus of 
corporate law is the pay-for-performance regime, in which an agent, although not 
sharing in his principal‟s returns, is nonetheless paid for successfully advancing her 
interests. The second incentive strategy- the trusteeship strategy- works in seeking to 
eliminate conflicts of interests ex ante to ensure that „bad‟ behaviour by an agent will 
not be rewarded. This strategy assumes that, in the absence of strongly focused – or 
„high-powered”- monetary incentives to behave opportunistically, agents will respond 
to the „low-powered‟ incentives of conscience, pride, and reputation, and are thus more 
likely to manage in the interests of their principals. Agents serving as trustees may be 
internal to the corporation, as when disinterested directors must approve a self-dealing 
transaction by a controlling shareholder, or they may be external, as when the law 
requires an investment banker, a state official, or a court to approve corporate action. 
                                                 
17
 These strategies are at the very core of corporate governance. Moreover, the power to appoint directors is a 
core strategy not only for addressing the agency problems of shareholders in relation to managers, but also, for 
addressing agency problems of minority shareholders in relation to controlling shareholders, and of employees 
in relationship to the shareholder class as a whole. 
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1.6. Some  conclusions 
The legal strategies just described can in principle be deployed to deal with the 
agency problems presented by any type of organization. As the discussion below will 
demonstrate, the U.K. and Italian jurisdictions adopt a fluid mix of regulatory and 
governance strategies in addressing managerial agency problems. 
This legal strategies presentation merely highlights the fact that half of the 
strategies take full effect before an agent acts, while the other half respond –at least 
potentially- to the quality of the agent‟s action ex post. In the case of the regulatory 
strategies, for example, rules specify what the agent may or may not do ex ante, while 
standards specify the general norm against which an agent‟s actions will be judged ex 
post. Thus, a rule might prohibit a class of self-dealing transactions outright, while a 
standard might mandate that these transactions will be judged against a norm of fairness 
ex post. Similarly, in the case of setting the terms of entry and exit, an entry strategy 
such as mandatory disclosure specifies what must be done before an agent can deal with 
a principal, while an exit device such as appraisal rights permits the principal to respond 
after the quality of the agent‟s action is revealed.  
The six governance strategies also fall into ex ante and ex post pairs. If 
principals can appoint their agents ex ante, they can screen for loyalty; if principals can 
remove their agents ex post, they can punish disloyalty. Finally, trusteeship is an ex ante 
strategy in the sense that it neutralizes an agent‟s adverse interests prior to her 
appointment by the principal, while most reward strategies are ex post in the sense that 
their payouts are contingent on uncertain future outcomes, and thus remain less than 
fully specified until after the agent acts. We do not wish, however, to overemphasize the 
clarity or analytic power of this categorization of legal strategies into ex ante and ex 
post types. Indeed these strategies clearly overlap, and any given legal rule might well 
be classified as an instance of two or more of those strategies. Our purpose here is 
simply to emphasize the various ways in which law can be used as an instrument, not to 
offer a new formalistic schema that displaces rather than aids functional understanding. 
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Chapter 2 
 
THE DISTRIBUTION OF POWER  
BETWEEN MEMBERS AND MANAGERS 
 
Summary: 2.1. Introduction - 2.2. The basic Italian distribution of power between 
members and managers - 2.2.1. Italian legal strategies protecting the firm‟s 
owners as a class - 2.2.2. Italian interest primacy approach: shareholders‟ and 
multi-party visions - 2.3. The basic UK distribution of power between members 
and managers - 2.3.1. UK legal strategies and approaches to protect members - 
2.3.2. Division of power between members and directors under UK Court 
decisions - 2.4. Peculiar separation of ownership and control in the public 
companies) - 2.5. Some conclusions. 
 
2.1 Introduction 
The appropriate or optimal distribution of power in companies is likely to vary 
accordingly to the specific attributes of the company, including most importantly the 
attributes of the shareholder body
18
.  
Generally, looking to the law to provide the framework for legitimation and 
control power, it is possible to highlight different visions. According to a theory, the 
power of a company will be legitimate only if it is exercised in the interest of all those 
whom it affects. As a consequence, the law has to require companies to give due 
consideration to all relevant interests.  Other thesis believe that corporate power is 
legitimated by the contribution that companies make to the economy and that the market 
provides adequate control of economic activity so that legal controls are either 
superfluous or produce damaging distortions of the market. 
With no value considerations about these lines of thoughts, I will try to outline briefly 
how corporate governance power and control is shared between shareholders and 
directors regarding the UK and the Italian legal model. 
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 D. Kershaw, Company Law in Context, Oxford Press University, 2009, p. 180. 
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Preliminary, in order to understand the actual extent of the managerial agency 
problems in this two jurisdictions, it is important to focus on the typical ownership 
structure of the English and Italian companies. In this regard, it can be shown that small 
and medium companies play a vital role in the UK and in Italy. Consequently, the 
ownership structure of the two systems has some notable similarities, at list in size. 
Nevertheless, in the context of public listed companies there is a fundamental difference 
between the Italian and the UK reality: on the one hand, in Italy the ownership is highly 
concentrated
19
, on the other, in the UK corporate ownership is splintered among 
numerous shareholders
20
. 
Regarding the relationship between ownership structure, company performance 
and corporate governance framework, the econometric analysis
21
 showed that the 
concentrated ownership structure  is a particular important determinant of the 
configuration of the board.  Indeed the increasing concentration shows the size of the 
board tending to shrink and to encourage the executive component, confirming that the 
majority shareholders have significant influence and bargaining power in the 
appointment of adviser of the board
22
.  
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 More exactly, SMEs are defined by the Companies Act as meeting two of the following criteria: a.) 
employing 250 people or less; b.) having a turnover of less than £ 11.2m (EC use less than Euro 40m); c.) 
having net assets of less than £ 5.6m (EC use less than Euro 27m). The UK‟s 3.7 million SMEs account for 
approximately 40% of GDP and have an annual turnover of one trillion pounds, employing over 12 million 
people in the UK, that represents 56% of the employed workforce. Of these, 80% are employed in firms of less 
than 50 persons. This data are available at www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk. 
Italian SMEs have similar criteria: a.) employing 50 people (year average);  b.) having net assets of less than 
Euro 3.125.000; c.) having a turnover of less than Euro 6.250.00019. The Italian SMEs are over than 4 million, 
that represents 67% of the employed workforce. There are also the so called “micro” companies, which 
employed less than ten people . Globally they account for 1/3 of the GDP. 
However there are also some difference and peculiarities of each ownership structure. In particular, on the one 
hand, in Italy, family-controlled companies are the dominant model, even among listed companies. On the 
other hand, in the UK a different category of investor is predominant. In this regard, it can be said that,  in the 
last decades, the ownership of the shares of UK companies has changed dramatically, showing a significant 
shift in the ownership from shareholders who are known as retail investors to institutional investors. Today 
institutional investors own approximately 70% of the shares of listed UK companies. For a recent account of 
the evolution of UK share ownership see B. Cheffins, Dividends as a Substitute for Corporate Law: the 
separation of ownership and control in the United Kingdom, (2006) 63 Washington and Lee Law Review 1273 
and B. Cheffins, Corporate Ownership and Control: British business transformed (OUP, 2008). Retail 
investors are individual investors who directly invest their own funds to buy shares. Even wealthy retail 
investors rarely have sufficient capital to buy anything other than a small fraction of a listed company‟s issued 
shares. Whilst retail investors are still an important part of the investor landscape in the UK their percentage 
shareholding in UK companies has decreased dramatically over the past few decades. Retail investors have 
been replaced by UK and foreign institutional investors. 
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 H. Kanda, Comparative Corporate Governance Country Report, in K. J. Hopt et al. (eds), Comparative 
Corporate Governance: the state of the art and emerging research, 1998, pp. 1045ss. 
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 See D. H. Chew, S. L. Gillan, Global corporate governance, Columbia Business School, New York, 2009, 
pp. 7ss. 
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 In relation to the Italian privatization, see: A. Goldstein, Privatization in Italy: goals, institutions, outcomes 
and outstanding issues, CESifo Working Paper, Munich, 2006, 16ss.; P. Sapienza, The effects of Government 
ownership on bank lending, in Journal of Financial Economics, 2003, 72, pp. 357ss.;  B. Bortolotti, Italy‟s 
privatization process and its implications for China, consultant report for the World Bank, 2005, pp. 193ss. 
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According to this premise, the similarity of ownership structure of UK and 
Italian small and medium companies should have correspondence on managerial agency 
problems terms. 
It is necessary to ask, then, whether the various strategies described in chapter 1 
are embodied in the U.K. and the Italian systems. Preliminary, it can be argued that 
these legal remedies do not necessarily require law for their implementation. Indeed, 
they could in principle be adopted by contract, for example, through appropriate 
provisions in the articles of association agreed to by the firm‟s owners. In addressing 
this issue, it is important to distinguish between legal rules that are merely default rules, 
in the sense that they govern only if the parties do not explicitly provide for something 
different and rules of law that are mandatory, leaving parties no option but to conform 
to them. Much of U.K. corporate law consist of default rules. To this extent, corporate 
law simply offers a standard form contract that the parties can adopt, at their option, in 
whole or in part. A familiar advantage of such a legally provided standard form is that it 
simplifies contracting among  the parties involved, requiring that they specify only 
those elements of their relationship that deviate from the standard terms. In serving this 
function, default rules of corporate law will generally serve best if they reflect the terms 
that the parties themselves would most commonly choose. Default rules can also, 
however, serve a protective or information-revealing function. A rule that serves this 
function may not be the one that well-informed parties would generally choose, but 
rather a „penalty default‟ that burdens the party most likely to have private information 
relevant to the transaction. The purpose of such a rule is to force parties to reveal their 
private information –in order to avoid the default outcome- and consequently induce 
explicit contracting between the parties that will lead to an outcome superior to that 
which would otherwise be expected. In the Italian system the wide majority of rules are 
mandatory. Firstly, mandatory rules serve a prescriptive function. Indeed, some parties 
might otherwise be exploited because they are not well informed, or that the interests of 
third parties might be affected, or that collective action problems (such as the notorious 
„prisoners‟ dilemma‟) might otherwise lead to contractual provisions that are inefficient 
or unfair. Moreover, in some circumstances, the rationale for mandatory rules is to serve 
an enabling function similar to that served by default rules. More particularly, 
mandatory rules can facilitate freedom of contract by helping corporate actors to signal 
the terms they offer and to bond themselves to those terms. The law accomplishes this 
24 
by creating corporate forms that are to some degree inflexible, but then permitting 
choice among different corporate forms
23
.  
 
2.2. The basic Italian distribution of power between  members and managers 
2.2.1. Italian legal strategies protecting the firm’s owners as a class 
The Italian corporate law typically deals with the basic agency problem between 
the firm‟s owners and its managers by a regulatory standard strategy, providing for a 
multi-member board
24
 of directors that is elected by the firm‟s shareholders 25, which 
have also the right to remove the managers
26
. As a consequence, it can be deducted that 
the law underpinning the corporate governance system relies also heavily on the 
governance-oriented remedies, represented by the appointments and decision rights 
strategies. 
This governance structure seems to be designed principally to effectuate the interests of 
shareholders as a class. This fact should be connected with the two core features of the 
corporate form, that are, firstly, investor ownership, which implies that shareholders – 
as residual claimants- have a significant right of control over their companies. The 
second is delegated management, which implies that shareholders generally exercise 
this control indirectly, by participating in the selection or removal of directors
27
. It 
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 In order to reach this aim there are also important mandatory rules in the U.K. system. There are two 
principal variants to this approach. Firs, a given jurisdiction can provide for a menu of different standard form 
legal entities from which parties may choose in structuring an organization. Second, even with respect to a 
particular type of legal entity, such as the publicity traded business corporation, entrepreneurs or managers may 
be permitted to choose among different jurisdictions‟ law. In this context, where there is intra-jurisdictional 
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 The management can be exercise by a single director or a board of directors, see art. 2380 bis  c.c. for the 
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“managing” board whose members are the principal managers of the firm. Thus, the two boards are in a semi-
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sindacale” in the traditional corporate governance system, “consiglio di sorveglianza” in the dualistic system 
and “comitato per il controllo sulla gestione” for the monistic corporate governance system. 
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 For the s.p.a: the first managers can be appointed by the statute, ex art. 2328, c. 2, n. 11; managers are 
appointed by the shareholders in a general meeting, ex  art. 2364, n. 2; for the s.r.l., the Code provides a default 
rule, on art. 2476 c.c., according to which management can be play by one or more members; as provided for 
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members ex art. 2479, c. 2, n. 2. 
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 See art. 2364, c. 2, n. 2, c.c. for the s.p.a. and art. 2463, c.2, n. 8, c.c. for the s.r.l. 
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 As Continental Europe corporate laws, Italian law distinguishes between “open” corporate forms, which have 
freely transferable shares, and “closed” forms, in which transferability is restricted and often subject to 
company or shareholders approval. Managerial authority is delegated to a board in the former and to one or 
more individuals (that are called “managers”) in the latter. 
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follows that the law protects the interests of the shareholders class in the first instance 
by structuring the selection powers of the firm‟s directors. 
Consequently, the appointment strategy is  the most basic protection of the collective 
interests of the member class. 
The Italian Code enhances shareholders control over the company by shaping 
the basic structure, power, and composition of the board, and by establishing the 
electoral ground rules that structure shareholders voting. In addition, numerous 
subsidiary rules influence the board‟s responsiveness to shareholders by fixing its fine 
structure and further adjusting its composition. In this regard, it can be focus on the rule 
which bears on how easily directors can be removed and on others which affect 
responsiveness by shaping the board‟s internal structure and procedures.  
Regarding the first one, it should be outlined that one aspect of the removal 
power is the ability to remove a director at the end of her term in office. This power 
turns on the length of the director‟s term, that is a maximum of three years for staggered 
boards
28
. A second aspect of this removal right is the ability to replace directors mid-
term. Law gives the shareholder majority a strong non- wearable right to remove 
directors without cause. 
Regarding to other Italian governance strategies, it can be highlighted that the 
principal rewards to management for pursuing shareholder interests are created by 
contract rather than by law, notably through the vehicle of compensation contracts. 
Nevertheless, the law facilitates this strategy mandates it
29
. In this regard, there should 
be adopted different reward strategies, for example, a fix sum of money, allocation of 
securities, bonuses,  pay-for-performance
30
; the latter actually  is not so use in the Italian 
system.  
As regard constraints strategies, it can be said that, generally speaking, rules and 
standards play an important role in many areas of Italian corporate governance, 
typically involving, in particular, for the present purposes, conflict of interests 
transactions. More precisely, the Code
31
, to ensure disclosure and prevent damage, 
provides that managers have to inform about all self-interests (that can be a conflict 
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 See art. 2364 n. 3 c.c. 
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 The pay-for-performance is widely used in the U.S. and in the U.K., that are countries where there is a large 
numbers of widely held companies and, as a consequence, these jurisdictions rely the most on high-powered 
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interest or not with the company) in the company activities. Moreover, whether it is the 
case of a delegated director, he has to refrain to perform the operation, transferring the 
competence to perform it on the board. Furthermore, the sole director have to disclose 
his self-interest to the shareholders in the close general meeting. However, a standard 
strategy provides that the board has to check discretionally whether the operation should 
be adopted or not, giving adequate reasons. Whether the director does not perform this 
standard, remedies should be the invalidity of the decision made by the determinant 
vote of this director or the damages remedy according to art. 2391 c.c. 
Standard strategies are also adopted by the Italian legislator in order to address 
manager duties of care. In this regard, the art. 2392 c.c., setting the manager liability to 
the company, is exemplary, identifying the criteria of the manager diligence with regard 
to her specific competences (a subjective standard) and the nature of the affair.  
 
2.2.2. Italian interest primacy approach: shareholders’ and multi-party visions  
At the beginning of the paragraph above, it has been said that managers act in 
the interest of shareholders. In order to understand if, according to the Italian law the 
members‟ one is alone, or the main interest or solely one of the many interests that 
should be reached by managers‟ activities, it will be examined some aspects and 
dispositions of the Code which seem open to different approaches, in particular, 
regarding the directors‟ board structure and composition  (art. 2380 bis ss. c.c.) and a 
peculiar intervention of the Court in the case managers‟ major irregularities, ex art. 2409 
c.c. 
In the traditional corporate and control system,  managers are entrusted 
exclusively to the management of  the business and they should work to accomplish all 
the operations necessary for the implementation of the company object (art. 2380 bis 
c.c.). The centrality of their role is sculpted and articulated by the many functions of 
which they are invested by law
32
.  
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 In particular,for the s.p.a., directors shall take decisions-making on all matters relating to management which 
are not reserved by law to the members (art. 2364, n. 5, c.c.). This is the so-called managerial power stricto 
sensu. Furthermore, they (or some of them) have the general representation of the company (art. 2384, c. 1, 
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consequences (art. 2392, c. 2, c.c.). For the s.r.l. there are similar dispositions [aggiungere articoli] but.... 
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The duties of directors are mandatory. Therefore they cannot be deprived of their 
powers and their duties exempted, nor by the statute, neither by the shareholders, as this 
is an expression of the principle of separation of powers that serves as a counterweight 
to the irresponsibility of the members for company debts.  
The directors are invested by law and not by mandate or by contract with  the 
members. Moreover they perform their functions in positions of formal independence 
from the shareholders. This is justified primarily in the fact that they must ensure that 
members make decisions compliance with the law and, in this regard, they have the 
power-duty to refrain from implementing the decisions whether they are likely to cause 
a damage for the company. In addition, they are personally responsible for performance 
of their duties, both on civil (art. 2392-2395 c.c.; art. 2476 c.c.) and criminal terms (art. 
2621-2638 c.c.). 
As a consequence, the articulated the broad features of which the directors are 
legally entitled, the mandatory rules related to their powers, the position of formal 
independence from the members, all of these issues unambiguously militate against the 
possibility of setting up a relationship of dependency with members, in particular they 
seem against the possibility to configure that as a mandate relationship
33
. However, 
there is no doubt that the investiture of directors is based on a members‟ body act for 
appointing them and  they are freely revocable by shareholders‟ body decision. It is also 
arguable that they manage the company to the others' interests, that is, in order to 
implement, to reach the aim of the company (“conseguire l‟oggetto sociale”, ex art. 
2380 bis, c. 1, c.c.). 
In particular, relating to the s.p.a., the division of powers between shareholders 
and directors is founded primarily on two dispositions, that are art. 2364, n. 5, c.c. and 
art. 2380bis, c. 1, c.c. 
The first article, in defining the powers of shareholders at the general meeting, states 
that they shall act on appropriate authorizations requested by statute for managerial 
activities, without prejudice to the directors‟ liability for actions taken.  
According to the second disposition, the managerial decisions making is an exclusive 
competence on the chief of the directors, which act in order to reach the corporate aims. 
As a result, it can be deduced that, by mandatory rules, on the one hand, the 
shareholders‟ managerial competence is specific and define, existing only when the law 
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explicitly provides in this sense; on the other hand, the managerial competence of 
directors is general, relating to every acts that are not expressly reserved to the 
shareholders‟ body. Consequently, it is generally correct that neither the shareholders‟ 
body can issue binding directives to directors about committing acts of governance, nor 
directors are obliged to submit to the prior approval of the shareholders‟ body of their 
initiatives
34
. 
 
2.3 The UKdistribution of power between members and managers 
2.3.1 UK legal strategies and approaches to protect members 
The Companies Act 2006 makes no general statements about the power of the 
board of directors. In other terms, the board is not provided with any authority to make 
decisions by the law. In fact the Act establishes that a private company is required to 
have at least one director and a public company at least two directors
35
, but it says 
nothing about what these directors are empowered to do. Nor does the Act provide any 
general statement about the authority or power of the shareholder body. In UK company 
law the general distribution of decision-making power is set out as a default rule in, 
prior to the 2006 Act, Table A Articles and henceforth in the Model Articles for public 
and private companies. 
The fact that it is left to the articles to determine the distribution of decision-
making power between the board and the shareholder body tell us that in UK company 
law the originating power of the company is located in the shareholder body acting in 
general meeting. The articles are default terms that can only be altered by the 
shareholder body by special resolution
36
, which means that any powers given to the 
board by the articles are powers that could be retained by the shareholder body. If no 
powers are granted to the board through the articles, the board would be powerless and 
the company could only act through the shareholder body. In UK system it is the 
shareholder body that empowers the board of directors. 
Under the 2006 Act, the provisions set out in the Model Articles provide for an 
identical default distribution of power
37
. Article 3  states that directors are responsible 
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for the management of the business and that they may exercise all the power of the 
company. Such authority is made subject to any other provisions of the articles. Articles 
4 provides the shareholder body with an instruction right, that is, the shareholder body 
retains the power to tell the board what to do by passing a special resolution
38
.  Article 4 
recognizes that if the directors have already acted then the shareholder resolution does 
not invalidate the board‟s action. To the extent that the board has acted itself or through 
its agents to bind the company then clearly the company is legally bound and a contrary 
shareholder instruction could not alter the legal effect of that transaction. However, this 
limitation on the shareholder instruction right goes further than this: it does not affect 
the validity of anything the board has done, regardless of whether this has resulted in 
the company becoming legally bound or not
39
.   
What it has been described above support the Company Act 2006 establishing that the 
directors of a company can act only in the way they consider, in good faith, would be 
most likely to promote the success of the company for the benefit of its members as a 
whole
40
.   
This standard strategy is known as the “enlightened shareholder value” (ESV) 
approach to directors‟ liabilities. In doing so they must have regard (among other 
matters) to: the likely consequences of any decision in the long term, the interests of the 
company‟s employees, the need to foster the company‟s business relationships with 
suppliers, customers and others, the impact of the company‟s operations on the 
community and the environment, the desirability of the company maintaining a 
reputation for high standards of business conduct and, finally, the need to act fairly as 
between members of the company.  
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CA 2006, s 172(1). In doing so they must have regard (among other matters) to: the likely consequences of 
any decision in the long term, the interests of the company‟s employees, the need to foster the company‟s 
business relationships with suppliers, customers and others, the impact of the company‟s operations on the 
community and the environment, the desirability of the company maintaining a reputation for high standards of 
business conduct and, finally, the need to act fairly as between members of the company. 
This preserves shareholders primacy while recognising that a company is both an association of its members 
and a person separate from them. Directors of a company must act to promote its success as a separate person, 
but for the benefit of its members, having regard to  matters among others. It is the members who have the 
benefit while other constituencies have only regard.   
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Consequently, this legal strategy preserves shareholders primacy while recognising that 
a company is both an association of its members and a person separate from them. 
Directors of a company must act to promote its success as a separate person, but for the 
benefit of its members, having regard to  matters among others. It is the members who 
have the benefit while other constituencies have only regard.  
In this regard, UK company law is often described as „shareholder-centred‟ or 
based on a principle of shareholder primacy. Actually shareholder primacy is the subject 
of considerable (political and theoretical) debate.  
The reform process that preceded the Company Act 2006 gave considerable 
attention to whether or not the common law approach to the “company‟s interests” 
should be changed to require a broader more inclusive consideration of non-
shareholders constituency interests when exercising corporate powers. The Company 
Law Steering Committee
41
 set out two different ways of taking into account non-
shareholder interests. The first approach was referred to as the “enlightened shareholder 
value approach”. This view would not alter the priority given to shareholder value; 
however, it would require that consideration be given to the interests of, and 
relationships with, other constituencies, and would support corporate action to further 
those interests or support those relationships provided that in so doing the interests of 
shareholders are also advanced. For example, taking into account the interests of 
employees when exercising corporate power may make the employees feel more valued 
and possible more secure in their jobs. More content and secure employees are likely to 
work harder and to be more willing to make the necessary firm-specific investments of 
human capital and, therefore, will be more productive workers which, in turn, generates 
more shareholders value. Importantly, however, where consideration of non-shareholder 
interests conflict with shareholder interests then an enlightened shareholder value 
approach requires that the decision be taken in the shareholders‟ interests. If the choice 
is between keeping  a loss-making plant open to save jobs or shifting production to a 
developing country where it will not be loss making the decision is clear: the plant must 
be closed down. 
The second alternative identified by the Company Law Review Steering 
Committee is the multiple-interest trusteeship model where no constituency interests 
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takes priority and directors are required to act in ways that balance these interests. This 
is the so called pluralistic approach. 
Defenders of the traditional shareholder primacy highlight that the ultimate 
objective of companies as currently enshrined in law is to generate maximum value for 
shareholders adding that this is in principle the best means of securing overall prosperity 
and welfare
42
.  As a result, the basic rule for directors is to operate companies for the 
benefit of members.  Moreover, it is claimed that restricting company management to 
the single objective of maximising shareholder wealth is the most efficient means of 
using companies to increase the wealth of society as a whole
43
.  
On the other side, supporters of the opposite theory, that is the pluralistic 
analysis,  claimed that incorporation is made available to encourage business for the 
good of society generally and not simply for the private profit of shareholders
44
. It can 
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be said that everyone connected with a company, whether as member, employee, 
supplier, customer or director, wants it to be well managed, or at least managed for their 
own benefit. Of these, the only group actually in a position to ensure that the company 
is managed for their own benefit are the directors and the only group who have the 
opportunity to control the directors are the members. It follows that the relationship 
between directors and members is of great importance. Following this theory, it is 
pointed out that requiring people working for companies to restrict the purpose of their 
working lives to maximising shareholder wealth is unhealthy, demeaning and morally 
corrupting
45
. In this regard, due recognition was also needed of the importance in 
modern business of fostering effective relationships over time, with employees, 
customers and suppliers, and in the community more widely. If companies failed to 
address these interests effectively, then neither their own success, nor the overall 
competitiveness of the economy could be secured.   
Recently, other commentators and economics
46
 has criticized both shareholder  primacy 
(and its form as enlightened shareholder value) and the stakeholders analysis proposing 
an entity maximization and sustainability theory
47
. This focuses on the company as a 
separate legal entity and maintains that the objective of the company is to maximize the 
wealth of the entity as an entity and, at the same time, to ensure that the company is 
sustained financially. The theory involves directors endeavoring to increase the overall 
long-run market value of the company as a whole, taking into account the investment 
made by various people and groups. But it maintains that maximization must be 
combined with aiming to ensure entity survival and feasible development. This theory 
does not specify any other persons as the intended beneficiaries of the company‟s 
wealth. Instead, it requires the company‟s directors to treat shareholders, employees, 
suppliers, lenders and so on as well as is necessary to ensure the company‟s prosperity 
and longevity. As beneficiaries are not specified, the theory avoids having to resolve 
conflicts of interest between the company and its members or other constituencies, or 
between different groups of persons interested in the company‟s prosperity. 
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In conclusion, the shareholder-centered vision of the company is not universally held 
among advanced economies
48
. Supporting the latter thesis, it can be argued that there 
are several indicators in the UK system, such as social, environmental and ethical 
considerations. For instance, CA 2006, s 417(5), requires companies whose shares are 
traded on the London Stock Exchange and some other exchanges to give information in 
a directors‟ report about the following matters to the extent necessary for an 
understanding of the development, performance or position of the company‟s business: 
environmental matters, including the impact of the company‟s business on the 
environment, the company‟s employees, and social community issues.  
Moreover, the United Kingdom, together with the other members of the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), has recommended 
the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises to multinational enterprises 
operating in or from its territory
49
. The first general policy set out in these Guidelines is 
that enterprises should contribute to economic, social and environmental progress with a 
view to achieving sustainable development.  
Economics analysts who favor explanations in terms of markets suggest that 
economic forces are significant in controlling the behavior of directors of companies 
whose shares are publicly traded: they think that when the stock market is informed that 
the directors of a company are not acting in the best interests of its shareholders, the 
price of the company‟s shares will fall and it will be taken over by new owners who will 
install new directors to run the business more efficiently
50
. They believe that directors 
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will be so frightened of this happening, because they will lose their jobs and will not be 
employed in such good jobs again, that they will realize that it is in their own interests 
to act in the interests of the shareholders. It is said that the market for corporate control 
and the market for directors‟ employment will align the interests of directors and 
shareholders. However, it is admitted that in some cases a director may be able to make 
more by diverting money from the company than he or she can hope to make 
legitimately and that such a director would not be deterred from taking the company‟s 
money merely by fear of losing legitimate earnings
51
. 
 
2.3.2. Division of power between members and directors under UK court decisions 
The principle that the articles divide the company‟s powers between the 
directors and the members, and the members cannot instruct the directors on how to 
exercise the powers assigned to them, is reinforced by the Court in Howard Smith Ltd v 
Ampol Petroleum Ltd
52
, Lord Wilberforce, delivering the judgment of the Privy 
Council, said: “The constitution of a limited company normally provides for directors, 
with powers of management, and shareholders, with defined voting powers having 
power to appoint the directors, and to take, in general meeting, by majority vote, 
decisions on matters not reserved for management [..] it is established that directors, 
within their management powers, may take decisions against the wishes of the majority 
of shareholders, and indeed that the majority of shareholders cannot control them in the 
exercise of these powers while they remain in office”. Moreover, in Grindt v Great 
Bouder Proprietary Mines Ltd
53, Cohen LJ said:” […] there is nothing unusual in the 
shareholders not being allowed to interfere in matters which have been deliberately 
placed under the control of the directors”. In Towcester Racecourse Co Ltd v 
Racecourse Association Ltd
54
, Patten J said: “[…] in the absence of articles permitting 
the members to control the board, it is entitled to govern the company and exercise its 
powers without interference. If the directors act unlawfully, then will be accountable for 
their action and for any losses suffered by the company as a result […] the proper 
claimant in such proceeding is the company and not the shareholders”. 
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The principle of division of powers is often described also by Courts as 
achieving a “separation of ownership and control”55. In this context, no statutory power 
of dismissal was available to the members in Teck Corporation Ltd v Millar
56
 in which 
the majority of members of a company authorized legal proceedings against its 
directors, seeking to halt an allotment of shares by the directors on the ground that it 
would be a misuse of their powers. Berger J, however, found that the allotment would 
not be an abuse of the directors‟ powers so that it could not be prevented57. 
In the model Articles of association in SI 2008/3229, the directors‟ general 
power of management is conferred by art 3 of both the model articles for private 
companies and the model articles for public companies:‟ Subject to the articles, the 
directors are responsible for the management of the company‟s business, for which 
purpose they may exercise all the powers of the company‟. This general power of 
management applies only to managing the company as a going concern
58
 and is 
expressed to be subject to provisions of the company‟s articles. It does not imply a 
power to pay bribes to secure business for the company
59
. What is controversial is 
whether the members have a general supervisory power: the courts have generally 
adopted the theory that they do not. 
The general power of management conferred by art 3 of the Model Articles for 
private and public companies is expressed to be subject to the articles. In Salmon v Quin 
and Axtens Ltd
60
 the articles of Quin and Axtens Ltd conferred a general power of 
management on directors (art 75) but art 80 made directors‟ decisions on certain matters 
subject to the veto of either of two named shareholders (who between them held the 
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bulk of the company‟s shares). These two named shareholders were also appointed 
directors and managing directors of the company by the articles. The Court of Appeal 
upheld the validity of a veto issued by one of the named shareholders under art 80 and 
held that an ordinary resolution of the members was ineffective to override the veto 
because it was an attempt to amend art 80 by ordinary resolution instead of special 
resolution. The Court of Appeal‟s decision was affirmed by the House of Lords. 
In the model articles both for private and public companies, art 4
61
 provides that 
“The shareholders may, by special resolution, direct the directors to take, or refrain from 
taking, specified action. No such special resolution invalidates anything which the 
directors have done before the passing of the resolution”. This article appears to confer 
a specific rather than a general supervisory power. Directors may wish to have a 
resolution passed under this article to make clear to persons they are dealing with that 
they have actual authority to enter into some unusual transaction. In practice, it is 
unlikely that this article would be used contrary to directors‟ wishes. Members who 
have disagreed so seriously with their directors that they have to adopt a special 
resolution under art 4, to tell them to do something they do not want to do, might just as 
well adopt an ordinary resolution under CA 2006 s 168, to dismiss the directors. 
In versions of model articles prior to 1985, the general power of management 
was expressed to be subject “to such regulations […] as may be prescribed by the 
company in general meeting”. The articles of some companies provided that the general 
power of management was subject to regulations made by extraordinary resolution. 
Such provisions would appear to give members a general supervisory power over 
directors. However, judges have taken the view that these provisions are not enough to 
confer on members a general supervisory power: to do that it would be necessary to use 
the formula adopted for statutory companies in the Companies Clauses Consolidation 
Act 1845, s 90, which makes directors‟ exercise of their powers „subject also to the 
control and regulation of any general meeting specially convened for the purpose‟62. 
The absence of words as strong as this in the Model Articles for registered companies 
shows that directors of a registered company have a different status from those of 
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statutory companies and that the members of registered companies do not have a 
general supervisor power
63
. 
If a company‟s directors are of the opinion that a particular course of action is 
not in the company‟s best interest, they may refuse to pursue that course of action, even 
though the entire membership wants it to be pursued and even though the agreement of 
the entire membership would relieve the directors from liability for breach of duty if 
they did pursue it
64
. 
The court will not add implied terms to the articles of association of a company 
concerning the manner in which a general power of management is to be exercised by 
the directors
65
. 
Directors of a company are not regarded as delegates of its members; the members 
cannot hold meeting to tell the directors what to do. As Buckley LJ said in Gramophone 
and Typewriter Ltd v Stanley
66: “The directors are not servants to obey directions given 
by the shareholders as individuals; they are not agents appointed by and bound to serve 
the shareholders as their principals”. 
The courts have generally ruled provisions in articles making the general 
management power of directors subject to directions given by ordinary resolution 
ineffective because they are inconsistent with the principle of division of power
67
. 
Similarly, a provision making the general power subject to extraordinary resolution is 
ineffective
68
. 
In conclusion, the principle of division of powers, and separation of ownership 
and control, are not universally popular under Courts‟ decisions; many critics believe 
that directors should be subject to members‟ control and should be regarded more as 
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members‟ delegates than as company officers. This is, in particular, crucial to proposals 
that in some companies, directors should be appointed to represent the interests of 
employees
69
. Critics of the division of powers principle have regarded statements of the 
principle by judges as obiter. This was the view taken by Neville J in Marshall‟s Value 
Gear Co Ltd v Manning Wardle and Co Ltd, in which his Lordship held that members 
of a company have an inherent right to supervise directors by ordinary resolution unless 
the articles specify otherwise. According to this theory, a provision in articles that the 
power of management is subject to regulations prescribed by the company in general 
meeting merely restates the general law, and so does s 90 of the Companies Clauses 
Consolidation Act 1845. His Lordship distinguished Automatic Self-Cleansing Filter 
Syndicate Co Ltd v Cuninghame on the ground that the general management article in 
that case had subjected the power of management to regulations made by extraordinary 
resolution and thereby disentitled the members from interfering by ordinary resolution. 
Treating the principle of division of power as a mere obiter dictum, critics assert 
that there is no basis for the decisions that provisions in articles subjecting directors‟ 
power of management to regulations made by ordinary resolution are ineffective. 
Several commentators offer lengthy discussion of the true construction of such articles 
and conclude that they do give members the right to control directors
70
. In our view, 
however, the principle of division of powers is the reason for holding such provisions 
ineffective. 
The principle of separation of powers seems to have been generally adopted by the 
courts in recent years, but criticism of it has continued in academic writings
71
. 
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2.4 Peculiar separation of ownership and control  in the public companies  
In the particular context of the public companies it is often claimed that the 
concept of shareholders as owners and directors as steward does not correctly describe 
the actual relationship between directors and shareholders.  This can be seen both in the 
UK and in the Italian corporate law system.
72
  
The whole idea of the public company has always been that it offers the 
opportunity to invest in a company without any involvement in management. Public 
company shareholders treat their shares as their property which they can do what they 
like with, but they see ownership of shares in a company as separate from ownership of 
the company. Usually a person buying company shares on a stock exchange does not 
obtain them from the company and does not give the company money for them – 
normally shares are bought from other shareholders. It is alleged that in many public 
companies, the wide spread of ownership of shares means that no one shareholders or 
group of shareholders can exercise effective control over the directors and that if owners 
of the shares in a company do not like what its directors are doing then, rather than try 
to influence directors, they sell the shares. The situation was described as a „separation 
of ownership and control‟73. In particular, it is argued that the shareholder-centred 
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 The role of  the Combined Code on Corporate Governance should be mentioned for the UK system as a mix 
of a statement of principles of good governance with a code of best practice for listed companies. The current 
edition of the Combined Code is dated June 2008, There are similar codes elsewhere in Europe In this regard, 
see the website of the European Corporate Governance Institute, www.ecgi.org. Every UK company with listed 
shares is subjected to listing rules which require an annual statement of how it has applied the main principles 
set out in s 1 of the Combined Code. This must be followed by a statement of whether or not the company has 
complied with the principles throughout the accounting period being reported on. The company must give 
reasons for any non-compliance. This is known as the „comply or explain‟ philosophy. 
Also for the Italian law there is a special regulatory discipline, that is the “Testo Unico degli Intermediari 
Finanziari”, TUFIN, d. lgs. 356/98. 
The Combined Code originated in the report of a committee chaired by Sir Adrian Cadbury, see Report of the 
Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance (London: Gee, 1992). The report noted that: 
„Companies whose standards of corporate governance are high are the more likely to gain the confidence of 
investors and support for the development of their businesses‟, The report included a Code of Best Practice 
(known as the „Cadbury Code‟), which rapidly assumed great practical importance because every listed 
company was required to state in its annual report and accounts whether or not it had complied throughout the 
accounting period with the Code. A combination of a revised code and a statement of principles of corporate 
governance was prepared by a committee under the chairmanship of Sir Ronald Hampel, see: Committee on 
Corporate Governance, Final Report (London: Gee, 1998). In consultation with the London Stock Exchange, 
the Hampel Committee produced a new „Combined Code‟- the Hampel Code- containing principles of good 
governance and a code of best practice. The Combined Code took its present form in 2003 when it was revised 
in the light of a report by the late Sir Derek Higgs, Review of the Role and Effectiveness of Non-Executive 
Directors (London: DTI, 2003). 
The European Commission has established a European Corporate Governance Forum to encourage the 
coordination and convergence of national corporate governance codes. If a company has transferable securities 
admitted to trading on a regulated market, Directive 78/660/EEC, art 46a (which was added by Directive 
2006/46/EC), requires its directors‟ report to include a corporate governance statement. 
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 See A A Berle Jr and G C Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property, (New York, 1932); M J 
Roe, Strong Managers, Weak Owners, (Princeton University Press, 1994). Berle and Means noted that 
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model of the company and the traditional view that the profits of an enterprise should go 
to the providers of its capital arose at a time when individual business people both 
provided capital for and directed their enterprises, so that profits, through the reward 
and incentive for both investment and direction, went to a single owner who combined 
both functions. The separation of ownership and control separated the two functions, 
which meant that the shareholder providers of capital could no longer claim the 
exclusive need to be incentivized by profits
74
. So the directors are given a self-effacing 
role working purely for others.  
Even classical economists acknowledged that a business‟s profit reward the 
successful direction of the business, by what called the „entrepreneur‟, as well as the 
passive supply of funds. This became clearer when capital markets developed and 
appeared to establish a price (rate of return) for the supply of capital, dependent on the 
riskiness of the investment. Investors could be regarded as supplying capital for a fixed 
return (at least, fixed from time to time by the capital market) just as workers worked 
for a fixed wage, and, some would argue, the balance of profits should go to the 
entrepreneur, though there is much room for disagreement over exactly which 
entrepreneurial function deserves the reward. 
A different approach sees a business organization as a coalition of individuals, 
including managers, workers, shareholders, suppliers, customers, lawyers, tax collectors 
and industry regulators
75
. Sharing the profits may be a matter of bargaining between 
these groups
76
.  
                                                                                                                                               
venturing capital in business and controlling or managing the business are two different functions, both of 
which need to be encouraged if economic activity is to be promoted. They argued  
74
 In this regard, Berle and Means made the not altogether obvious leap from this argument to the proposal that 
large American corporations in which ownership and control had been separated should serve „all society‟ and 
that :‟ the control of the great corporations should develop into a purely neutral technocracy, balancing a 
variety of claims by various groups in the community and assuming to each a portion of the income stream on 
the basis of public rather than private cupidity. 
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 R M Cyert and J G March, A Behavioral Theory of the Firm, 2nd edn (Cambridge, Mass: Blackwell, 1992), p 
31. 
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 For an exploration of companies in terms of bargaining between managers and shareholders, analyzed using 
game theory, see M A Utset, Towards a bargaining theory of the firm, (1995) 80 Cornell L Rev 540; E F Fama, 
Agency problems and the theory of the firm,  (1980) 88 J Polit Econ 288, who suggested that „ownership of 
capital should not be confused with ownership of the firm. Capital is just one input supplied to a company for 
the purpose of its operations and each input is owned by some person. Management is just another input. Using 
the nexus of contracts image Fama went on to say: „The firm is just the set of contracts covering the way inputs 
are joined to create outputs and the way receipts from outputs are shared among inputs. In this „nexus of 
contracts‟ perspective, ownership of the firm is an irrelevant concept‟. But in a later article, E F Fama and M C 
Jensen, Separation of ownership and control, (1983) 26 J Law and Econ 301, re-established primacy by 
describing the equity shareholders of a company as the „residual claimants‟ – that is, they are entitled to 
whatever is left of the company‟s assets after its debts have been paid. They may receive amount from zero 
upwards, but in a limited company, provided their shares are fully paid, they will not be required to pay 
anything more, Fama and Jensen offer the alternative description „residual risk bearers‟ and this has become a 
popular description, but it may perhaps exaggerate the heroism of shareholders. Members of companies risk 
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As we have already said, in the UK corporate ownership is more splintered than 
in Italy; as a result, the former is more familiar with agency costs  which deals with 
collective action problems. Although the law can enhance or diminish shareholder 
influence by facilitating or deflecting collective action by the shareholder majority, a 
                                                                                                                                               
losing their investment, but this is no different from the risk that all creditors of limited companies bear of not 
being paid. The „residual risk‟ that members bear is just the risk of not receiving the return that they expect on 
their investments, The idea of equity shareholders as residual claimants rather than owners allows  for 
other claimants such as creditors in whose interests the company may be operated. But as residual claimants, 
equity shareholders members can argue that the company ought to be run in such a way as to maximize their 
residue and that may not be in the interests of other constituencies. 
For a restatement of the view that the shareholders of a company should not be seen as its owners, either 
economically or legally, see R Sappideen, Ownership of the large corporation: Why clothe the emperor?, 
(1996-7) 7 King‟s College LJ 27. Professor Sappideen argues that the only owner of a company is the company 
itself so that it is meaningless to talk of a separation of ownership and control. Some commentators prefer to 
think of control of a company as a variety of political process. In this regard see A A Berle Jr, „Control‟ in 
corporate law, (1958) 58 Colum L Rev 1212 at p 1215; Ib., Modern functions of the corporate system, (1962) 
62 Colum L Rev 433 at p 445: „In fact a large corporation is a variety of non-statist institution‟. J Pound, The 
rise of the political model of corporate governance and corporate control, (1993) 68 NYU L Rev 1003, 
observes that in democratic politics, influence may be exerted by discussion and lobbying as well as by 
intermittently changing the government by general election, and claims that in the US in the early 1990s 
changes in board personnel and policies were more often brought about by the lobbying of large investors than 
by takeovers, which Pound claims are an inefficiently drastic method of correcting mismanagement. The 
increase in shareholder activism in the US, where large public employee pension funds are particularly 
significant shareholders, is discussed by B S Black, Shareholder passivity re-examined, (1990) 89 Mich L Rev 
520. Black notes that shareholding is becoming more concentrated as institutions such as pension funds invest 
large amounts in the leading companies whose shares are publicly traded. It is possible for large institutional 
shareholders to control enough shares to overcome the separation of ownership and control in large public 
companies and have a direct influence on their management. For similar comments in the British context see J 
Farrar and M Russell, The impact of institutional investment on company law, (1984) 5 Co Law 107. However, 
several commentators, have pointed out that active participation in the management of companies is an 
inappropriate activity for many institutional investors, such as pension funds and insurance companies, which 
have duties to their own members or costumers requiring them to avoid risk. In this regard, see R Sappideen, 
Ownership of the large corporation: Why clothe the emperor?, (1996-7) 7 King‟s College LJ 27; T A Smith, 
Institutions and entrepreneurs in American corporate finance, (1997) 85 Calif L Rev 1. Main principles D.1 
and E.1 of the Combined Code for listed companies state that the board and institutional shareholders should 
enter into a dialogue based on mutual understanding of objectives. The members of the Association of British 
Insurers (ABI) and the National Association of Pension Funds (NAPF) between them control about half of the 
equity shares of United Kingdom listed companies. A joint statement by the ABI and NAPF, Responsible 
Voting, issued in July 1999 said:‟ ...voting rights and the exercise thereof, in pursuit of responsible and 
effective corporate governance and the achievement of long-term shareholder value, may be recognised as an 
important and integral part of the investment management function...Voting, though, is only part of the 
dialogue that should exist between investors and boards of directors‟. The ABI and NAPF were members of the 
Institutional Shareholders‟ Committee which issued The Responsibilities of Institutional Shareholders and 
Agents – Statement of Principles in 2002 (the June 2007 version is at 
institutionalshareholderscommittee.org.uk).  
The board of a listed company should appoint one of the independent non-executive directors to be the senior 
independent director, who should be available to shareholders if they have concerns, which they cannot 
communicate to, or have failed to resolve with, the chairman, chief executive or finance director (Combined 
Code, para A 3.3.). The board should keep in touch with shareholder opinion in whatever ways are most 
practical and efficient (Combined Code, supporting principle D.1) and there should be a statement in the 
directors‟ report if the steps taken to ensure that members of the board, particularly non-executive directors, 
develop an understanding of the views of major shareholders (Combined Code, para D.1.2). 
The trustees of occupational pension schemes are required by Pension Act 1995, s 35, to produce a statement of 
their investment principles. As from 3 July 2000 this must state the trustees‟ policy in relation to the exercise of 
voting rights attaching to investments (SI 1996/3127, reg 11A(b)). The same requirement has been imposed on 
authorised administering pension funds for local government employees in England and Wales (SI 1998/1831, 
reg 9A(2)(g)) and Scotland (SI 1998/2888, reg 9A(2)(g)). 
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review of the UK voting procedures suggests that no regime has attempted to minimize 
the costs of participation in corporate governance by disaggregated shareholders.  
However, there are clear differences among Italian and UK jurisdictions in how 
their procedures are likely to affect collective action by small and middle sized 
shareholders. Voting mechanisms are the most conspicuous example. Indeed both 
jurisdictions provides a mechanism for allowing small shareholders to vote at 
shareholders meeting without the need to be present at the meetings. Generally there are 
three principal strategies: mail voting, proxy solicitation by corporate partisans, and 
proxy voting through depository institutions.  
In Italy, as in Continental Europe, depositary institutions –banks or trusts- can manage 
the proxies of small and middle-sized shareholders
77
.    
In the UK proxies, that are relative regulated,  are solicited by corporate 
partisans themselves: by management alone in the case of an uncontested vote, and by 
both management and its opponents in the case of a contested vote.  The principal 
alternative is proxy management by financial intermediaries and depositary institutions 
(e.g. pension funds, mutual funds and unit trusts), which hold title to shares and play a 
large and growing role in corporate governance.  For the most part, however, the stakes 
held by these institutions do not rise to a level where they qualify their holders as 
corporate insiders. By contrast, the brokerage houses that serve as depositary 
institutions play little role.  
 
2.5 Some conclusions 
The trusteeship strategy is a device for controlling managerialism most attractive 
for UK companies. In fact the value of trusteeship remedy for the protection of the 
interests of the shareholders as a class is closely tied to ownership structure. As a result, 
for the UK public companies with dispersed shareholders, it places the main role and 
authority over the interests of a vulnerable constituency in the hands of decision-makers 
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 In realtà si evince un cambiamento di tendenza nella legge italiana. In passato (sino al 1998)  infatti il 
legislatore ha sempre disincentivato l‟uso delle deleghe di voto, vietando in particolare alle banche di 
rappresentare gli azionisti in assemblea, ponendo limiti massimi al numero di azionisti che un singolo soggetto 
vi poteva rappresentare, nonché (tuttora) vietando alle società e ai loro amministratori  di sollecitare deleghe di 
voto. Con il d.lgs. 58/1998 e successive modifiche si è inteso agevolare la raccolta delle deleghe di voto, si è 
rimosso il divieto per le banche di rappresentare gli azionisti in assemblea e si è introdotto il voto per 
corrispondenza. Cfr. M. Belcredi, C. Bellavite Pellegrini, A. Penati, Le assemblee delle società quotate: 
un‟indagine empirica, in L‟assemblea delle società quotate in un mercato che cambia, Quaderno Assogestioni, 
2001, 24, pp. 29ss.;  
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who lack strong conflicting interests
78
. In the case of shareholders as a class, trusteeship 
protection implies a decision-making authority within the firm that does not share the 
financial interests of hired managers.  
Although in this discussion I will not focus on agency problems inside the managerial 
class, it should be mentioned that trusteeship, especially in the public companies 
context, is a matter of degree. At one extreme, simply defining a subset of the firm‟s 
managers as “directors”, with powers and liabilities not shared by other managers, 
creates a measure of trusteeship insofar as the new manager-directors take more of the 
credit when the firm does well and face more of the blame when it does badly. They 
have a greater incentive than other managers to respect the interests of shareholders. At 
the opposite extreme, directors without a management role or other ties to the company 
have no reason not to respect shareholder interests, and potential ethical and 
reputational reasons to do so. In addition, the UK law reinforce trusteeship roles by 
removing opportunities for conflict with shareholder interests. This is done, not just by 
imposing restrictions on the ability of directors to enter into self-dealing transactions, 
but also by completely separating directors and managers: that is, by mandating that 
some directors cannot be salaried employees of the firm. The UK law strongly 
encourages non-employee (and otherwise independent) directors on the boards of public 
companies, while UK exchange rules require a majority of independent directors on the 
board of listed companies. Moreover, it can be outlined the UK peculiarity in dividing 
the roles of the CEO and chair of the board of directors and assigning the powerful 
chairman‟s role to a non-employee director.  
From a different point of view, it can be argued that trusteeship strategies are 
related with fiduciary relationships. Following this thought, directors‟ duties are 
expression of trusteeship remedies, being all the directors‟ duties described in the Act, 
save for the duty of care, skill and diligence, fiduciary duties. Loyalty is the 
distinguishing obligation of a person who owes fiduciary duties. The fundamental 
aspect of loyalty is that the director acts for proper purposes and without self-interest
79
, 
and fiduciary, is someone who agrees to act for another person‟s interests80.  
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 See L. A. Hammermesh, Corporate Democracy and shareholder-adopted by-laws: taking back to street?, in 
Tulane Law Review, 1998, p. 409. 
79
 S. Worthington, Reforming directors‟ duties, in MLR, 2001, 64, pp. 439ss. 
80
 A. Scott, The fiduciary principle, in California Law Review, 1949, 37, pp. 539ss. According to Millet LJ in 
Bristol and West Building Society v. Mothew, “The principal is entitled to the single-minded loyalty of his 
fiduciary [...] he may not act [...] for the benefit of a third person without the informed consent of his 
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Section 171 of the Act sets out two duties that are encompassed by the broad 
title to the heading “duty to act for proper purposes”. The first duty is that directors 
must act in accordance with the company‟s constitution; secondly, they must only 
exercise their power for the purposes for which they were conferred. This states that it 
matters not if directors believe in good faith that their action is in the best interests of 
the company if the courts assess that the directors substantial purpose in taking the 
action was improper
81
.  
Section 172 (1), which is probably the most controversial and challenging duty 
in the legislation, sets up that a director of a company must act in a way that he 
considers, in good faith, would be most likely to promote the success of the company 
for the benefit of its members as a whole, and in doing so have regard amongst other 
matters. The provision includes several unknown elements
82
, such as the meaning of the 
“success of the company” and “have regard to” in the context of the section. So it 
appears to give almost unfettered discretion to directors in their decision-making. 
Critically provided that the directors act in good faith and can point to the fact that they 
have considered the factors set out in the subsection (employee interests etc.), it would 
seem that their decisions are unassailable. Nevertheless the courts might, as they did 
with the former duty of acting bona fide in the best interests of the company, take the 
view that they will not accept a director‟s evidence of honest belief in his or her actions 
in situations where the facts seem to suggest the contrary. 
Section 173 states that directors must exercise independent judgement and then 
goes on to provide virtual exceptions to that rule when it says that the duty is not 
breached if directors act in accordance with an agreement entered into by the company 
that restricts the future exercise of discretion by the directors or in a way authorised by 
                                                                                                                                               
principal”. Moreover Millet LJ said in this case that “fiduciary duty” is restricted to duties that are peculiar to 
fiduciaries and if it is breached it leads to different consequences from the breach of other duties. 
The effect of the provisions in the Act is cumulative so more than one duty may apply to a particular state of 
affairs. Where this occurs, a director must comply with each applicable duty. A director cannot claim immunity 
if he or she was fulfilling one duty but fails to comply with another.. 
81
 For some of the leading cases, see Piercy v. S. Mills & Co Ltd [1920] 1 Ch 77; Teck Corporation Ltd v. 
Millar [1973] 33 DLR (3d) 288; Hogg v. Cramphorn [1967] Ch 254; Howard Smith Ltd v. Ampol Ltd [1974] 
AC 821, PC; Extrasure Travel Insurances Ltd v. Scattergood [2003] 1 BCLC 598. In the latter it is summarized 
the iniquity of the Court as below: “Identify the power whose exercise is in question; identify the proper 
purpose for which that power was delegated to the directors; identify the substantial purpose for which the 
power was in fact exercised, and decide whether that purpose was proper”. 
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 For more discussion of the duty, see A Keay, Enlightened shareholder value, the reform of the duties of 
company directors and the corporate objective, in Lloyds Maritime and Commercial Law Quarterly, 2006, pp. 
335ss.; Id., Section 172 (1): an interpretation and assessment, in Company Lawyer, 2007, 28, pp. 106ss.; S. 
Kiarie,  At crossroads: shareholder value, stakeholder value and enlightened shareholder value: which road 
should the U.K. take?, in International Company and Commercial Law Review, 2006, 17, pp. 329ss.. 
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the company‟s constitution, The duty is clearly based on the duty at common law that 
directors are not to fetter their discretion
83
. 
In the area of care, skill and diligence, the classic case is Re City Equitable Fire 
Insurance Co Ltd
84
 which sets out the basic principles covering care and skill largely, 
but not exclusively, in subjective terms. The case provided, inter alia, that directors need 
not to manifest, while undertaking their duties, any more skill than someone as 
competent or as inexperienced as they are. Somewhat famously, the court said that 
directors were not bound to give continuous attention to the affairs of their companies 
and this has been said to have caused the poor attendance of some directors at board 
meetings. Also, the court stated that if it is prudent, from a business point of view (and 
taking into account the constitution), that some duty be left to some other official, then a 
director, in the absence of grounds for suspicion, is justified in trusting that official to 
perform such a duty honestly
85
.  The cases that have the most profound effect on the 
area are probably Norman v. Theodore Goddard and Re D‟Jan of London Ltd86, where 
the courts held the wrongful trading provision, section 214 of the Insolvency Act, 
embodies the standard required of a director at common law, in terms of care, skill and 
diligence. It will be recalled that section 214 provides that a director is liable if he or she 
“knew or ought to have concluded that there was no reasonable prospect that the 
company would avoid going into insolvent liquidation” unless the court is satisfied that 
the director “took every step with a view to minimising the potential loss to the 
company‟s creditors‟ as ought to have been taken. The section requires directors to act 
as a reasonable diligent person having the knowledge, skill and experience that may be 
reasonably expected of a person performing the same functions, as well as having the 
knowledge, skill and experience which the director has. Jonathan Parker J
87
 considered 
the duties of directors in general. As far as duties of care and skill are concerned, his 
Lordship said that, firstly, directors have, both collectively and individually, a 
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 Re City Equitable Fire Insurance Co Ltd [1925] Ch 407. 
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 The law has tightened things more in the past 15 years or so recent times and the indication is that the courts 
of today will require greater vigilance on the part of directors. See, in this regard,  Re Majestic Recording 
Studies Ltd (1988) 4 BCC 519. The older cases that devised the law did so with the post of non-executive 
director in mind. It was generally accepted that non-executive directors had no serious role to play within the 
company. See P. Davies, Gower‟s Principles of Modern Company Law, Sweet & Maxwell, 1997, pp. 641ss., 
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course, the commercial world has changed significantly over time and the role of non-executive directors is 
more demanding than it once was. 
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 Norman v. Theodore Goddard and Re D‟Jan of London Ltd [1993] BCC 646, [1994] 1 BCLC 561. 
 
87
 In Re Barings plc (n.5) [1999] 1 BCLC 433. 
46 
continuing duty to acquire and maintain a sufficient knowledge and understanding of 
the company‟s business to enable them to discharge their duties. Moreover, while 
directors are entitled (subjected to the articles of association of the company) to delegate 
particular functions to those below them in the management chain and to trust their 
competence and integrity to a reasonable extent, the exercise of the power of delegation 
does not absolve a director from the duty to supervise the discharge of the delegated 
functions. Finally, no rule of universal application can be formulated as to that duty. 
The extent of the duty and the question whether it has been discharged, must depend on 
the facts of each particular case, including the director‟s role in the management of the 
company. 
Section 174 of the Act has codified the duty, adopting, for the most part, the 
approach taken in more recent times at common law. Indeed, section 174 (1) provides 
that a director of a company must exercise reasonable care, skill and diligence and this 
means the care, skill and diligence that would be exercised by a reasonably diligent 
person with (a) the general knowledge, skill and experience that may reasonably be 
expected of a person carrying out the functions carried out by the director in relation to 
the company, and (b) the general knowledge, skill and experience that the director has. 
This provision lays down both a subjective test and an objective test. 
 Following on from rules  regulating trustees, company law has always been 
concerned to ensure that directors do not place themselves in conflict situations, for 
example, where their personal interest and their duty to their company conflict. The idea 
behind this is to ensure that the fiduciary is not swayed by concerns for his or personal 
interests in any given situation
88
. Section 175, building on what was referred to as the 
no-conflict rule at common law
89
 provides that a director of a company must avoid a 
situation in which he has, or can have, a direct or indirect interest that conflicts, or 
possibly may conflict, with the interest of the company. According to the next 
subsection, this rule applies in particular to the exploitation of any property, information 
or opportunity. This provision bring in an aspect of what was known in equity as the no-
profit rule, that is, directors are not to profit from their positions unless they are 
expressly permitted to do so and they are not to exploit what really belongs to their 
company. The classic breach of this rule is where a director discovers a commercial 
opportunity when a director of a company and rather than passing on this to the board, 
                                                 
88
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 For example, see Aberdeen Rly Co v. Blaikie (1854), Macq, 1, HL 461. 
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he or she exploits it for his or her own benefit either whilst a director or after 
resignation
90
. 
Section 176 deals with another aspect of the no-profit rule, providing that a 
director of a company must not accept a benefit from a third party conferred by reason 
of his being a director, or his doing (or not doing) anything as director. This is designed, 
inert alia, to proscribe directors taking secret commission or bribes. 
Furthermore, section 177 (1) sets out that if a director of a company is in any 
way, directly or indirectly, interested in a proposed transaction or arrangement with the 
company, he must declare the nature and extent of that interest to the other directors. 
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PART 2 
 
CREDITOR PROTECTION 
 
In this Part we explores the agency problem faced by creditors in the context 
where the need for legal protection is arguably greatest, that is when a company is in 
troubled or close to insolvency. In this regard, we address the legal strategies employed 
by the UK and the Italian jurisdictions to protect corporate creditors. 
Preliminarily it can be said that corporate creditors‟ category includes not only 
banks and bondholders, but also the members of other corporate constituencies, such as 
employees or suppliers, who accept claims on corporate cash flows in exchange for their 
goods and services. In other terms, all parties who contract with corporations benefit 
from creditor protection. The main ratio for placing creditor protections in company law 
is that corporate creditors face a unique risk specific too the corporate form, that is the 
risk that arises from the power of shareholders to manipulate limited liability to the 
detriment of business creditors
91
. The law can often provide a useful foundation and 
supplement for contractual protections. In the first instance, it can define the parties‟ 
background expectations. Standard legal protections can save costs in some cases by 
offering ready-made terms and, in other cases, by inducing explicit negotiation when 
default terms do not suffice. In addition, standard legal protections are essential when 
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 See: Re Exchange Banking Company, Flitcroft‟s [1882], 21, Chancery Division, 518; V. L. A. Bebchuk & J. 
M. Fried, The Uneasy Case for the Priority of Secured Claims in Bankruptcy, 105, Yale Law Journal, 1996, p. 
857.; V. Company Law Review Steering Group, Modern Company Law for a Competitive Economy: The 
Strategic Framework, 1999; J. Armour, Share Capital and Creditor Protection: Efficient Rules for a Modern 
Company Law, 63, in Modern Law Review, 2000, p. 355; B. R. Cheffins, Company Law: Theory, Structure and 
Operations, 1997, pp. 75-78. Both individual debtors‟ creditors and corporate debtors‟ ones face the same 
forms of debtor misbehaviour. Ex ante- before borrowing- debtors may lie about their assets to obtain a loan. 
Ex post –after borrowing- debtors may violate the terms of their agreements, either by „diluting‟ the assets 
available to satisfy their creditors or by pursuing risky projects that shift the risk of failure to their creditors
91
. 
Limited liability exacerbates both of these risks. Ex ante, it assist shareholders in misrepresenting the value of 
corporate assets by falsely claiming that the firm holds title to assets that shareholders control but that actually 
belong to other entities or to shareholders themselves in their personal capacity. Ex post, shareholders can 
siphon assets out of corporate solution directly, or do so indirectly by pursuing risky projects knowing that 
creditors will bear the costs if these projects fail. If follows that both creditors and shareholders can benefit 
from enhanced creditor protections that reduce the costs of raising debt capital through the corporate form. 
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parties cannot negotiate protections for themselves; this is the case, for instance, when 
transactions are too small to support negotiation, or when creditors are too naive to 
protect themselves; moreover, it is also the case when collective action problems 
prevent creditors from obtaining terms that might benefit all creditors ex ante, such as 
mandatory public disclosure or debtor registration of large corporate debts and, finally, 
when the company is near insolvency. The need to protect corporate creditors, however, 
does not necessarily imply that corporate law must do this job, thus today major 
business creditors rely not on the law, but on contract, credit agencies and a host of 
other self-help measures to safeguard their interests.  
As a result, it will be argued that there are various legal strategies in order to 
reach that goal, both regulatory and governance remedies, as we will see with reference 
to the two jurisdictions, in Italy and in the U.K.,  here considered. Furthermore, it will 
be highlighted that all the benefits of legal protections for creditors come at a cost. In 
theory, they are supposed to reduce costs, that are, primarily, agency costs, but in 
practice, they can also increase transaction costs when they are overly rigid and 
intrusive. In the context of troubled companies, in particular, the risk of shareholder 
opportunism is likely to be especially severe and, accordingly, the benefits of creditor 
protections particularly large. Consequently, the point is not to eliminate opportunism 
entirely, but to bring its costs into rough equilibrium with the costs of controlling it
92
.  
Since there are agency problems between the various actors to be seen how they 
can be resolved, it was said that this crisis is a projection of the management of an 
enterprise in physiological stage; therefore there must apply the same principles 
outlined in that context. It follows (abstractly) the possibility to use the same remedies. I 
will try to consider in this discussion whether these policies, legislation and governance 
remedies,  are planned and / or retrievable from  UK system and  Italian law.  
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 EU jurisdictions employ rules such as capital maintenance provisions to complement a standards strategy for 
protecting creditors. EU law recognizes that insolvency proceedings do not necessarily require judicial 
intervention. See: Regulation on Insolvency Proceedings [2000] OJ L 160/1. See also J. Armour & S. Deakin, 
Norms in private insolvency: the “London Approach” to the resolution of financial distress, in Journal of 
Corporate Law Studies, 2001, 1, p. 21s.). For a comparative discussion see : P. Povel, Optimal “soft” or 
“tough” bankruptcy procedures, in Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, 1999, 15, pp. 659ss. 
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Chapter 3: 
CREDITOR ROLE IN TROUBLES COMPANIES 
 
Summary: 3.1. Introduction - 3.2. Creditors‟ protection in a solvent company - 
3.3. Ownership and corporate control of a troubled company - 3.4. Regulatory 
role in creditors‟ protection - 3.4.1. Different approaches to creditors‟ protection - 
3.4.2. Reflecting upon standard strategies - 3.5. The state of insolvency under the 
U.K. system - 3.5.1. Insolvency Act tests - 3.6. The state of insolvency under the 
Italian system - 3.6.1. The nature of the company‟s “troubles” under Italian 
interpretation - 3.7. The relationship between balance of equity/debt and balance 
of corporate control. 
 
3.1.  Introduction 
As we have analyzed in Part 1, according to the doctrine of the agency costs, the 
justification of control as shareholders is traditionally found in the fact that they are 
residual claimants, that is they are holders of a claim on the residual after all debts have 
been paid or has been set aside what is necessary to pay them. If the company is in 
normal operation, the creditors shall have no voice, and it is right that the control is 
entirely up to the shareholders. 
This justification no longer holds when risk capital has been lost, becoming the 
creditors, in that changed context, investors without rights. It therefore becomes 
necessary to understand who are “the owners” of a troubled firm, and how they change, 
the onset of insolvency, the rights belong to those interested in his assets.   
Hence the question about who should run the business in this stage and with 
what goals and liabilities, and one wonders if through insolvency proceedings a 
reallocation of control is possible, transferring from the old shareholders to creditors. 
These are questions of great importance, which can be answered only supported by a 
wider context, analyzing if there are legal or private remedies and/or proceedings, 
whose theoretical justification is to transfer company control to creditors when they 
have become residual claimants, and to create an organization for the creditors which 
can effectively exercise control (in view of a liquidation of assets or a financial 
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restructuring). Moreover, it becomes crucial to understand whether people with 
incentives and power to control are entitled to make business decisions such as to 
reduce the agency costs. 
The purpose of this discussion is primarily to highlight the close connections 
between the interest of company law and insolvency law with reference to creditor 
protection. In this regard, it is proposed to restore the consistency between the solvent 
firm law and the in troubled firm law, lining up the protection of creditors to that 
enjoyed by the shareholders to creditors. So the discussion leads to whether creditors 
have to be guaranteed the power to direct the management decisions making and the 
power to control and, if it is the case, which strategies are they entitled to use.  
These reflections are presented in either the need to evaluate the strategies that 
nowadays exist in the UK and Italian jurisdiction, both to verify whether these 
mechanisms can deal with the situation of today's crisis, that is, do they provide the 
tools to build a general model of ownership and control of solvent and insolvent 
company.  
 
3.2. Creditor protection in a solvent company 
In a system of corporate governance of a solvent company both the UK and 
Italian jurisdiction, even if in different terms,  as it has been seen above, nearby the 
interests of the shareholders, put other interests. In this discussion I will outline that 
between these “other interests” there is a direct or indirect protection to creditors. 
One of the point in this regard is the institution of limited liability, while it may 
have the perverse effect of encouraging indiscriminate risk taking, is a great 
compromise between the encouragement of entrepreneurship and the creditor 
protection. Indeed, in terms of relations with creditors, limited liability is substantiated 
by the fact that creditors, agreeing to give credit to a society whose members are only 
liable for accepting a condition imposed on them by the same shareholders, albeit with 
the cooperation of law: a requirement that, on the one hand, the company asset is 
intended primarily to their satisfaction, but on the other hand, in case of troubles, the 
personal assets of members cannot be touched. In a perspective of the prevalence of 
substance of the company on the corporate form, be a member means above all to be 
among the many who chose to provide funding of venture capital. Than "owners" of the 
company, the shareholders, are the residual claimants, i.e.  persons who are entitled to 
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receive all that remains once the creditors have been paid. They, like creditors, are 
therefore holding a claim of a financial nature, but is at a lower step, the last one. 
So if the members can receive the surplus only once all creditors have been 
satisfied, they have an incentive to ensure that the company may produce sufficient 
wealth (at least) to pay creditors. The members are real concerned then that the 
management is as efficient as possible: if it is, they will gain,  if it is not, they lose the 
paid amount to the company. Precisely, this assumption is based on the justification of 
the power to choose the managers of the company, that the law leaves exclusively to 
members. This then is the foundation of “control” arrangements, for what he finds here, 
as the right to appoint directors
93
.  
Besides the power to carry on business activities, moreover, the law gives 
shareholders the right to satisfy them (chronologically) first that creditors have been 
met. Single but necessary condition is to be periodically produced a sort of assessment 
and plan of apportionment of the wealth produced by the company, which shows that, 
even in prospect, there are sufficient resources to pay for creditors. This periodic 
distribution plan, whose function is vital for the functioning of financial markets, is 
obviously the balance sheet. The operating budget is drawn up by administrators 
appointed by the shareholders acting in their interest, and is therefore a powerful tool in 
their hands. On the basis of this fact, members have the power to allocate to themselves, 
by dividend or other distribution (purchases of shares, reduction of capital) resources of 
the company even when the creditors were not paid. The budget is essentially the 
instrument of a potential reversal to the detriment of creditors, the order of priority in 
the payment and repayment of principal. It is also in view of this that the law requires 
that, in drafting the budget, property is assessed on prudency, based on mandatory rules 
and particularly severe penalties provided for the drafting of infidel budgets. If, once 
observed these criteria, it appears that creditors may be paid in full, the law allows the 
distribution to the shareholders of any surplus. Just this great power has led someone to 
believe, implicitly, or requiring the establishment by law, on an additional requirement 
                                                 
93
 The presence in law and practice of intermediate categories between shareholders and creditors, such as the 
meaning of Article 2346 and 2411 c. 3 cc, complicates the equation, but not revolutionary. In fact it emerges a 
sort of continuous line that has, at one end, the holder of fixed claims (and therefore usually devoid of 
management powers) and, at the other one, holders of a mere expectation not coercible (therefore normally 
holders of voice), along which the lack of protection ex post (ie the right to a guaranteed remuneration) tends to 
be offset by a power ex ante (the right to choose the managers). 
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as the dividends can be paid: that the company, after payment, remains solvent (so-
called solvency test)
94
. 
As a result, the law thus gives great confidence and authority to the members not 
(only) on the basis that they are owners of the company, but (rather) on the assumption 
that they, and not creditors, have everything to gain and to lose respectively from a good 
and bad management, being the creditors' rights fully safeguarded by legal strategies 
which are for the major part ex ante remedies. This is the model of control of the solvent 
company, according to the Italian and the U.K. law and rules of the financial market. 
 
3.3. Ownership and corporate control of a troubled company 
The company belongs economically to those who, from a formal point of view, 
have the property and the corporate control  until company debt is kept within limits of 
sustainability (sufficiency of cash flows) and governance (ability to manage and govern 
the company). Indeed, if the debt remains sustainable and government, it does not 
threaten, but rather strengthens the power of control of the shareholders or of the control 
group. As a matter of fact,  as evidenced by studies of financial economics, the cost of 
capital for existing owners is, under certain conditions, lower if the increases in 
financing needs are satisfied with debt capital rather than risk capital. Moreover, the use 
of debt capital can more easily maximize the rate of profit, thanks to the leverage 
inherent in supply, financed by borrowing. 
The company with an unsustainable debt or government (that is, when financial 
or economic or legal troubles arise) ceases to belong economically (at least exclusively) 
to the shareholders or the control group.  
Transferring this economic theory in law terms, it can be said that, if in normal 
operation is entirely justified under law that creditors are outside the control of the 
company, there is a serious question about the control of the company when it is not in 
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 It should however be noted that while the above is valid for European countries traditionally based on social 
capital (also in accordance with Directive 77/91/EEC, the second EU directive on company law), it is only in 
part for the American . The conditions that legitimize the distribution of dividends are in fact significantly 
different in the two systems. While in European  law require the existence of a budget surplus,  in the U.S. law 
system, not based entirely on the capital, necessary and sufficient condition is that the company will remain 
solvent after the payment of dividends. It is up to directors, appointed by the shareholders, (not the 
determination of the surplus in the budget, but) the determination of the solvency of the company. The adoption 
of the so-called solvency test in the place of the share capital was registered in the Community by the ratio of 
the High Level Group of Company Law Experts, who noted that the rules on social capital may preclude the 
distribution of dividends to the solvent company and allow it to insolvency company or however with assets 
less than the balance sheet liabilities. IN this regard, see High Level Group of Company Law Experts – A 
Modern Regulatory Framework for Company Law in Europe, 4.11.2002, Ch. IV, par. 4, 86ss. For a 
Commission‟s opinion see Modernizing Company Law and Enhancing Corporate Governance in the European 
Union: a Plan to move forward, 21.5.2003, par.3.2, 17ss. 
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normal operation and the discharge of debts is in danger: a problem of control of the 
company that is in troubles. Assuming that, as a result of operating losses, it occurs, at 
this stage of the life of the company, a financial structure entirely made of debt that 
initially would be unacceptable to creditors. However, while at the beginning the lender 
had the choice of whether credit or not, now he is a “prisoner” of the debtor. It is now  
creditors who provide the true risk capital, but it is still  debtor (members) who makes 
the decisions about the company and may by its conduct worse. Indeed neither the race 
of creditors to enforce recovery of their loans can eliminate the problem. On the 
contrary, it worsens as risks destroying the very values on which the creditors could 
rely. The situation needs a remedy also because the debtor, in this condition, has a 
strong economic incentive to invest in high risk projects, because, if the result is 
positive, he will enjoy the benefits, while, if the result is negative, the losses will fall on 
the creditors. Directors of an insolvent company have the same incentive, if they pursue 
the interests of unscrupulous members (and have not paid social security for the debt)
95
. 
It is precisely for this reason that, in case of danger to creditors, that is when 
companies are “in troubles”,  it is necessary to verify if the law raises specific protection 
duties, that are limitations of the management power and corporate control, on the 
debtor-in-chief or on the directors.
96
 
The control of the company should dissolve (because the company is subject to a 
disruptive liquidation), or should pass block to others in an open and transparent way 
(through a voluntary or compulsory sale of the entire assets) or it should undergo a non-
linear process of control transfer. This passage of control to creditors can occur through 
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 English literature adds in acts prejudicial to creditors, the distribution of liquidating dividends, i.e.  pure and 
simple distribution to the shareholders of the insolvent company's remaining wealth. See S. A. Ross-R.W. 
Westerfield-J.F. Jaffe, Corporate finance, VI ed., McGraw-Hill, Boston-London, 2001, 458. Such conduct 
obviously incorporates the extremes of the Art. 2627 c.c. (illegal sharing of profits or reserves) and the 
fraudulent bankruptcy, through the art. 223, c. 2, l. fall, in case of subsequent failure of the company. In this 
regard see also: K. H. Daigle, M. T. Maloney, Residual Claims in Bankruptcy: an agency theory explanation, 
in Journal of Law & Economics, 1994 (37), 182-187; B. R. Cheffins, Company Law: Theory, Structure and 
Operation, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1997, 75ss. They believe that the interests of managers with a 
good reputation is a major factor in mitigating the risk of opportunistic behavior to the detriment of creditors, 
even in insolvency, see L. Enriques-J. R. Macey, Creditors Versus Capital Formation: the case against the 
European Legal Capital Rules, in Cornell Law Review, 2001 (86), 1171. 
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 In English law (not in the Italians) is provided for a  specific obligation to resort to judicial authority 
activating an insolvency proceeding; see: R. Kraakman, P. Davies. H. Hansmann, G. Hertig, K. Hopt, H. 
Kanda, E. Rock (nt.3), 73. According to the Italian system there is a similar duty, but in an indirect and 
incomplete form, under art. 217, n. 4, l. fall., which punishes the entrepreneur who has aggravated his 
insolvency by not requiring the declaration of its bankruptcy. This rule is extended to company‟s directors 
under art 224 l. fall. Moreover, Italy requires corporate managers (boards, liquidators) to initiate bankruptcy 
proceeding upon the onset of insolvency. The U.K. jurisdiction imposes liability for failure to take timely 
action in the event of insolvency. Here, where the fate of insolvency closely held companies  has historically 
been reserved out of court, directors are liable for damages under the Insolvency Act for failing to respond 
adequately to the insolvency of their companies. 
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a non uniform way, by judicial or extra-judicial, legal or contractual strategies, and it is 
far for simple to delineate when this transfer process, that is a different distribution of 
power of control, begin producing effects. 
In this discuss I will try to outline the rules that govern the transfer of control 
power when this step is driven by an evolutionary pathology of debt. In this sense, it 
will deal with the cross border between the decreased of control on the owners and the 
transfer process of (total or partial) corporate control to creditors or to a part of them.  
Furthermore, I will focus on the rules that delineate the role assigned to the holders of 
debt
97
 in order to outline, in particular, the relationship between the latter and  the power 
to carry on business activities.   
Although it is not here the place to stress, in terms of indicators and economic 
analysis, the threshold "critical" that defines debt as unsustainable, it seems necessarily 
refer to some critical aspects associated with such a threshold, that is the undeniable 
decline of the concept of insolvency; this state of distress will be outlined  with regard 
also to the (new) rule of the social capital which needs to be reinterpreted in light of 
more flexible criteria. Furthermore, it must be emphasize the relationship between the 
formal corporate governance power  and the rules of behavior that the holders of this 
power must observe in cases of troubled companies. 
 
3.4. Regulatory role in creditors’ protection 
In order to protect corporate creditors, both Italian and U.K. jurisdictions adopt 
some common strategies, relying  primarily on three classes of legal remedies: 
affiliation rights (in the form of mandatory disclosure), rules and standards
98
. Reliance 
on a common set of remedies, however, does not imply a uniform level of creditor 
protection.  
Corporate law adopts entry strategy by requiring companies to publicly disclosure 
certain basic information before borrowing funds
99
. For example, both Italian and U.K. 
jurisdictions require companies to file their charters in public registers, which makes 
available information about legal capital, restrictions on director liability. This is a 
consequence of the E.U. approach, where Member states must establish user-friendly 
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 As noted above, in this discuss it will not be taken into account all the categories of creditors, nor the class of 
creditor as a whole, but it will highlight only a specific class of creditors, that are the holders of debt. 
98
 See Part 1…. 
99
 To the contrary, voluntary creditors often contract for an exit opportunity in the form of an acceleration 
clause that makes a debt due and payable upon the occurrence of a significant default. 
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registers
100
. In addition, all jurisdictions require companies to keep appropriate 
accounting records
101
. 
In addition to mandatory disclosure (that helps creditors protect themselves), agent 
constraint  strategies provide standard-form protections for creditors. This is the case of 
the rules that govern “legal capital”102. According to both U.K. and Italian jurisdictions, 
these rules regulate corporate distributions, minimum capital requirements and the 
ongoing maintenance of corporate capital. Each of these rules is clear-cut and even 
mechanical in its application. In particular, such formal rules have always been integral 
to the regulation of legal capital. One reason should be that the information costs of 
applying and enforcing them are law. Ease of enforcement may also explain why rules 
governing legal capital were undoubtedly more important for creditor protection than 
they are today.  More precisely, three aspects of corporate finance can be highlighted, 
that are, firstly, the maximum permissible outflow of capital; secondly, the minimum 
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 See Art. 2-3 First Company Law Directive [1968] OJ L 65/8. 
101
 See Fourth Company Law Directive [1978] OJ L 222/11 (accounting standards); Art. 2(1)(f) First Company 
Law Directive (disclosure of balance sheet as well as profit and loss account for each financial year).  
See, e.g., W. F. Ebke, Accounting, Auditing and Global Capital Markets, in T. Baums, K. J. Hopt & N. Horn 
(edn.), Corporations, capital markets and business in the law, 2000, pp. 119ss.; K. van Hulle, International 
Harmonization of Accounting Principles: a European perspective, 2000, p.97. 
All EU companies traded on EU regulated markets will have to follow International Accounting Standards 
(IAS) by 2005: see Regulation on the application of International Accounting Standards [2002] OJ L 243/1. 
See also Communication of the Commission, EU Financial Reporting Strategy, The Way Forward, 
COM(2000), 5-6, p. 359.  
Regarding public companies, it can be said that disclosure is traditionally more heavily regulated in the U.K. 
than in our jurisdiction. Under U.K. securities law, a company issuing publicly traded securities –including 
debt securities- must disclose all material information bearing on the value of the issue and the issuer‟s 
financial condition in a registration statement filed with the Central bank. In addition, public companies must 
periodically file financial statements that are prepared in accordance with U.K. GAAP, and immediately report 
on new material developments. Italian law, as all EU continental jurisdictions, still impose much less 
demanding accounting principles and disclosure requirements. 
In theory, U.K. GAAP seek to protect shareholders interests by accurately depicting company finances. By 
contrast, continental Europe‟s accounting practices attempt to protect creditors by reliably signaling that a 
company‟s assets and revenue can cover its liabilities- or if this is not the case, that creditors know it. Anglo-
Saxon accounting gives better information, but continental accounting gives more reliable assurance of 
solvency and solidity. In any event, traditional differences are likely to be short lived because it seems that the 
capital markets and regulation are inexorably pressing European continental companies towards the U.K (and 
U.S.) model of financial reporting. For  a focus on the relevant of the financial situation connected with the 
themes above,  see: A. Lolli, Mandatory rules on financial situation, dividends distribution and fair value 
accounting in the EU IRFS/IAS regulation, in Corporate Ownership and Control Journal, 2009. 
Although the U.K. is traditionally among the most credit-friendly jurisdiction, in this context U.K. law is very 
close to U.S. law, that are commonly called the Anglo-Saxon disclosure and accounting rules which are the 
birthplace of shareholders-oriented accounting principles. See C. Nobes & R. H. Parker, Comparative 
International Accounting, 2002, pp. 54ss. 
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 In most jurisdictions, legal capital is the aggregate nominal (or par) value of issued shares, which is typically 
much lower than the actual issue price of these shares. In U.S. jurisdictions that permit “no par” shares, legal 
capital is initially set by a company‟s organizers, and may be any amount less than (or equal to) the issue price 
of a company‟s shares. Generally speaking, legal capital does not include reserves although some jurisdictions 
require companies to set aside non-distributable reserves from current earnings as an additional hedge against 
shareholders opportunism. Note too that a few U.S. jurisdictions permit companies to use economic value 
rather than book value to set dividend policy, see § 6.40(d) RMBCA and Comment 4.b; § 500 California 
Corporation  Code. 
58 
initial investment of capital, and finally, the level of capital that must be maintained 
during corporate life. Company law restrict the outflow of distribution –i.e., dividends 
and share repurchases- in order to prevent shareholders from diluting the pool of assets 
that implicitly bonds a company‟s debts. Although these distribution restrictions vary 
across jurisdictions, the most common rule is one that prohibits payment of dividends 
that would impair the company‟s legal capital, i.e. distributions that exceed the 
difference between the company‟s book value and legal capital as fixed by the 
company‟s charter. As one might expect, dividend restrictions are more protective- and 
more confining- when they are combined with conservative accounting practices, such 
as those of Europe. Conversely, dividend restrictions do less to protect creditors where, 
as in common law jurisdiction
103
, accounting principles are less conservative and the 
shareholders meeting, or even the board of directors in some cases, can reduce a 
company‟s legal capital with comparative ease. 
 The minimum capital rules, that are the rules governing the minimum 
investment levels for incorporation, focus on the concept of legal capital to regulate how 
much shareholders must invest to qualify for incorporation. EU firms that adopt the 
open corporate form must have initial legal capital of at least Euro 25.000, although 
Member states may set higher thresholds if they wish
104
. Although these numbers are 
large by U.S. standards (which generally require nothing at all), they are actually quite 
small in comparison to the actual capital requirements of almost all European 
businesses. Presumably they are small precisely in order to permit almost all legitimate 
businesses to incorporate as “open” corporations. Nonetheless, it remains unclear how 
much real protection these rules provide to creditors, particularly since any firm‟s initial 
capital is likely to be long gone before it files for bankruptcy
105
.  
 Finally, the rules governing the reduction of legal capital in established 
companies, called capital maintenance rules, should make legal capital a credible 
financial cushion for creditors. In Italy, for instance, companies that reduce legal capital 
distributing assets to shareholders, may be required to provide guarantees for unsecured 
creditors (2445 cc). Moreover, EU law requires open companies to call a shareholder 
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 For an overview of a variety of dividend restriction rules used by U.S. jurisdictions, see, e.g. R. W. 
Hamilton, The law of corporations, 2000, pp. 585ss. 
104
 See Art. 6 Second Company Law Directive [1977] OJ L 26/1 and [1992] OJ L 347/64. 
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It has been argued that in theory, company law could toughen minimum capital requirements by, for 
example, forcing companies to meet a specific debt-equity ratio. As the on-going debate about debt-equity 
ratios suggests, however, any such requirement would be perceived as intolerably rigid, first of all according to 
the “rule” that different businesses carry different risks. See also the Basle Accord on Bank Capital Adequacy 
(although the figures used there are not simple balance sheet numbers but rather adjusted, “risk-based” figures). 
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meeting to consider dissolution after a serious loss of legal capital
106
. Creditors clearly 
benefit from the latter requirement, since earlier bankruptcy proceedings generally leave 
more on the table for distribution to creditors. In theory, moreover, creditors might 
benefit from mandatory shareholders meetings for the same reason: a shareholders 
decision to dissolve before exhausting the firm‟s legal capital leaves more assets 
available for distribution to creditors and shareholders. In addition, a meeting 
requirement might also provide creditors with an early warning of impending financial 
crises. 
One difficult issue is whether the possible benefit of the European capital 
maintenance rules are realized in practice. Italy and the U.K., such as most of the 
European States, maintain only a thin layer of legal capital between the layers of 
unrestricted shareholder equity and debt on their balance sheets. Thus, by the time the 
difficulties of most failing companies come to light, they have long since exhausted 
their legal capital and become deeply insolvent. There is simply no time for early 
warnings or shareholders meetings. Even so, however, the capital maintenance rules 
may still have some value for creditors. They benchmark the points at which boards and 
controlling shareholders must liquidate or restructure failing companies, and so make it 
easier for creditors and bankruptcy receivers to sue these parties if they fail to discharge 
their duties.  
Traditionally, the rule strategy is popular in continental Europe but not among 
common law jurisdictions. This divergence does not turn on whether a jurisdiction is 
debtor- or creditor- friendly.  
 
3.4.1. Different approaches to creditors’ protection  
Conventional wisdom has it that the world divides into “debtor-friendly” and 
“creditor-friendly” jurisdictions. Thus, the U.S. is reputed to be debtor-friendly, while 
EU, with differences between the members, is usually characterized as creditor-friendly 
(so, the U.K. and, to a lesser extent, Italy).  Many global explanations of why entire 
jurisdictions might be creditor- or debtor- friendly can be found
107
, but the point is 
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 Art. 17 Second Company Law Directive. EU law also protects creditors against reduction through charter 
amendments or share repurchases, but not against capital reduction to restore financial soundness- the 
reasoning being that shareholder opportunism is then less an issue. For a comparison, see also: H.D. Assmann, 
B. Lange & R. Sethe, The Law of Business Associations, in W. F. Ebke & M. W. Finkin (edn.), Introduction to 
German Law, 1996, 159.  
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 Thus, in addition to sheer historical inertia, some jurisdictions might favor debtors because the market 
already protects creditors, or because politically dominant shareholders believe that strong creditor rights 
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whether any of these explanations can account for the fine structure of the law. There 
are significant variations within jurisdictions in the treatment of different classes of 
debtors and creditors. In addition, a jurisdiction‟s weighting of debtor and creditor 
interests evolves over time
108
.  
The creditor-friendly UK would probably follow the debtor-friendly U.S. in 
preferring standards over rules, if it were not for the constraints imposed by EU 
directives
109
. Instead, it can be argued that there are two main related explanations for 
Continental Europe‟s preference for rules. Firstly, according to the familiar divide 
between common law and civil law, judges in the latter jurisdictions, such as in Italy,  
are uncomfortable with open-ended standards, and much prefer to enforce relatively 
bright-line rules
110
. By contrast, the second explanation looks to differences in the 
capital markets. Rules strategies such as capital maintenance requirements are more 
effective when financing is conservative and bank-centered, and law or market 
institutions restrict wholesale leveraging or share repurchases
111
. In the past, these 
conditions generally prevailed in continental Europe, with the result that capital 
maintenance requirements posed little or no burden on financial transactions. Today, 
however, they impose a considerably larger burden in a riskier, market-oriented 
environment. For instance, EU restrictions on using company assets as security 
significantly impede leveraged buy-outs of smaller EU firms
112
. Similarly, capital 
maintenance requirements are thought to handicap larger EU firms that wish to switch 
                                                                                                                                               
discourage entrepreneurship. Similarly, jurisdictions might favor creditors because banks are politically 
powerful while populist mistrust of “capitalists” undercuts the influence of shareholders. Even firm size might 
play a role: if smaller companies often fail, demand for creditor protections may be greater in the fragmented 
EU market, with its traditionally smaller companies, than in the U.S. See C. M. McHugh (edn.), The 2000 
Bankruptcy Yearbook and Almanac, 2000, pp. 332s. See also K. B. Kumar, R. G. Rajan & L. Zingales, What 
determines firm size, Working Paper, available at ssrn.com. 
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 See E. Berglof, H. Rosenthal & E. von Thadden, The formation of legal institutions for bankruptcy: a 
comparative study of legislative history, Working Paper 2001, available at www.hec.unil.ch. For example, 
recent European reforms that encourage the early restructuring of failing companies diminish the differences 
between EU and the U.S. insolvency regimes. Similarly, the willingness of U.S. courts to allow U.S. creditors 
to choose between U.S. and foreign insolvency regimes in international bankruptcies suggests a degree of 
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 The Second Company Law Directive obliged the U.K. to introduce minimum capital requirements for public 
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legal capital rules to closely held companies: see V. Edwards, EC Company Law, 1999, p. 53; J. Freedman, 
Limited liability: large company theory and small firm, in Modern Law Review, 2000, 63, p. 317. 
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from bank financing to raising equity capital on the share markets
113
. Some 
commentators suggest a public choice explanation, that is that these rules remain in 
place because they benefit powerful European interest group, such as the banks, who are 
the primary lenders, and incumbent managers, who face less pressure to perform with a 
larger equity cushion
114
. 
Fiduciary duties in the form of standards are widely used in the U.K. to protect 
corporate creditors.  Also Italy, even if in a different and less labeled way, imposes a 
species of fiduciary duty on a company‟s insider and professional partners on behalf of 
its creditors. 
Both jurisdictions provide a risk of personal liability on corporate directors in certain 
circumstances, notably when a company falls into “the vicinity” of insolvency or is 
insolvent and the risk of shareholders opportunism is large. In this regard, it seems that 
these jurisdictions employ a broadly similar approach to framing the liability of board 
members to protect creditors. Directors, including de facto or shadow directors, may be 
held personally liable for damages to creditors resulting from the board‟s gross 
negligence or narrow pursuit of shareholder interests when the company is insolvent or 
nearly so
115
. Th4e extent to which such personal liability provides significant protection 
for creditors varies with the circumstances. Directors of smaller firms are often 
principals who are likely to lose their personal and business assets simultaneously. 
Large firms, however, frequently purchase liability insurance for their board members, 
which protects directors while it can also compensate injured creditors
116
. 
 It Italy hold directors who act negligently on the srink of insolvency are 
personally liable to creditors. In particular, they become negligent per se by failing to 
observe capital maintenance rules. However, this liability is less far-reaching than it 
might seem. Firstly, it is not easy to show that a board failed to act at the precise point 
when the company lost half, respectively, of all of its legal capital. This point depends 
inter alia on whether the board uses going-concern or liquidation value. In practice, 
alternative valuation methodologies often give directors a one-to-two year window to 
act without violating their duty to creditors. Secondly, even if directors do violate their 
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duty, establish that they caused a creditor‟s injury is not easy. Finally, creditors cannot 
recover if the board‟s violation of duty did not increase their consolidated damages, or if 
they assumed the risk of dealing with an insolvent company. 
 Hence, it is the U.K. that imposes a somewhat heavier duty on directors to attend 
to creditor interests in the vicinity of corporate insolvency. In particular, it has recently 
increased enforcement of the Company Directors Disqualification Act of 1986, which 
allows courts to disqualify directors of insolvent companies who have proven 
themselves to be “unfit” from future management activities, whether these parties are 
actual directors, de facto directors or shadow directors
117
. This standard apparently 
includes disqualification for failing to attend accounting matters or engaging in reckless 
conduct. Thus, it appears that disqualification may be a more effective remedy than 
liability, although the disqualification action has yet to achieve any real traction in 
continental Europe
118
.  
Furthermore, it can be mentioned that, in addition to the liability of directors,  
there is the auditor liability. Outside auditor function, in the first instance, to ensure that 
a company‟s financial statements reflect the laws and accounting standards of the 
jurisdictions in which it is domiciled or its securities trade. Moreover, shareholders and 
creditors alike increasingly rely on auditors to play a broader role in monitoring for 
breaches of fiduciary duties by managers. Auditors, of course, disclaim any duties 
beyond verifying financial statements. Nevertheless, the sharp investor reaction 
worldwide to accounting scandals, form Enron until the recent cases such as Lehman 
Brothers may eventually force auditors elsewhere in the world to accept a broader scope 
of responsibility to the investing public
119. The auditor‟s monitoring role is of special 
importance for large companies that must retain outside auditors by law. In both the 
Italian and the U.K. jurisdictions, the courts have been the principal architects of auditor 
liability, even though Italian law imposed statutory liability on auditors who fail to 
report breaches of managerial duties to creditors. As a result of the increasing volume of 
suits against auditors, Italian and English Courts have tended to extend auditor liability 
by finding that creditors were foreseeable users of financial statements or that they had a 
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special relationship with the auditors, for example because the latter have specifically 
confirmed their support for the company‟s accounts120. 
 
3.4.2. Reflecting upon the standard strategy 
There are several influential corporate insiders –directors, auditors, “inside” 
creditors, or controlling shareholders- liable for participating in corporate opportunism 
in the vicinity of insolvency. Holding these people liable can benefit creditors and 
shareholders, but the fact depend on costs that arise from imposing such liability. For 
instance, imposing liability on directors or on large creditors such as banks, may harm 
creditors as well as shareholders, inter alia by discouraging these parties from initiating 
or consenting to corporate workouts
121
.  
Jurisdictions resolve this tension in different ways. In order to try give some 
explanations of the extent of such divergences, it can be said, firstly that strategies of 
creditor protection reflect different styles of adjudication and enforcement. For example, 
rules are more popular in continental Europe than they are in the common law systems. 
This difference is rooted in the reluctance of civil law courts to interpret standards – or, 
conversely, in the willingness of common law courts to apply often ambiguous norms. 
In addition, divergent strategies for protecting creditors also reflect jurisdictional 
differences in insolvency proceedings. For instance, director disqualification was 
originally important in the UK partly because it was the principal sanction available 
against directors when companies were subject to receivership in lieu of insolvency 
proceedings
122
. 
Finally, creditor protection diverge because jurisdictions do not attach the same 
importance to this issue. While not as significant as conventional wisdom has it, the 
traditional distinction between creditor- and debtor- friendly jurisdictions continues to 
matter. Thus, the UK, which is reputed to be the most creditor-friendly jurisdiction, has 
in fact the best record of enforcing the disclosure rules governing small companies and 
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sanctioning directors who breach their duties to creditors. Italy, who is said to be less 
creditor-friendly than the UK, is in fact less eager to enforce small company disclosure 
and directorial duties, even though they maintain strict capital maintenance rules
123
. 
 
3.5. The state of insolvency in the U.K. system 
In the U.K., to talk of “troubled” or “failing” companies is to refer to companies 
encountering a variety of problems and in different stages of decline or regeneration. As 
a consequence, the term “troubled” deals with both distress and insolvent companies. 
Distress companies are those that encounter crises that cannot be resolved without a 
sizable recasting of the  firm‟s operations or structures124. Such distress may be seen in 
terms of default, where the company has failed to make a significant payment of 
principal or interest to a creditor
125
. Alternatively, distress can be seen in terms of 
financial ratios. Thus, calculations based on a company‟s accounts can be used to reveal 
profitability ratios, liquidity ratios and long-term solvency ratios
126
. Assessing whether 
a company is in distress may involve reference t these ratios individually or collectively, 
but the central issue is whether the company is revealed to be in such a state of crisis 
that drastic action is required
127
. 
 A company is insolvent for the purpose of the law if it is unable to pay its 
debts
128
. No legal consequences attach to a firm simply by virtue of its insolvent state. 
Such consequences only follow the institution of a formal proceeding such as winding 
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up or the appointment of an administrator or administrative receiver. Moreover, there is 
no single legal definition of inability to pay debts. Within the Insolvency Act 1986 and 
other insolvency-related statutes there are a number of tests of insolvency and these 
relate to the purposes of different legislative provisions. As a result, what is a debt 
depends on the particular test of insolvency that is being applied. In this regard, there 
are two primary tests, on the one hand, the “cash flow” or “commercial” insolvency test 
and the “balance sheet” or “absolute” insolvency test on the other129. 
Under the former test a company is generally regarded as insolvent when unable to pay 
debts as they become due. This means that there are insufficient resources available to 
the debtor to pay creditors. The fact that the firm‟s assets exceed its liabilities is 
irrelevant. The critical issue is whether the company can pay his way in carrying on her 
business or conducing her affairs. 
The second test holds that a company is insolvent if the total liabilities are greater than 
value of the assets, with the consequences that the debtor has insufficient assets to 
discharge the liabilities. 
It is quite possible for a business to be insolvent in cash flow terms, but be asset rich 
and able to be regarded as solvent on the balance sheet test
130
. Similarly, a business may 
be able to pass the cash flow test, but its liabilities are greater than its assets. 
Notwithstanding this, in practice, businesses usually tend to fail or pass both tests
131
. 
 
3.5.1. Insolvency Act tests 
 Both tests are set out in U.K. Insolvency Act. Thus, section 122
132
, for instance, 
provides that a company may be wound up if it is “unable to pay its debts”, that is it is 
insolvent. This phrase is explained in section 123 in two ways, using the two tests. 
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Indeed, section 123 (1) (e) provides that a company is unable to pay its debts if it is 
unable to pay its debts as they fall due. Section 123 (2) incorporates the balance sheet 
test, stating that a company is unable to pay its debts if it is proved that the value of the 
company‟s assets is less than the amount of its liabilities. 
The concept of cash flow insolvency seems simple prima facie, but in some 
cases it may be far from easy to determine whether the test is satisfied at any particular 
point of time. In this regard, a quite developed jurisprudence has been laid down by 
English Courts.  Firstly, Courts, in examining whether a company is suffering cash flow 
insolvency, will consider whether the company is actually paying its debtors. Then, it 
must take into account what current revenue the company has as well as what the 
company can procure by realizing assets within a relatively short time
133
. A company 
can rely upon money which might be obtain form the sale of assets or upon money 
which might be obtain by a loan on the strength of its assets
134
. It is possible that 
sometimes a debtor might be able to establish solvency by demonstrating that funds can 
be obtained through an unsecured loan
135
. Furthermore, in considering whether a 
company is insolvent, the debtor‟s whole financial position must be studied136 and a 
temporary lack of liquidity does not necessarily mean that the company is insolvent. In 
Lewis v Doran the following were seen as usual indicia of insolvency (from a cash flow 
perspective): a history of dishonored cheques; suppliers insisting on cash on delivery 
before providing goods; the issue of post-dated cheques; special arrangements with 
creditors; inability to produce timely audited accounts; demands from banks to reduce 
overdrafts; and the receipt of letters of demand; and statutory demands under the 
insolvency legislation. 
It is probable that the presence of the words “as they fall due”, under sec. 123 
(1),  means, as far as the debts to be taken into account are concerned, that Courts may 
look into the future to see what debts will fall due in the future
137
. To what extend a 
court is permitted to gaze into the future is not really settled, although what is clear is 
that it will depend on the debtor and the debtor‟s circumstances. The issue has not been 
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canvassed in England and Wales. In Australia there is some divergence in the cases as 
to whether or not “debts due” includes liabilities not payable because creditors had 
granted the debtor extended terms of repayment. It seems that the better supported view 
now is that it is proper to take into account any extensions of time granted to the debtor 
to  pay its creditors and, in turn, to take into account the dates when it might be 
reasonably expected that the creditor would receive debts due and owing to it
138
. 
Until recently, it has been unclear whether in English law future debts can be 
taken into account when assessing insolvency. It has been argued that “contingent and 
prospective liabilities” are not to be taken into account in determining a debtor‟s 
solvency under the cash flow method, because, unlike section 123 (2) – dealing with 
balance sheet solvency-, which includes a reference to “contingent and prospective 
liabilities”, section 123 (1) (e), does not139.  
At one time Courts were rather strict on what they required to be established before they 
were willing to deem a company insolvent, but in more recent times they have become 
more liberal as far as creditors are concerned and have held that a debtor is insolvent if a 
creditor is able to prove that he has not been paid an undisputed debt after a demand has 
been made
140
. 
Whether a company is cash flow insolvent is principally a question of fact and 
one which may be established in any number of ways, such as the existence of a large 
number of outstanding debts and unsatisfied judgments or a lack of assets on which 
execution can be levied
141
. 
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Moreover, it has been said that a debtor is not to be regarded as solvent just because if 
sufficient time were granted the debts could be paid off
142
. 
 The balance sheet test actually looks at the affairs of the company and is 
provided for, for example, in section 123 (2), which considers whether the company‟s 
assets are insufficient to discharge its liabilities, taking into account, as it has already 
mentioned above, its contingent and prospective liabilities. This may involve assessing 
the value of assets and judging the amount the asset would raise in the market; through 
a difficulty arises through the Act‟s failure to indicate whether valuations should be 
made on the basis of a “going concern” or “break-up” sale. Particular difficulties may 
arise where there is no established market value for the commodity. The test, moreover, 
gives rise to potential problems in so far as there is no statutory definition of prospective 
liabilities. Standard accounting practice treats contingent liabilities more subtly than 
section 123 (2) and that section does not include any particular basis for measuring 
assets and liabilities
143
.  
In this regard, court decisions states that, in determining whether the assets are 
outweighed by the liabilities, a Court is able to take into account contingent and 
prospective liabilities, but not contingent and prospective assets
144
, added that 
“liabilities” is a broader term compared with “debts”145. “Liabilities” is defined for the 
purposes of winding up in rule 13.12 (4) to mean “a liability to pay money or money‟s 
worth, including any liability under an enactment, any liability for breach of trust, any 
liability in contract, tort or bailment and any liability arising out of an obligation to 
make restitution”. Then rule 13.12 (3) states that it is immaterial whether the liability is 
present or future, whether it is certain or contingent, or whether its amount is fixed or 
liquidated, or is capable of being ascertained by fixed rules or as a matter of opinion. 
Clearly with this test it is only possible to take into account the assets owned by the 
company, including the uncalled capital of the company
146
. Finally, in establishing 
balance sheet insolvency in court a creditor might need to adduce expert evidence from 
a person such as an experienced accountant.  
In conclusion, defining “insolvency” at law is further complicated by the use of 
further tests in statutes other than the Insolvency Act. Legal definitions, moreover, are 
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not the only measures for corporate failure. Thus, “insolvency” is defined in different 
ways for different purposes which indicate that the firm is “in troubles”. 
Insolvency under the cash flow is a ground for a winding-up order
147
 or an 
administration order
148
 or for setting aside transactions at undervalue, preferences
149
 and 
floating charges given other than for specified forms of new value
150
. 
The balance sheet test is also one of the tests prescribed for the purpose of grounds for 
wining up
151
, administration
152
 or the avoidance of transaction at undervalue
153
, 
preferences and certain floating charges
154
. It is also a test relevant in considering the 
disqualification of directors
155
 and is the one test used in identifying insolvent 
liquidation for the purposes of assessing directorial liabilities for wrongful trading
156
. 
 
3.6. The state of insolvency under the Italian system 
With reference to Italian Insolvency Law, the state of insolvency is not precisely 
defined and no tests are explicitly adopted by the Legislator. The art. 5  explicitly 
provides for “events of default”157. The object of this events is the “inability of the 
debtor to meets regularly his obligations”, whatever the causes that generate this 
situation. This demonstrate that the data more closely balance sheet remains in the 
background than the financial data. In other words, what is important is that the debtor 
is no longer able to meet its obligations because he does not have the necessary 
resources or he still cannot obtain them. “Regularly” means promptly and “by normal” 
means regarding the ordinary management of the company. The Courts have been 
expressed in terms of  “structural crisis of the corporate organization”, the “functional 
state of helplessness and not transient, irreversible, to meet the obligations of the 
company”. Moreover, with the Court‟s words, the state of insolvency deals with  the 
“inability to produce goods with profit margins likely to be sufficient to cover the needs 
                                                 
147
 Insolvency Act 1986, s. 122 (1) (f). 
148
 Insolvency Act 1986, Sch. B1, Paras. 11, 111 (1). 
149
 Insolvency Act 1986, s. 239, 240 (2). 
150
 Insolvency Act 1986, ss. 238-42 and 245, expecially ss. 240 (2) and 245 (4).  
151
 See R. Goode, Principle of corporate insolvency law, op. cit., p. 90. 
152
 See nt. 33 above. 
153
 Insolvency Act 1986, ss. 238-40 (2). 
154
 Insolvency Act 1986, s. 245, in particolar 245 (4). 
155
 Company Directors‟ Disqualification Act (CDDA) 1986, s. 6 (2). 
156
 Insolvency Act 1986, s. 214. 
157
  Inserire AGG comm Vassalli, La nozione di insolvenza (alla luce dei recenti interventi legislativi sulle 
imprese in crisi), in Studi in onore di Ferri, Padova, 1983, pp. 245ss.; Lanfranchi, Uso “alternativo” delle 
procedure concorsuali, amministrazione e prededucibilità dei crediti, in Riv. Dir. civ., 1985, I, p. 152s.; Maffei 
Alberti, La nozione di insolvenza: un concetto che muta, Relazione al convegno Sisco, in fall., 1988, p. 911; 
Id., Aspetti giuridici dello stato di insolvenza, in Atti del convegno Sisco, Lucca, 21 ottobre 1989, pp. 20ss.  
70 
of business” or the situation where “there is a talk of inability to borrow on normal 
terms”.  
As a consequence, it can be said that there is generally a lack of ordinary liquidity, that 
is the liquidity which is generated by carrying on normal business activities.  
The insolvency becomes relevant when it occurs outside. The main form of this 
manifestation is the repeated failure of performance
158
, as deduced from the already 
mentioned art. 5, c. 2, l. fall. 
Regarding the relationship between “debts” and “corporate governance” of the 
company, the rule of the state of insolvency is essential in the Italian jurisdiction 
because it performs a fundamental function of discrimination. In fact, so long as the 
debt does not degenerate into insolvency, it is assessed as a manifestation of manager 
freedom, and, as such, it does not affect the ownership of corporate assets; 
consequently, the shareholders are entitled of the corporate governance power. 
Otherwise, when the debt becomes insolvency, manager freedom ceases, any act in 
violation of par condition creditorum is banned, the duty not to aggravate the failure by 
delaying the use of  bankruptcy or other insolvency proceedings arises; as a result, the 
rule is dispossession
159
, first, and loss of control of the company, then.  
 Italian insolvency law confines the term “insolvency” to formal legal 
proceedings, such as “fallimento”, “liquidazione coatta amministrativa”160 and 
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“amministrazione straordinaria”161. At the same time, the “insolvency” is not the only 
legal state relevant in law. Indeed, the state of “crisis” is codified as the objective legal 
condition to access to the “concordato preventivo”162 procedure.  
As a result, according to Italian law, as under U.K. legislation, it is recognized 
that the starting point of a pathological state arises at a pre-insolvency step. This “step” 
seems not to be exactly the same, while the U.K. sets out and codifies specific  “troubles 
state” tests which explicitly give relevance to economics rules, Italy states standards of 
manifestation of company troubles which needs to be interpreted, maybe, in economic 
terms. However, it can be argued that under both Italian and U.K. jurisdiction it is 
possible to speak about a “trouble situation” of a company which, at the same time, 
marks the final defeat of freedom of governance of the owners and the requirement for a 
forced  replacement.  Excessive debt may be relevant in law and affect the power of 
governance of the company, that is the control, although the threshold of insolvency is 
not exceeded. Both Italian and U.K. systems seem focus on this phenomenon, 
providing, as a consequence, legal strategies to discipline the change of control and 
remedies to protect creditors. In this discuss I will outline the situations in which the 
pathological debt affect the power of control of the formal owners of the company. 
 
3.6.1. The nature of the company’s “troubles” under Italian interpretation 
Italian strategies to protect creditors are connected with three main default 
occasions, which play a fundamental role in understanding when companies are “in 
troubles”. These are: economic imbalance, financial imbalance and governance 
imbalance.  
The company expresses an economic imbalance when revenues generated from 
its activities are no longer able to cover operating costs and, therefore, operates in a 
condition clearly uneconomic. If the owners do not interfere with efforts to redress the 
trend, and if these inefficiencies are eliminated technically, the imbalance will 
inevitably have to generate operating losses for the end to eat into equity up to his zero. 
In order to face the economic imbalance, where there is not merely a transitory event, 
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but it is a stabilized condition and structural integration, with no doubts that it is a 
situation of default risk,  the law does not intervene powerfully as it would if there was 
a declaration of insolvency. Rather, the Legislator intervenes, specifically, in particular 
circumstances providing mandatory rules or behavior for owners. A typical example in 
this sense is the discipline of the default of the banks, according to which the mere 
anticipation of heavy losses, as they appear in the accounts or in the findings of 
inspections carried out by supervisors, is a prerequisite for the access to the  bank 
insolvency procedure called “amministrazione straordinaria”163; in the case of 
exceptional losses, it is opened the bank liquidation procedure  called “liquidazione 
coatta amministrativa”164. Both procedures are arranged by an order of the Minister of 
Economy, on a proposal from the Banca d‟Italia, which should order a provisional 
management called “gestione provvisoria”165. The serious or exceptionally serious 
qualities of the losses are sometimes interpreted in quantitative relation to the effects 
produced by losses on equity or, otherwise, on the balance sheet of the company (capital 
reduction under the legal minimum,  heritage losses). Actually, this reading does not 
seem necessary, given that the difference in intensity of losses determines the access to 
a procedure rather than another. Moreover, the option between “amministrazione 
straordinaria” or “liquidazione coatta amministrativa” depends on the forecast 
evaluations, whose reliability can be improved through management replacement. 
These measures are clearly aimed at making it extremely timely intervention of 
supervisors of possible crisis situations on the company; the scope is to prevent further 
deterioration and  to limit the damage, in regard to the specific material interest in these 
areas and the impact on the whole economic system that the instability of such 
investment companies may result. 
Regarding the discipline under the Code about companies with shares, the evident loss 
of management requires shareholders  take certain legal remedies. More precisely, these 
losses become relevant when they have affected the share capital causing a reduction of 
more than one third. In this circumstances, the managers should immediately call the 
shareholder meeting to adopt the appropriate provisions. Whether the losses would be 
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not restored to less than one third within the next financial year, the shareholder meeting 
should proceed to the reduction of share capital in proportion to the losses incurred (art. 
2446 and 2482-bis c.c.). It is also established that in the case of any omission by the 
shareholder meeting, that reduction of the share capital would be provided by the 
Tribunal, called by the managers.  
Whether the loss brings the capital below the legal minimum, the managers 
should immediately convene the shareholder meeting to deliberate the reduction of the 
share capital and the contemporary  increase of the same to a figure not less than that 
minimum or, alternatively, it should be deliberate the merger of the company (art. 2447 
c.c.). The rules which provides the power of the shareholders to reduce the share capital 
is a default rule; as a consequence, it can be delegated this power to managers. 
The discipline described above, albeit briefly and with no claim to completeness, 
has multiple purposes. Primarily, it intends to restore, where possible, a situation of 
effectiveness of the share capital, so that the nominal capital of the company must 
match resources actually present. In the case of capital reduction to below the legal 
minimum, the shareholders are obliged to opt for a new organizational structure 
appropriate to the existing capital (merger) or, alternatively, to liberate, through the 
dissolution of the company, the resources allocated to a project already unproductive 
because they may find new activities. 
However, the presence of qualified operating losses is not necessarily 
symptomatic of a state of default of the company. Definitely, it expresses the economic 
dysfunction that is reflected on the investment made by the participants, who see their 
unmet expectations of profit in line with the business plan to which they have 
subscribed, but no profits may be physiological in some cases, as typically happens in 
stages starting a business. Moreover, even in cases where the losses would imply a 
pathological state of economic imbalance, it is doubtful that these legal strategies 
adopted by the Italian legislator will be able to effectively play a role in the prevention 
of insolvency and the protection of the creditors of the company. Indeed, despite claims 
that traditionally the minimum share capital, through the "net system" acts as the buffer 
between the insolvency of the company and the total loss of its assets, the minimum 
capital required by law are so insignificant that they cannot certainly ensure a truly 
payment of all debts. 
Conclusively, it can be argued that the minimum legal share capital cannot be 
effective index of an adequate capitalization of the company to prevent or counteract 
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specifically the future indebtedness of the company. This assumption raises the debate 
about the role of the share capital in a company as the guarantee offered to protect 
shareholders and creditors and the relationship between the so called “capital 
maintenance regime” and the promotion of business efficiency166. 
It is true that the security of creditors is not statically represented by the share capital, or 
otherwise the assets of which the company currently has, but rather by its ability to 
generate income and this situation of efficiency (and hence trend solvency) is facilitated 
by the constant presence of an adequate capital resources to fund the planned activities.  
In the EU context
167
  has been arising the idea of reforming the current legal capital 
regime as established by the 2
nd
 Company Directive , believing that  the financial 
situation of a company and its future evolution are legally relevant in providing 
solvency tests either as an alternative or as an additional system to legal capital. 
The second type of imbalance which will be considered here is the financial 
situation.  
A situation of financial imbalance arises when the company finances its activities with 
its modest means and mainly by means of third parties. The equity of the company is 
failing to fund the activities planned, in particular to support those durable investments 
needed for their development. Hence the need to resort to borrowing (the so-called 
leverage) to continuing management. 
It is undeniable that the use of leverage in many cases is part of the physiology of the 
financing techniques of the company. More precisely, the expansion of borrowing can 
be beneficial for the company when the expected income from the use of new resources 
exceed their cost, or when it is really able to allow the company to exceed a period of 
temporary difficulty. 
Nevertheless, when these conditions are not met or whenever an imbalance of 
debt compared to equity exceeds certain limits (or certain parameters that the economics 
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have tried to identify) may trigger a pathological situation which threatens the future of 
the company itself and, then, can lead to an irreversible crisis of solvency. In these 
cases, the urgent need to external finance and the difficulty of providing guarantees to 
lenders for the lack of own resources can put the company in a weak bargaining 
position, forcing her to accept  high financial burdens, if not unsustainable. Indeed, 
ordinary, lenders, especially if professional, would offset the increased risk that comes 
from the low capital base of the party with the rising cost of financial transfer. 
The rising cost of credit raises the cost of managing the funded company, reducing its 
profitability and further depress the equity. Ultimately, the financial imbalance in 
physiological conditions are not likely to trigger a spiral of degeneration that can deal 
with or accelerate the economic decline of feeding a growing debt, especially in short 
term, to lead inevitably to the insolvency of the company. 
 In these cases the financial troubles lead the company to a particular serious 
dangerous situation and this is the foundation of the legal strategies that sometimes the 
Italian legislator provides for counteract the characteristic risk of insolvency produced 
by such imbalance. 
In order to understand these legal remedies, it seems useful, preliminary,  make some 
reflections on the phenomenon of the so called “thin capitalization”, that is a choice, 
taken by the company, to minimize the portion of wealth exposed to the risk of 
business, with creditors on the consequences of an eventual insolvency. The 
phenomenon is widespread and encouraged by the modesty of minimum capital 
requirements which, as already mentioned, have no real selective function, allowing the 
company to be in a permanent state of financial imbalance and deliberate, so even the 
good that was produced the management would probably have been drained by 
shareholders and certainly not used to recapitalize the company. 
Although in the Italian corporate law system there are no express rules which prohibit 
this practice, or that, otherwise, would oblige members to provide what is necessary to 
make the company more capitalized, it can be focused on a normative tendency of the 
Italian Legislator to take into account that problem, which can be deduced under art. 
2467 c.c.
168
 This disposition deals with the practice, carried out by members of s.r.l.,  of 
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those financial activities consisting in supporting the company business by founds 
which, as they are not attributed to venture capital, are subject to claim to return,  
as if the sums awarded under loan.  In a troubles company situation, the legislative 
solution is consist of postponing the satisfaction of the financing members to creditors. 
This happens when the loans are such as described under c. 2 art. 2467 c.c., that are 
loans granted by the members in favor of the s.r.l. at a time when, even in the type of 
activity conducted by the company, there is an imbalance of too much debt compared to 
equity, or in a financial situation of the company in which would have been useful 
funding. Indeed, whether that loan has been granted during the year preceding the 
declaration of insolvency, it must be returned.  
In conclusion, what these provisions are designed to counteract is the so called 
“nominal (or formal) thin capitalization” of the company, that is the situation in which 
the company is financed, but not in the forms of risk capital. Members opportunistically 
exploit this state by continuing to support the activity until the latter proves viable, 
while leaving the company bankrupt at the time of difficulty; in doing so only after 
having promptly recovered their credit, with a large and obvious translation losses and 
risk chief creditors. As a result, this becomes a practice which encourages irresponsible 
management  and, consequently, which exposes the company to a more specific risk of 
insolvency. 
 In the Italian legal system are absent, however, legal strategies designed to 
prevent or remedy to a substantial thin capitalization of the company, that is the specific 
lack of adequate capital investment for the performance of the planned activities. 
In this context there may report only hints at a different approach, a sign of an opening 
of the Italian Legislator to this subject, in terms of “assets intended for a specific 
purpose” (the Italian “patrimoni destinati ad uno specifico affare”169) for whose 
constitution the Italian law requires the establishment of a specific business plan 
showing the adequacy of capital compared to the creation of business, within the 
meaning of article 2447-ter c.c. 
In the face of provisions such as those described it is undoubtedly the problem of try to 
extrapolate, in a systematic way, a principle for further generalization, but it is certainly 
a complex issue that cannot be addressed here. What in this discussion I would highlight 
                                                 
169
 The reference is intended to those assets listed in art. 2447-bis,let. a.), c.c., that is the first type, known as 
management asset, separate from the second type, known as financial assets which are provided in art. 2447-
bis, let. b.), c.c. 
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is that, operationally, the problem is how identify parameters of increased technical 
prowess likely to indicate the conditions under which the company can be considered in 
a situation of adequate capitalization, that is financial balance. For these purposes 
economics have developed certain criteria based on the relationship between equity and 
debt (debt / equity ratio)
170
, which seem able to indicate, approximately, the condition 
of financial equilibrium of the company.  
In this regard, it is interesting to note the Italian law begins to take up these 
tools, for example, in accordance with that purpose in the companies  called 
“cooperative”, under art. 2545-quinquies c.c.,  it is possible the dividends distribution,  
the purchase of own shares, the allocation of divisible reserves to members only if the 
ratio between equity and total debt of the company is in excess of one quarter. 
In conclusion, it can be argued that the situation of financial imbalance, even if 
not considered by the Italian law generally and systematically, is the subject of attention 
of the modern Legislator in contexts where  exposed to greater danger and where the 
fate of the company lends itself to opportunistic strategies of its members.  
As well as being indicative of a greater sensitivity to the problems that the situation 
arises, this approach highlights the particular importance of preventive strategies in the 
protection of creditors when companies are in troubles. 
The third type of imbalance concerns the balance sheet, arising when all the 
activities of the company is less than its liabilities. 
The sufficiency of the company's own resources is not viewed here in relation to the 
funding needs of its business, as a function of ability to pay its current debts. Despite 
not having sufficient resources to address its debt, the company could, nevertheless, still 
be solvent, if unable to obtain from third parties necessary financial resources to meet 
regularly with its obligations or, otherwise, complete or partial deferral of the deadline 
from its creditors. 
This condition may also be physiological in the company life, whether temporary and 
with the intention to be eliminated by an increase of profit capable of restoring the 
assets to an extent sufficient to cover liabilities. 
The capital imbalance is, thus, more or less according to the worrying economic 
development of the company. Whether the latter pays in a situation of economic 
imbalance, with a negative trend in profitability, it is clear that the already limited  
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financial situation of the company will make less and less able to absorb losses up to the 
crisis of solvency. 
Normally,  capital imbalance is accompanied by an unbalanced financial situation, since 
the lack of assets implies a reduction in resources available to finance its ongoing 
activities. 
Facing the mere asset imbalance, which then also gives rise to a financial imbalance, 
and that does not yet translate into a full-blown bankruptcy, the Italian system does not 
intervene to impose special legal measures or, better, it provides only for indirect 
strategies. 
It is the case, for instance, of the discipline, under art. 2394
171
 c.c., of directors' liability 
to creditors for social obligations regarding the conservation of the integrity of corporate 
assets. Assumption of this liability is that the assets are insufficient to satisfy creditors. 
Consequently, managers should be encouraged to ensure a permanent balance sheet 
situation, that is a situation in which the assets of the company are (basically) always 
adequate to cover existing liabilities. Such ex post remedies can be seen also in a same 
provision under art. 2485 and art. 2486, c. 2, c.c.  in the context of dissolution and 
liquidation of the company
172
. 
 Although there are no  general rules or principles providing a stronger remedy 
for avoiding dangerous thin capitalization, however, in special sector of activities, the 
Italian system has established stronger and more direct measures, requiring to comply 
with, on the one hand, specific standards of capitalization (i.e. a minimum allocation of 
equity, because of certain specified type of business) and, on the other hand, solvency 
ratios capable to deal with risk to exposure and which need to be observed on an 
ongoing basis. For banks and brokerage companies, for instance,  these coefficients are 
usually given in fixed relationships that should exist between certain activities and 
capital instruments deemed useful for supervisory purposes. Moreover, for insurance 
companies, the special Code
173
 (and the secondary legislation enacted by Isvap) states 
the preservation of a clear margin of solvency and of a guarantee amount consisting of 
specifically designated assets
174
. 
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The above outlined precautions are dictated by the primary protection of relationships 
which are typically established in carrying out the recalled activities and by the public 
relevance of the interest therein underlying, potentially compromised by an economic 
crisis, no less than a crisis of legality. It accompanies (and may even be regarded as the 
ultimate goal of these measures) the protection of the general interest to the firm 
stability in the mentioned sectors and the financial system as a whole, for his reflections 
on the world economic system. 
 
 
 
3.7. The Relationship between balance of equity/debt and balance of corporate 
control 
It has been shown that excessive indebtedness, which determines the troubles of 
a company, from whatever source it originates, is relevant in law in particular, as it is 
pointed out in this discussion, because it affects the corporate governance of the 
company, that is the corporate control, even if the threshold of insolvency is not 
exceeded. From the substantive point of view, that freedom of carrying on business is 
compressed and redirected as a result of the rules protecting the assets. This fact  
reflects, and this is the next step that I would  to outline here, a limitation of the power 
of control of the members or of the control group. In this case the control does not pass 
to subjects other than those already held. However, the imbalance between equity and 
debt, made evident by the existence of losses, results in a significant downsizing in the 
freedom of management choices in chief of the directors and, consequently, in chief 
who holds control. 
These corporate governance rules are not only important from a procedural 
prospective, but they are also relevant as an expression of a general principle which, it 
can be argued, should be expressed by the prohibition, in certain circumstances, to 
continue the business activities  if it is not reconstituted for such continuation an 
adequate level of equity. The typical circumstance, already cited above, which trigger 
that ban is the existence of an imbalance between liabilities and assets to an extent to set 
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the continuation of the concern without any recapitalization, as a conscious and 
improper risk translation  on creditors. 
This duty of good business management, which can be translated into a duty to 
correct asset organization, leads to, if it is not met, a fault-based liability on the part of 
those who, in practice, are empowered of the governance of the business activities of the 
company and which continue to operate not as a going concern. Thus, in economic 
terms, this is the going concern principle
175
 as a ratio to evaluate the debt condition of a 
company in order to highlight a possible situation of excessive indebtedness. In other 
words, the going concern principle  expresses the economic and financial capacity of the 
company in normal activities to auto-generate, in the foreseeable future, the conditions 
for its economic balance. In this regard, it is one of the basic assumptions that must be 
made in order to proceed with the preparation of the balance sheet of any company 
which is not deemed to be in liquidation. 
The concept of going concern related to the financial situation of the company 
can be applied concurrently  to the detriment of the concepts of “losses” or 
“insolvency”.  
Indeed, the opportunity to continue the business activity is based on the assumption that 
the company is in a financial condition to continue doing so, that, the company will be 
able to generate and/or raise enough resources to stay operational. It can be argued that 
the lack of the going concern, which usually depend on over-indebtedness not refreshed 
by a substantial injection of venture capital, as on a lack of financial resources (but 
which can also arise from non-financial factors, providing the same effect of not to 
render  predictable the continuity of the business activities),  marks the starting point of 
that phase in which  the duties and the conduct obligations of correct business  
originate. 
In other respects, it can be shown that it is possible to deduce a fault-based 
liability for breaches of rules of correct business organization also by the criminal 
provisions of the Italian Insolvency Law
176
. In particular, the reference is to articles 
216-222,  which provide a duty of good management and / or maintenance of the 
activities which are part of the assets subject to business risk, dealing with prudence and 
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fairness ratios compared to the  interest to maintain the solvency of the company. In this 
regard, it is particular significant the article 218 l. fall., which make managers 
criminally liable whether they have concealed the troubles of the company
177
, 
continuing  the use or misuse of credit.  
As a result,  the Italian Legislator prohibits  criminal conduct which may also consist in 
continuing to resort to credit when there is a pathological situation that is not 
insolvency, but that already contains the structural imbalance of economic and financial 
factors capable of maturing that default state. 
Another area where it is possible to highlight the relationship between the going 
concern principle, the solvency situation of the company and the fault liability 
connected with the violation of that principle is, paradoxically, the context of the Italian 
discipline of the liquidation of the company under articles 2484ss. c.c.  
The law allows, at least in theory, business activities during the extinctive procedure of 
the company. More exactly, art. 2486 c.c. provides the possibility for the directors (in 
the time between the cause of the dissolution and the commencement of liquidation) to 
continue business activities even though in a perspective prepared for liquidation. 
Indeed, the discipline, as reformed by the legislator  in 2004, no longer provides the 
prohibition of “new business activities” as it was the case under the  repealed article 
2449, c. 1, c.c.; moreover, nowadays, it has failed the reference to the “preservation of 
social goods”, which was indicated under the former article 2449, c. 3, cc; furthermore, 
the law speaks in terms of “continuation” of activities, not shooting,  unlike the case 
under, for instance, the different hypothesis ex article 90 l. fall. Finally, art. 2486, c. 1, 
c.c., specifies the aim of the directors, that is the preservation of the integrity and value 
of assets, connected with the liability ex c. 2 of the same article, for damage caused to 
the company, the members, the creditors or third parties in general,  whether they do not 
respect the previous mandatory rule ex c. 1. 
Problematic is the point whether such a duty to continue the business activities is 
a real duty or a mere faculty for directors, as an arrangement to ensure the maintenance 
of the assets view to the possible cession of business
178
. Connected with this theme it is 
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also the discussion about the necessity of a decision of the shareholder meeting  in order 
to continue the business activities
179
. 
The interest of a correct management is also apparent when the activities are carried out 
by the liquidators. The main difference between the role of liquidators and directors is 
that the latter have carried out their activities to meet the profit interest of the company, 
otherwise liquidators have to manage for the interest of the company that is, at this 
stage, conservative. Liquidators, under the default rule ex art. 2489 c.c., have the 
freedom to perform all the acts useful for the liquidation of the company, but, according 
to art. 2487, c. 1, let. c), c.c.
180
, only those necessary for the maintenance  of the value 
of the assets. However,  this means that to be preserved, must pre-exist a correct 
business organization.  
The liquidation is in the exclusive interest of the members. Nevertheless, the 
satisfaction of that interest is normatively subject to the creditors‟ satisfaction. This is 
the case, for example, under art. 2491, c. 2
181
, which provides the rule under which 
liquidators cannot  distribute among the members  the interim result of the liquidation. 
However, that distribution is permitted if it does not affect the availability of 
appropriate amounts to the integral and timely satisfaction of the creditors. Liquidators 
may still affect the distribution of benefits by a member of eligible collateral. 
Furthermore, if the funds are insufficient for the payment of the company‟s creditors, 
liquidators may ask shareholder pro rata capital contributions. 
In this context, one wonders whether between members and creditors there is a conflict 
and/or a relationship of unique implication, namely in the fact that members can achieve 
their interests in so much, as the one of creditors has already fulfilled. As a 
consequence, when the company is in troubles, it seems the settlement being intended 
primarily to permit the satisfaction of creditors. In this regard commentators call for 
management in the hands of the creditors themselves
182
. 
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 For a deep discussion, see G. Niccolini, sub. art. 2486, in Società di capitali, III, pp. 1733ss.;  Id., Gestione 
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U.K. 
 
4.1. Creditors’ interests under U.K. jurisdiction 
The mechanisms that U.K. insolvency law establishes to protect creditors are 
expertise-accountability remedies which can be specified as rules on disqualification
183
 
and rules that provide for directors‟ liability184 with the associated issues of 
enforcement
185
. Mention should then be made of the processes that are designed to 
control the activities of directors by providing that a company may be wound up in the 
public interest. 
                                                 
183
 Disqualification Act. 
184
 Company Act 2006. 
185
 A starting point in examining directors‟ liability is the set of common law duties that a director owes to a 
company. In general, a director cannot be made liable in insolvency for the obligations of his or her company. 
It has long been established, that a director owes a fiduciary duty to act in bona fide in the best interests of the 
company and, in an insolvency, this duty may come into play. A liquidator, for instance, may mount a claim 
against the director personally where the director‟s negligent conduct has diminished the insolvency estate. In 
this regard the leading case is: Salomon v. Salomon & Co. Ltd, [1897], AC, 22. See generally A Keay, 
Company Directors‟ Responsibilities to creditors, Routledge-Cavendish, London, 2007; See Re Smith and 
Fawcett Ltd, [1942] Ch 304. On the degree of care owed see Romer J in Re City equitable fire insurance Co. 
[1925] Ch 407; Dorchester Finance Co. Ltd v. Stebbing [1989] BCLC 498; V. Finch, Company directors: who 
cares about skill and care?, 1992, 55 MLR 179; see also the statutory encapsulation of this duty in the 
Companies Act 2006 s. 172. 
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The set of duties that directors owe to company creditors are usually 
underpinned by the arguments that, as a company approaches insolvency
186
, the 
commercial risks involved fall increasingly on the company‟s creditors rather than 
shareholders; that not all creditors will be well placed to protect themselves (by, for 
examples, taking security, demanding guarantees, spreading risks, or costing such risks 
into their loan agreements); and that the directors of the company may, in the absence of 
legal controls, both breach the canons of commercial morality and take unreasonable, 
unfair and inefficient risks with the creditors‟ money187. 
As for the nature and content of the duties, the Company Act 2006 codifies the 
common law‟s provision of directors‟ duties in a statutory statement but in a manner 
that leaves the decisions of the courts of relevance with regard to duties to creditors. 
This is because the 2006 Act section 170 (4) stipulates that its codified terms are to be 
applied in a like manner to the common law and equitable principle that predated 
section 172 (3) of the 2006 Act, moreover, states that the directors‟ general duties to 
promote the success of the company (under section 172) have effect “subject to any 
enactment or rule of law requiring directors, in certain circumstances, to consider or act 
in the interests of creditors of the company”. 
The court, however, have taken divergent views on the nature, as well as the 
content, of the duty owed by directors to creditors. On one approach it is seen as an 
aspect of the traditional fiduciary duty of directors to act bone fide in the interests of the 
company, on another, it is viewed as an independent, positive duty owed directly to 
creditors and founded either on ordinary principles of directors‟ duty of care or on 
tortious principles
188
. 
In favour of the idea that duties to creditors flow from the traditional fiduciary 
duty to act in the best interests of the company, there are a number of English court 
decisions that build on a series of Commonwealth cases. Notable among the latter is 
                                                 
186
 See generally D. Milman, Strategies for regulating managerial performance in the twilight zone, [2004] 
JBL 493. 
187
 See generally A Keay, A theoretical analysis of the director‟s duty to consider creditor interests: the 
progressive school‟s approach (2004) JCLS 307; Id, Directors‟ duties to creditors: contractarian concerns 
relating efficiency and over-protection of creditors, (2003) 66 MLR 665; Id, The duty of directors to take 
account of creditors‟ interests [2002] JBL 379. See also P. Davies, Directors‟ creditor-regarding duties in 
respect of trading decisions taken in the vicinity of insolvency (2006) 7 EBOLR 301. 
188
 See V. Finch, Creditors‟ interests and directors‟ obligations, in S. Sheikh and W. Rees (eds.), Corporate 
governance and corporate control, Cavendish, London, 1995; Id., Directors‟ duties: insolvency and the 
unsecured creditor, in A. Clarke (ed.), Current issues in insolvency law, Stevens, London, 1991, p. 87. On 
directors‟ duties to creditors see also R. Grantham, The judicial extension of directors‟ duties to creditors 
[1991] JBL 1; D. Prentice, Creditors‟ interest and directors‟ duties (1990) 10 OJLS 265; L.S. Sealy, Directors‟ 
“Wider” responsibilities: problems, conceptual, practical and procedural (1987) 13 Monash LR 164; J,. S. 
Ziegel, Creditors as Corporate shareholders, 1993, 43 U Toronto LJ 511. 
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Walker v. Wimborne
189
 in which the Australian High Court spoke of “directors of a 
company in discharging their duty to the company [having to] take account of the 
interest of its shareholders and its creditors”190. Similarly, in Nicholson v. Permakraft191 
Cooke J, sitting in the New Zealand Court of Appeal, concluded obiter that directors‟ 
duties to the company “may require them to consider inter alia the interests of 
creditors
192
. During the 1980s the English courts echoed this approach. In Lonrho v. 
Shell Petroleum
193Diplock LJ indicated that the “best interests of the company” might 
not be exclusively those of shareholders “but may include those of creditors”. Buckley 
LJ in Re Horsley and Weight Ltd referred to the “loose” terminology of “directors 
owing an indirect duty to creditors not to permit any unlawful reduction of capital to 
occur” and stated that it was more accurate to say that directors “owe a duty to the 
company in this respect”. In both the Court of Appeal and the House of Lords decisions 
in Brady v. Brady
194
 it was indicated (by Nourse LJ and Lord Oliver) that directors 
need
195
 to consider creditors‟ interests if they were to act in the interests of the 
company. 
Contrasting with this approach are dicta suggesting that there is a direct and 
specific duty that is owed to creditors. Thus, in Winkworth v. Edward Baron 
Developments Co. Ltd
196
 Lord Templeman stated: “A duty is owed by directors of the 
company and to the creditors of the company to ensure that the affairs of the company 
are properly administered and that its property is not dissipated or exploited for the 
benefit of directors themselves to the prejudice of creditors”. His Lordship‟s distinction 
between the company and the creditors here implied the motion of a specific duty to the 
latter
197
. 
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 Walker v. Wimborne [1976] 50 ALJR 446 at 449: Noted: R. Baxt (1976) 50 ALJ 591. 
190
 Maison J., op. cit., pp. 134ss. 
191
 [1985] 1 NZLR 242. 
192
 Ibid., at 249. Noted: [1985] JBL 413: See also Kinsela v. Russel Kinsela Pty Ltd (1986) 4 ACLC 215, noted: 
Baxt (1986) 14 ABLR 320. See also the Supreme Court of Canada in People Department Stores v. Wise [2004] 
SCC 68; A. Keay, Directors‟ duties – do recent Canadian developments require a rethinking in the UK on the 
issue of the directors‟ duties to consider crediotors‟ interests?, in Insolvency Intelligence, 2005, 65, 18. 
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 [1980] 1 WLR 627 at 634. 
194
 [1989]3 BCC 535 (CA), [1988] 2 All ER 617 (HL). 
195
 For an attack on the view that fiduciary duties should shift to creditors when the company is in financial 
distress see J. Lipson, Directors‟ duties to creditors: power imbalance and the financially distressed 
corporation, 2003, 50 UCLA L Rev. 1189 (arguing for adverting to power imbalances expressed as disparities 
of volition, cognition and exit when considering who should benefit from directors‟ duties. For opposition to 
the shift towards duties owed to creditors at any stage before a formal filing see H. Hu and J. Westbrook, 
Abolition of the corporate duty to creditors, in Columbia Law Review, 2007, 107, p. 1321.  
196
 [1987] 1 All ER 114 at 118. 
197
 In this regard see also Hooker Investments Pty Ltd v. Email Ltd (1986) 10 ACLR 443. If a direct duty to 
creditors were to be recognized routinely by the courts (which seems unlikely) then the question as to the 
nature of that duty would arise. Is the duty, for example, to be seen as an extension of the directors‟ traditional 
86 
The most recent indications are, however, that the courts are unwilling to 
recognize a duty owed directly to creditors and, indeed, academic opinion now seems to 
accept that the duty is an indirect one
198
. In the Yukong case
199
 Toulson J considered 
West Mercia
200
 and stated that where a director acted in breach of his duty to the 
company by causing assets of the company to be transferred in disregard of the interests 
of its creditor (or creditors), he was answerable through the scheme Parliament had 
provided in the Insolvency Act 1986 section 212 (misfeasance or breach of fiduciary or 
other duty) but “he does not owe a direct fiduciary duty towards an individual creditor 
nor is an individual creditor entitled to sue for breach of the fiduciary duty
201
 owed by 
the director to the company”202. 
                                                                                                                                               
duty of care or is it to be seen as one grounded in tortious principles? See V. Finch, Creditors‟ interests and 
directors‟ obligations, op. cit, pp. 176ss.  
198
 See Colin Gwyer & Associates Ltd v. London Wharf (Limehouse) Ltd [2003] 2 BCLC 153; Yukong Lines Ltd 
of Korea v. rendsburg Investments corporation [1998] BCC 870; Kuwait Asia Bank EC v. National Mutual Life 
Nominees Ltd [1991] 1 AC 187; Apies v. The Queen (2000) 201 CLR 603, (2000) 173 ALR 529; Re New 
World Alliance Pty Ltd, Fed. No. 332/94, 26 May 1994. See also L. S. Sealy,  Personal liability of directors 
and officers for debts of insolvent corporations: a jurisdictional perspective (England), in J. Ziegel (ed.), 
Current developments in international and comparative corporate insolvency law, Clarendon Press, Oxford. 
1994, p. 486; A Keay, Another way of skinning a cat, in Insolvency Intelligence, 2004, 12, pp. 1-4; D. 
McKenzie Skene, The directors‟ duties to creditors of a financially distressed company: a perspective from 
across the pond, in Journal of Business and Technology Law, 2007, p. 499. 
199
 Yukong Lines Ltd of Korea v. Rendsburg Investments Corporation [1998] BCC 870; see also T. Ogowewo, 
A perfect case for the application of section 423 of the Insolvency Act 1986: Yukong Lines Ltd of Korea v. 
Rendsburg Investments Corporation, in Ins. Law., 1999, 106. 
200
 West Mercia Safetywear Ltd v. Dodd [1988] 4 BCC 30, where it was noted that shareholders are replaced by 
creditors on insolvency as residual claimants, thus implying that the company‟s interests are now represented 
by the creditors‟ interests.   
201
 To view duties to creditors as part of the traditional duty to act bona fide in the company‟s interests is, 
however, not without problems, Are creditors‟ interests to be considered independently or merely in so far as 
they are relevant to the company‟s interests? Are creditors‟ interests to be part of a package of claims (e.g. 
including those of shareholders and employees), in which case how will directors proceed if these constituent 
company interests conflict? Is, moreover, directorial consideration of creditors‟ interests to be assessed 
subjectively or objectively? Subjectively may be consistent with principle but would pose problems of 
accountability and on objective approach could draw the judges into assessment of directors‟ business 
decisions. See Re Smith and Fawcett [1942] Ch 304: the duty is to act bona fide in what the director considers, 
not what the court considers, is in the company‟s interests (per Lord Greene). See also Regentcrest plc (in 
liquidation) v. Cohen [2001] BCC 494, where Jonathan Parker J, in dismissing a claim brought by liquidators 
against a director for breach of his fiduciary duty to act bona fide in the best interest of the company, stated the 
duty was to be judged on a subjective basis: if the director “honestly believed that he was acting in the best 
interests of the company” he was not in breach. 
The judges have yet to resolve these questions, but the weight of argument does currently  favour treating the 
duty to creditors as part of the duty to act in the interests of the company. See Yukong LINES Ltd of Korea v. 
Rendsburg Investments Corporation [1998] BCC 870. As noted above, enforcement of the duty can thus be 
effected through s. 212 of the Insolvency Act – a summary remedy which applies if, in the course of winding 
up, it appears that an officer of the company has been guilty of any misfeasance or breach of any fiduciary duty 
or other duty in relation to the company. As for the proceeds of actions for breaches of duties to creditors, a 
weakness of the law here is that these will not go primarily to the unsecured creditors (who are the parties most 
in need of protection), but, since the company will be in liquidation, such proceeds will be caught by any 
security interests the company has granted: see P. Davies, Directors‟ creditor-regarding duties, op. cit., pp. 
67ss. 
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 As Toulson J  indicated, enforcement of the duty can be effected through s. 212 of the Insolvency Act 1986 
– a summary remedy which applies if, in the course of winding up, it appears that an officer of the company (s, 
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Judges have tended to speak of creditors as a homogeneous group but have 
failed to state clearly whether directors owe a duty to creditors generally, to individual 
creditors, or to a class of creditors. Attempts have been made to distinguish the interests 
of existing creditors from those of future creditors but, even in this endeavour, 
inconsistent approaches are to be encountered. Thus, in Nicholson v. Permakraft
203
 
Cooke J indicated that future creditors might normally be expected to “take the 
company as it is” and guard their own interests, whereas in Winkworth v. Edward 
Baron
204
 Lord Templeman urged that “duties were owed to creditors present and future 
to keep its property inviolate and available for the payment of debts”. 
As for existing creditors, these may possess highly conflicting interests; the 
unsecured trade creditor is in a quite different position from the bank with a floating 
charge over the company‟s property. The courts have  yet to offer clear guidance to the 
director who has to choose between such competing interests
205
 and an undifferentiated  
approach may reduce the force of such a duty quite considerably:”Where duties are 
owed to persons with potentially opposed interests, the duty bifurcates and fragments so 
that it amounts ultimately to no more than a vague obligation to be fair [...]. If the law 
does this it abandons all effective control  over the decision maker. 
In Re Pantone 485 Ltd
206
 it was stated that “the creditors” meant the creditors as a 
whole, i.e. the general creditors. Consequently, if directors acted consistently with the 
interests of the general creditors but inconsistently with the interest of a creditor or a 
section of creditors with special rights in a winding up then the directors would not be 
in breach of their duty. Distinguishing between classes of creditor seems necessary, 
however, if nothing else, for the purposes of rendering duties potentially effective. If 
unsecured creditors are to be protected, the judges will have to construe the duty as 
owed to them either individually or as a specific class and the latter approach would 
                                                                                                                                               
212(1) (a)) has been guilty of any misfeasance or breach of any fiduciary duty or other duty in relation to the 
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 For example, directors may have to choose between using remaining assets to pay off preferential creditors 
or continuing trading in the hope of benefiting unsecured creditors. Of course, choosing to trade on for the 
benefit of unsecured creditors rather than immediately paying preferential debts is not necessarily improper: 
see Re CU Fitting Ltd [1989] 5 BCC 210, which is a disqualification case, noted in V. Finch, Disqualification 
of directors: a plea for competence, 1990, MLR, 53, 385. 
206
 [2002] 1 BCLC 266.  
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seem more consistent with the notion of bankruptcy as a collective procedure concerned 
with pari passu distribution according to pre-bankruptcy entitlements
207
. 
A further issue that the courts have yet to resolve concerns the exclusivity of the 
attention that directors should give to creditor interests when those interests fall to be 
considered
208
. In the case of Whalley v. Doney
209
 Park J said that, at the pre-insolvency 
stage of financial difficulties, the duties owed to the company extended to encompass 
the interests of the creditors as a whole as well as those of a shareholder
210
. It is 
noteworthy here that Whalley talks of creditor interests joining those of the shareholder. 
Some authorities, however, come close to making creditor interests an exclusive focus –
at least at the stage when insolvency is questionable or imminent. Thus, in Brady v. 
Brady
211
, Nourse LJ, in the Court of Appeal, indicated that after the advent of 
insolvency (or doubtful insolvency) the interests of the company are in reality the 
interests of existing creditors alone
212
. This implies that the directors have a duty to 
pursue the advantage of creditors, an approach consistent with the comments of Street 
CJ in Kinsela to the effect that in an insolvent company it is the creditors‟ and not the 
shareholders‟ assets that are under the management of the directors. More recently, in 
the Colin Gwyer case, it was emphasised that, where the company was on the verge of 
insolvency, the interests of the creditors must be considered paramount
213
. 
A contrasting approach allows directors to act post-insolvency in the interests of 
the company as a whole, provided that actions do not prejudice creditors. Thus, in Re 
Welfab Enginers Ltd
214
, Hoffmann J considered the position where a company was 
insolvent but had not been placed in the hands of a receiver. He stated that although the 
directors were not, at such a stage, entitled to act in a manner leaving the creditors in a 
worse position than on a liquidation, they had not failed in their duty to the company 
when they had borne in mind the effect on employees of different courses of action
215
. 
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Insolvency Intelligence, 2004, 17, 103. 
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 Brady v. Brady [1989] 3 BCC 535.  
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Oliver: see [1988] 2 All ER 617 at 632.  
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 See also Re Pantone 485 Ltd [2002] 1 BCLC 266. 
214
 Re Welfab Enginers Ltd [1990] BCC 600. 
215
 See Grantham, Directors‟ dulie and insolvent compagnie, p. 578 
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A way to resolve such tension is to read dicta in Brady and Kinsela as being concerned 
with the reorientation of focus from shareholders to creditor interests that occurs around 
the point of insolvency rather than being concern to address the issue of exclusivity of 
interest. The judges could endorse Welfab and stress that creditor interests fall to be 
considered on insolvency (or doubtful insolvency) but that such interests do not have to 
be the exclusive concerns of directors. Just as directors are entitled to look beyond 
shareholder interests before insolvency they should be given a degree of flexibility in 
relation to the interests of the creditors, who, on insolvency, have stepped into the shoes 
of the shareholders
216
. 
Even if it is accepted that the duty to creditors flows from the traditional duty to 
act in the company‟s interests, the courts have been tentative in stating when creditors‟ 
interests fall to be considered by directors as part of those company interests. Three 
positions on the issue can be distinguished: a.) when a company becomes insolvent the 
interests of creditors are company interests; b.) creditors‟ interests transform into 
company interests as the company approaches insolvency or when insolvency is 
threatened, in a single term, when company is “in troubles”; c.) the interests of the 
company include those of creditors and directors should bear in mind creditors‟ interests 
at all times. 
The judges have hovered, sometimes uneasily, between these three positions. In 
support of the  position  a.) is the West Mercia
217
 decision of the Court of Appeal in 
which a director effected a fraudulent preference and was found to be guilty of a breach 
of duty (the director had, for his own purposes, made a transfer between accounts in 
disregard of the interests of the general creditors of the insolvent company). West 
Mercia indicated that where a company is insolvent, a director‟s duty to act in the best 
interests of the company includes a duty to protect the interests of the company‟s 
creditors. Dillon LJ noted with approval Street CJ‟s statement in the Australian case of 
Kinsela v. Russel Kinsela property Ltd
218
 that in a solvent company the proprietary 
interests of the shareholders entitle them as a general body to be regarded as the 
company when questions of the duty of directors arise, but “where a company is 
insolvent the interests of creditors intrude. They become prospectively entitled, through 
the mechanism of liquidation, to displace the power of the shareholders and directors to 
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deal with the company‟s assets”. Whether insolvency is a precondition of creditor 
interests being subsumed within company interests is, however, a matter not beyond 
doubt. A number of cases extend the principle to incipient insolvency or even threatened 
insolvency. Thus the Court of Appeal in Re Horsley and Weight Ltd
219
 stated that 
insolvency, or near insolvency, was a precondition, and a similar stance appeared to be 
taken by the New Zealand Court of Appeal in Nicholson v. Permakraft
220
. In Nicholson 
the company was solvent at the relevant time but Cooke J considered situations in 
which directors should consider creditors‟ interests. These included circumstances of 
insolvency or near insolvency or doubtful insolvency or if the “contemplated payment 
or other course of action could jeopardise its solvency”. Such reasoning may accord to 
some extent with position b.) and the idea that creditor interests fall to be considered in 
so far as insolvency looms. This is echoed in, for example, Nourse LJ‟s dicta in Brady 
v. Brady
221where His Lordship considered the meaning of “given in good faith in the 
interest of the company” in section 153 of the Companies Act 1985222 and stated that 
where the company is insolvent or even doubtfully solvent, the interests of the company 
are in reality the interests of the existing creditors alone. In Whalley v. Doney
223
Park J 
urged that a company did not have to be insolvent for a director to have breached his 
duties to the company by being motivated only by the interests of shareholders and 
employees. In Whalley there was a preliquidation sale to an entity in which the principal 
and the liquidator argued that the price represented an undervaluation. The judge found 
for the liquidator on a misfeasance claim and said that the company might have a good 
claim against a director when the company “whether technically insolvent or not, is in 
financial difficulties to the extent that its creditors are at risk”224.  
Certain cases go further, however, and adopt a stance close to position c.) by 
suggesting that insolvency per se is no precondition to consideration of creditors‟ 
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interests. In the High Court of Australia in Walker v. Wimborne
225
 Mason J indicated 
that creditors‟ interests should be considered even before insolvency because “those 
interests nay be prejudiced by the movement of funds between companies in the event 
that the companies become insolvent”. Thus, creditors‟ interests could always be 
relevant given the theoretical possibility of future insolvency
226
. Nicholson v. 
Permakraft
227
is not far short of this position in referring to circumstances in which a 
contemplated payment or other course of action might jeopardise solvency, There are 
dicta, moreover, in two House of Lords decisions in which duties to creditors are 
mooted and the issue of insolvency is not even referred to
228
. The courts have thus 
adopted a variety of positions on directors‟ duties to creditors229 but, post-Gwyer230 and 
Whalley
231
 , there does seem to be a shift by the English judiciary towards position b.) 
above. The West Mercia and Gwyer cases, however, did not address the issue of 
whether the directors‟ state of appreciation of the company‟s solvency was to be judged 
objectively or subjectively
232
. 
 
4.2. Regulatory remedy to protect creditors: compensate strategies 
4.2.1. Fraudulent trading 
It is fundamental and peculiar of U.K. jurisdiction the provision of fraudulent 
trading, making directors personally liable in the context of companies in troubles. This 
is a strategy which requires directors to compensate for the damage caused. More 
precisely, the offence of fraudulent trading
233
 is committed by every person who 
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 See Walker v. Wimborne (1976) 137 CLR 1, (1978) 3 ACLR 529. See also Facia Footwear Ltd (in 
administration) v. Hinchliffe [1998] 1 BCLC 218; Galladin Pty Ltd v. Aimnorth Pty Ltd (1993) 11 ACSR 23; 
Wright v. Frisnia (1983) 1 ACLC 716. 
226
 See Barrett (1977) 40 MLR 229. 
227
 See Nicholson v. Permakraft [1985] 1 NZLR 242. 
228
 See in Lonrho v. Shell Petroleum [1980] 1 WLR 627, Lord Diplock, where speaking of the best interests of 
the company not necessarily being those of shareholders alone but possibly including those of creditors, made 
no mention of solvency or  insolvency. Neither did Lord Templeman in Winkworth v. Edward Baron 
Developments Co. Ltd [1986] 1 WLR 1512, when he was speaking of the duty apparently directly owed to 
creditors.  
229
 Per Giles J A in Linton v. Telnet Pty Ltd (1999) 30 ACSR 465 at 473: there is significant difficulty in 
deciding when directors should have renard to creditors‟ interests and it depends on the particular facts. 
230
 Colin Gwyer & Associated Ltd v. London Wharf (Limehouse) Ltd, op. cit. 
231
 Whalley v. Doney, op. cit. 
232
 In Whalley v. Doney, op. cit Park J seems, indeed, to adhere to both assessments:” whether IM Ltd was 
technically insolvent before the transaction or not (and in my view it was anyway) it was on any view in a 
dangerous financial position, and Mr Doney knew it”. 
233
 Since 1928, the U.K. legislation provided that a civil remedy could be sought where fraudulent trading, as it 
was called, could be proved. But the Report of the Insolvency Law Review Committee, Insolvency Law and 
Practice (known as the “Cork Report”) put forward the opinion that the fraudulent trading provision possessed 
significant inadequacies in dealing with irresponsible trading, such as the fact that the criminal burden of proof 
applied to civil actions and, also, applicants were required to establish actual dishonestly and real moral blame 
(Re Patrick and Lyion Ltd [1993] Ch 786). The recommendation of the Cork Committee was that the provision 
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knowingly is a party to the carrying on of a business of a company with intent to 
defraud creditors of the company or creditors of any other person, or for a fraudulent 
purpose. The provision can be invoked even where the intention  is to defraud future 
creditors of the company
234
. 
Section 213 (1) sets out the conduct that constitutes the action of fraudulent 
trading, i.e. intent to defraud creditors or having a fraudulent purpose. The following  
section 213 (2) then states who is liable in civil action and for what they can be liable
235
. 
The persons who are liable to be proceeded against are those who knowingly are parties 
to the carrying on of a business of a company with intent to defraud creditors. Such 
persons are liable to make such contributions to the company as the court thinks 
proper
236. Commonly those persons will be the company‟s directors, but they are not the 
                                                                                                                                               
be amended and that criminal liability should apply only in relation to fraudulent trading and a new provision 
should be introduced to permit the taking of civil actions. The legislature responded by introducing wrongful 
trading, a  civil action, and fraudulent trading was divided into two. First, there was section 213 of the Act, 
which provided for a civil action. Second, there was provision for a criminal prosecution of fraudulent trading 
under what is now section 993 of the Companies Act 2006 (formerly s. 458 of the Company Act 1985). The 
two provisions dealing with fraudulent trading are essentially identical, with the primary difference being 
procedural. Under the former the applicant will be the liquidator, while criminal proceeding under section 993 
must be initiated by the Crown. Critically, while a criminal prosecution may be initiated whether or not the 
company is in liquidation, civil actions may only be commenced where the company  has entered liquidation.  
At one time it was generally thought that section 213 would not be invoked frequently, given the advent of the 
action of wrongful trading in section 214, but that is not the case. While section 214 has a lower threshold of 
proof, and the elements of the section appear prima facie easier to establish, wrongful trading actions have not 
been prolific and  there have been a good number of fraudulent trading actions in the past 10 years, leading to 
something of a renaissance for the provision. See, for instance, Re Esal (Commodities) Ltd [1997] 1 BCLC 705, 
CA; Re BCCI; Morris v. State Bank of India [1999] BCC 943, [2000] BPIR 83, CA; Morris v. bank of America 
National Trust and Savings Association [2000] BPIR 83, [2000] BCC 1076, [2001] BPIR 8; Re Bank of Credit 
and Commerce International SA; Morris v. State Bank of India [2004] 2 BCLC 236; Morphites v. Bernasconi 
[2003] EWCA Civ 289, [20003] BCC 540, CA; Morris v. Bank of India [2004] BCC 404 and affirmed on 
appeal in [2005] EWCA Civ, 693. 
234
 See Re Smith [1996] 2 BCLC 109. In fact customers of a company may be regarded as creditors of the 
company for the purposes of section 213, cfr. R. v. Imman [1967] 1 QB 140, CCA; [1996] 3 All ER 414; Re 
Sarflax Ltd [1979] 1 Ch 592, on the basis that they are prospective or contingent creditors, although this does 
not include all customers, see In re Gerald Cooper Chemicals Ltd [1978] Ch 262. 
235
 According to statutory provision creating personal liability, directors may be liable to compensate creditors 
where they have been party to fraudulent trading by the company. Section 213 of the Insolvency Act 1986 
provides: 
(1) If in the course of the winding up of the company it appears that any business of the company has 
been carried on with intent to defraud creditors of the company, or creditors of any other person, or 
for any fraudulent purpose, the following has effect. 
(2) The court, on the application of the liquidator, may declare that any persons who were knowingly 
parties to the carrying on of the business in the manner above mentioned are liable to make such 
contributions (if any) to the company assets as the court thinks proper. 
236
 It has been said that there must be a connection between the losses caused by the fraudulent trading and the 
quantum of compensation and that the court has no power under section 213 to impose a punitive element in 
the compensation order made. The section has a long history and, indeed, was introduced particularly to protect 
unsecured creditors from the abuse of “filling up” floating charges. Now, however, it is recognized that the aim 
of fraudulent trading provisions – to discourage directors from carrying on business at the expense of creditors 
– is severely restricted by the requirement of dishonest intent and the courts‟ insistence on strict standards of 
pleading and proof. Such an approach may be understandable for criminal liability under section 993 of the 
Companies Act 2006, but its imposition on the civil liability provided for in section 213 of the 1986 Act has led 
to the latter section‟s virtual obsolescence.. This obsolescence is now even more apparent with the advent of 
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only ones who may, theoretically, be sued. For instance, Neuberger J
237
 held that section 
213 (2) was not limited to those who managed or controlled the company that had 
failed. The learned judge said that a company that was involved in and assisted and 
benefited from the business of the failed company and did so knowingly, could fall 
within section 213. This assumption opens the view to another discussion, about the 
possibility to evocate this remedy also to other subjects connected with the company, 
such as banks or creditors in general who had had the control of the company of, 
however, had made some business decisions with the intention to defraud (other) 
creditors of the same company (or group of the company). 
Only liquidators are able to apply for an order under section 213, and in taking 
action the liquidator is seeking compensation on behalf of the general body of 
creditors
238
.  
There are, therefore, three elements that need to be established by a liquidator. 
These are: the business of the company in liquidation has been carried on with intent to 
                                                                                                                                               
section 214, the “wrongful trading” provision. What is more, the Court of Appeal appears to have adopted a 
concept of intention for the purposes of section 213 that is even harder to demonstrate than would b the case in 
the criminal law. In criminal law it is established by the House of Lords that a person “intends” the 
consequences of an action that are foreseen as virtually certain – and that whether those consequences were 
desired or were the main motive for the action is irrelevant236. In the court of Appeal case of Morphitis v. 
Bernasconi, however, Chadwick LJ did not treat the phrase “with intent to defraud” as a composite whole, 
finding that fraud alone is not sufficient to ground liability and defining the word “intent” in isolation. Thus, 
according to Chadwick LJ, there had been no “intent to defraud” since the aim or objective underlying the 
company‟s trading was to protect the directors from liability under section 216of the Insolvency Act rather than 
to defraud creditors or in particular the landlord. It would, however, have been equally possible to recognise 
that the purpose behind the scheme was to enable the company to divest itself of onerous leasehold premises 
while simultaneously protecting the company brand or, alternatively, as an attempt to minimise rent payments 
while forestalling the issue of a writ236. Whether the ruling in Morphitis v. Bernasconi will survive scrutiny 
should the House of Lords consider this matter in the future nay be doubtful since, as one commentator has 
said:” the test of oblique intention [...] in Morphitis is wholly out of step with contemporary thinking on the 
issue in criminal law cases proper”.. In this regard, see: A. Savarimuthu, Morphitis in the Court of Appeal, 
(2005) 26 Co. Law. 245 at 248. 
As for the criminal offence of fraudulent trading, this was formerly set out in section 458 of the Companies Act 
1985 and is now provided for in section 993 of the Companies Act 2006. This has been called “a valuable 
weapon in countering crime”.  Problems of under-deterrence, however, prompted the CLRSG to propose, in 
2001, that the penalty for the offence should be raised to a level comparable with that for deception under the 
Theft Act. In due course, the Fraud Act 2006 section 10 increased the maximum penalty under section 993 of 
the Companies Act 2006 to ten years on indictment and section 9 of the Fraud Act 2006 provided for a similar 
offence to apply to sole trader who would otherwise be beyond the scope of section 993. See CLRSG, Final 
Report, 2001, par. 15.7. The CLRSG recommended that the offence should be extended  to companies 
incorporated overseas and trading in the UK and to individuals and partnerships. For an equivalent to the 
Companies Act 2006 s. 993 that is of relevance to sole trader, see the Fraud Act 2006, s. 4. 
237
 See in Re BCCI; Banque Arabe Internationale D‟Investissment SA v. Morris [2002] BCC 407, Neuberger J. 
238
 The upshot is that courts are unable to direct that specific creditors be compensated for losses that they have 
suffered as a result of fraudulent trading, see: Re Esal (Commodities) Ltd; London and Overseas (Sugar) Co 
Ltd v. Punjab National Bank [1993] BCLC 872 and affirmed on appeal at [1997] 1 BCLC 705, CA. 
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defraud creditors
239
 or for any other fraudulent purpose
240
; the respondent participated 
in the carrying of business; the respondent did so knowingly
241
. 
To keep within the limitation period, proceedings, being for the recovery of a 
sum of money, must be commenced within six years of either the resolution to wind up, 
in voluntary liquidation, or the making of a court order, in compulsory winding up
242
. 
Where a court makes a declaration, it is, at its discretion and as under section 
214, empowered to make further directions to give effect to its declaration, ex section 
215 (2)
243
. 
As with wrongful trading claims, it would seem that any recoveries are not 
available to a chargeholder who has a charge over the present  and future assets of the 
company. This is because the liquidator is proceeding in his or her own capacity for the 
benefit of creditors and not on the company‟s behalf244. 
 
4.2.2. Wrongful trading 
In terms of increasing directors‟ duties to unsecured creditors, section 214 
provides that where a company is in liquidation, a liquidator can apply to the court to 
have a person who is or has been a director declared personally liable to make such 
contribution to the company‟s assets as the court thinks proper245. The liquidator must 
establish that, at some time before the commencement of the winding up of the 
company, that person knew or ought to have concluded that there was no reasonable 
prospect that the company would avoid going into insolvent liquidation and that the 
respondent was either a director or a shadow director
246
 of the company at that time. 
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 For a detailed discussion of this element of the section see, A. Keay, Fraudulent trading: the intent to 
defraud element, in Common Law World Review, 2006, 35, pp. 121ss.; J. Farrar, Fraudulent trading, in JBL, 
1990, pp. 336ss. 
240
 See Re Cyona Distributors Ltd [1967] Ch 889 at 902; Re Seillon [1982] Crim LR 676; R v. Kemp [1988] QB 
645; [1988] 4 BCC 203. 
241
 See generally: Re BCCI; Morris v. Bamk of India [2004], op. cit., 236. 
242
 See Re Farmizer (Products) Ltd [1995] BCC 926. 
243
 For instance, a court might directthat the amount which it has ordered against the director be a charge on any 
debt or obligation due from the company to the respondent, or on any mortgage or charge or any interest in a 
mortgage or charge on assets of the company held by or vested in the respondent, or any person on behalf of 
the respondent, or any person claiming as assignee from or through the respondent (section 215 (2) a.). Also, 
the court may, from time to time, make such further or other order as may be necessary fro enforcing any 
charge imposed under section 215 (section 215 (2) b.). 
244
 See Re Oasis Merchandising Services Ltd [1995] BCC 911 and affirmed on appeal by the Court of Appeal 
at [1997] 1 All ER 1009,[1997] BCC 282. 
245
 Section 214 of the Insolvency Act 1986 owes its birthright to the Cork Committee (Cork Report, ch. 44), 
and, as stated previously, was the White Paper‟s great hope for the unsecured creditor. See Prentice, Creditors‟ 
Interest;  F. Oditah, Wrongful Trading, [1990] LMCLQ 205. 
246
 On shadow directors see Insolvency Act 1986 s. 251; Company Directors‟ Disqualification Act 1986 s. 
22(5); Company Act 2006 s. 251(2). 
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Here it is noteworthy that a point may arise , during a cumulation of failures to produce 
funds, when directors must realise that insolvency is unavoidable
247
. Thus, in Rubin v. 
Gunner and another
248
, the court found directors to be liable for wrongfully trading 
after the date at which they ought to have concluded that promised funds would not be 
forthcoming from an investor who had given numerous assurances but had repeatedly 
failed to produce the moneys needed to avoid insolvent liquidation. From the said date, 
said the court, the directors should have concluded that there was no reasonable 
prospect of the company avoiding going into insolvent liquidation. A defence is, 
however, available if the respondent director shows that, having reached the state of 
knowledge referred to, he took every step with a view to minimising potential loss to the 
company‟s creditors that he ought to have taken249. Here there is a movement away 
from the subjective test of skill and care applied to directors in the common law cases 
such as Re City Equitable Fire Insurance Co
250
. Under section 214, a director is judged 
not only by the knowledge, skill and experience that he actually has (section 214(4) (b), 
but also by the “general knowledge, skill and experience that may reasonably be 
expected of a person carrying out the same functions” (section 214(4) (a)). A director 
can, therefore, under this limb be judged by standards of the “reasonable director” even 
though he may be well below those standards himself.
251
 
The wrongful trading section has, however, proved to be a disappointment in 
terms of numbers of reported cases
252
. The reason may be that it is often seen as easier 
to make out a case of misfeasance, preference or transaction at undervalue than to chart 
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 See also Katz and Mumford, Making creditor protection effective, part. 5, who, in discussing what form of 
evidence is needed to establish that  “a director knew or ought to have concluded  [stated that] the key evidence 
includes cash flow forecasts, prepared at intervals, that reflect the perceived seriousness of the company‟s 
financial situation”. 
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 Rubin v. Gunner and another, [2004] BCC 684, [2004] 2 BCLC 110. In Re Hawkes Hill Publishing Co. Ltd 
(2007) 151 SJLB 743, Lewison J stressed that the use of hindsight was not always fair in judging whether a 
director had reasonable grounds to believe the company would not survive. 
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 See Section 214(3). For suggestions on steps and strategies which directors could adopt (including, inter 
alia, taking appropriate outside professional advice, holding weekly board meetings, keeping major creditors 
and all directors in the loop and recording all recommendations for remedial action made by the directors) see 
C.. Swain, Light at the end of the tunnel- operating in the twilight zone, in Insolvency Intelligence, 2006, 19, 
pp. 33-35. 
250
 Re City Equitable Fire Insurance Co [1925] Ch 407. 
251
 This sets a minimum standard and, in deciding whether this minimum has been obtained, regard can be had 
to the particular company and its business: see Re produce marketing consortium [1989] 5 BCC 569 per  Knox 
J at 594. For a further discussion see also Prentice, Creditors‟ interests, op. cit.; L. S. Sealy [1989] CLJ 375; 
see also Park J in Re continental assurance co of London plc [2001] BPIR 733 for a judicial analysis of the 
nature of individual directors‟ potential liabilities, quantum and issues of several liability versus joint and 
several liability under s. 214; see further A. Walters, Wrongful trading: two recent cases, [2001] Ins. Law, 211. 
252
 See Re D‟Jan [1993] BCC 646 comparing with Companies Act 2006 s. 174. 
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the difficult waters of wrongful trading
253
. Central to those difficulties is often the 
liquidator‟s challenge in identifying the “relevant date or time”, when the director 
should have been aware that there was no reasonable prospect that the company would 
avoid going into insolvent liquidation. Establishing this time will often be problematic, 
especially if the company‟s records are incomplete254. Also, as Keay has commented, 
the courts have been reluctant to second-guess directors‟ commercial decisions. They 
usually recognize that directors have to make tough decisions, often in difficult 
circumstances, and “have generally come down on the side of the directors255. Problems 
in the funding of wrongful trading actions clearly have not helped to develop wrongful 
trading as a strong force for directorial accountability
256
. Judicial approaches to section 
214 have, furthermore, not added to the efficacy of the provision. This is an area where 
there has been an unhelpful confusion about the role and purpose of the law. Cork had 
envisaged that civil liability for wrongful trading would effect a balance between 
encouraging the growth of enterprises and discouraging “downright irresponsibility”257. 
This balancing as involved in section 214, has allowed different judges to adopt 
different approaches to wrongful trading and degree of uncertainty has resulted. In Re 
produce marketing consortium ltd
258
 Knox J trated the section 214 jurisdiction as 
“primarily compensatory rather than penal”259. It is clear, however, from other cases 
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 The courts require compelling evidence to be convinced of wrongful trading and often prefer to impose 
liability through other mechanisms. As Milman notes:”This is because wrongful trading rarely occurs in a 
vacuum but usually in a context of other managerial shortcomings which are easier to prove through legal 
action”. D. Milman, Improper  trading: can it be effectively regulated?, Sweet & Maxwell‟s Company Law 
Newsletter, 2004, 4, 3. A cited example of a wrongful trading action that failed to impress the court was 
Liquidator of Marini Ltd v. Dickenson [2004] BCC 172 in which the claim foundered because there was no 
evidence of an increase in the net deficiency of the company during the relevant period of alleged wrongful 
trading (an application of Re Continental Assurance plc [2001] All ER 229, where Park J had stated that there 
had to be more than a “mere „but for‟ nexus […] to connect the wrongfulness of the director‟s conduct with the 
company‟s losses” : see MIlman, Improper trading, op. cit.; N. Spence, Personal liability for wrongful trading, 
in Insolvency Intelligence, 2004, 17, 11. 
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 The liquidator, in seeking to maximize assets for the general creditors, may, understandably, be tempted to 
select the time period which would provide the possibility of the highest attainable contribution. On the courts‟ 
approaches as to whether the liquidator‟s exact selection of time is fundamental see A Keay, Wrongful trading 
and the point of liability, in Insolvency Intelligence, 2006, 19, 132. See also Rubin v. Gunner and another 
[2004] BCC 686, [2004] 2 BCLC 110, where the liquidator appeared to rely on several dates during the course 
of the litigation and trial and where a specific time was then settled upon by the court itself.  
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 See A. Keay, Wrongful trading and the liability of company directors, in Legal Studies, 2005, 25, pp. 432ss., 
citing Re Continental Assurance plc [2001] All ER 229. 
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 The Insolvency (Amendment) Rules 2008 (SI 2008/737) amend the Insolvency Rules 1986 by replacing r. 
4.218(a) with a new r. 4.218(1), (2) and (3) and by inserting new rr. 4.218 A-4.218E. The amendments, inter 
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 Cork Report, par. 1805. 
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 Re produce marketing consortium ltd  [1989] 5 BCC 569. 
259
 On the public law function of s. 214 in prescribing standards of directorial behavior see R. Walker J in Re 
Oasis Merchandising services Ltd [1995] BCC 911-918. 
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such as Re Sherborne Associates ltd
260
, that the wrongful trading provisions are being 
seen by some judges not so much as a civil remedy to raise standards among directors 
and to compensate creditors, but as a way to punish directors whose actions are seen 
immoral. Such a punitive conception may also sit more comfortably with a “pro-
enterprise” / “pro-rescue” stance rather than a “pro-creditor” position261. In Sherborne, 
the actions were dismissed and the judge was sympathetic to the honest, hard-working, 
well-respected businessmen who acted as directors in times of difficulty. Even on a 
finding of liability under section 214, the court nay exercise its discretion under section 
214(1) when deciding the appropriate amount of compensation to be paid by director 
and may take account of the degree of culpability exhibited by the director
262
. The court 
can, therefore, note whether the director‟s conduct resulted from a failure to appreciate 
rather than from a deliberate course of wrongdoing: whether or not there were heeded or 
unheeded warnings from the auditors
263
; and whether there was any misappropriation of 
assets by the directors for their own benefit
264
. In Re Purpoint Ltd
265
, however, Vinelott 
J did not look kindly on directors who failed to monitor their company‟s financial 
affairs and in Re DKG Contractors Ltd
266
 there was a similar approach to directors who 
failed to abide by the basic requirements of company law. In Re Continental Assurance 
of London plc
267
 it was emphasised, moreover, that it was directors who had “closed 
their eyes to the reality of the company‟s position [...] had been irresponsible and had 
not made any genuine attempt to grapple with the company‟s real position” who had 
something to fear apropos liability under section 214. 
Thus, in exercising their discretions to order directorial contributions, the courts 
may, as noted, vary their responses according to their espousal of different approaches 
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 Re Sherborne Associates ltd [1995] BCC 40. See also P. Godfrey & S. Nield, The wrongful trading 
provisions: all bank and no bite?, in IL&P, 1995, 11, p. 139. 
261
 See I. F. Fletcher, Wrongful trading: reasonable prospect  of insolvency, in Insolvency Intelligence, 1995, 8, 
p. 14. The dangers of acting on hindsight (noted in Re Sherborne itself), and of assuming that what has 
happened was always bound to happen and was apparent, were noted in Re Brian D.   Pierson (Contractors) 
Ltd [1999] BCC 26 when Hazel Williamson QC, in the Chancery Division, declined to be “wise with 
hindsight” and gave respect to the directors‟ judgment as to the company‟s prospects. Nevertheless, on the 
facts, she was satisfied that the directors ought to have concluded that there was no reasonable prospect of 
avoiding insolvent liquidation and they were liable under s. 214. In Re Continental Assurance Co. of London 
plc [2001] All ER 229, however, a sympathetic view of directors appears to have been taken again when Park J 
rejected a wrongful trading action, noting that the directors had not acted unreasonably in difficult 
circumstances when they sought expert advice and, reasonably, traded on.  
262
 See M. Simmons, Wrongful trading, in Insolvency Intelligence, 2001, 14, p. 12. 
263
 See  Re Brian D. Pierson (Contractors) Ltd [1999] BCC 26. 
264
 See  Produce Marketing Consortium Ltd [1989] BCLC 520, [1989] 5 BCC 569. 
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 See Re Purpoint Ltd [1991] BCLC 491. 
266
 See Re DKG Contractors Ltd [1990] BCC 903. 
267
 See Re Continental Assurance of London plc [2001] All ER 229. 
98 
to section 214, be these compensatory (as in Re Produce marketing) or inclined to 
advert to issues of culpability (as discernible, for instance, in such cases as Re 
Sherborne, re Purpoint, Re DKG Contractors and Re Continental Assurance). The bite 
of the wrongful trading provisions is, therefore, diminished not merely by the legal 
uncertainties that liquidators face on seeing widely varying judicial ruling, but also by 
the propensity of the judiciary to look to culpability (rather than pure compensation) as 
a factor of relevance in deciding both whether to declare a liability to contribute and 
subsequent issues of quantum. 
 
4.2.3. Enforcement strategies: some considerations 
After setting out the main rules governing the potential liability of directors in 
cases of corporate troubles, matters of enforcement need, however, to be considered in 
order to understand if the real accountability of directors is to be assessed. In relation to 
the common law duties that directors owe to creditors, there are considerable 
enforcement difficulties. The judges have tended to see directors‟ duties to creditors in 
exhortatory terms and so have failed to grasp the enforcement nettle. If creditors‟ 
interests derive from general duties owed to the company then breaches should properly 
be dealt with by the company as contemplated in Nicholson
268
 and Walker v. 
Wimborne
269
. The problem is that enforcement of the duty is likely to be difficult before 
the company goes into administration, receivership or liquidation since creditors cannot 
rely on the existing board or the shareholders to complain about the ill-treatment of 
creditors‟ interests. On liquidation, the possibility arises of a misfeasance action under 
section 212 of the Insolvency Act 1986, which allows proceedings where a director has 
been guilty of “any misfeasance or breach of any fiduciary or other duty in relation to 
the company
270
. Duties to creditors may thus arise at the stage of doubtful solvency but 
creditors per se are given a right of action only on winding up
271
. 
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 See Nicholson, op. cit., [1985] 1 NZLR 242. 
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 See Walker v. Wimborne, op. cit., [1976] 50 ALJR 446, (1976) 137 CLR 1, (1978) 3 ACLR 529. 
270
 The Insolvency Act 1986 extended the ambit f misfeasance to “include breach of any duty including the 
duty of care”: per Hoffmann LJ in Re D‟Jan of London Ltd [1994] 1 BCLC 561 at 562. On misfeasance see 
further Re Eurocruit Europe Ltd [2007] BCC 916, claims under s. 212 do not have a limitation period distinct 
fron that applicable to the underlying claim; Whitehouse v. Wilson [2007] BPIR 230, which clarifies 
liquidators‟ responsibilities to the various stakeholders apropos offers to settle misfeasance claims; Mullarkey 
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and Another [2005] All ER 277, according to which liquidator ordered to pay the director‟s costs as the action 
was commercially worthless from the start in that the director had limited assets; Re Brian D. Pierson 
(Contractors) Ltd [1999] BCC 26; Re Westlowe Storage & Distribution Ltd [2000] BCC 851; Re Continental 
Assurance Co  
271
 Such enforcement would, of course, offer little assistance to unsecured creditors since any recovered funds 
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In order to verify whether creditors are in a good position to enforce duties 
against directors, it can be argued that effective enforcement demands an ability to 
acquire and use information; expertise or understanding of the relevant activity; a 
commitment to act; and an ability to bring pressure or sanctions to bear on the party to 
be controlled. On the first issue, creditors may have not inconsiderable access to 
information. The disclosure rules operating throughout company legislation generally 
reflect the principle that these operate for creditors‟ as well as shareholders‟ benefit. 
Creditors, like shareholders, can obtain information on the financial state of the 
company at the Company Registry in the form of copies of certain class of resolution, 
annual accounts and directorss‟ and auditors‟ reports. Copies of these documents have, 
moreover, to be sent to “all debenture holders”. When a company enters or nears 
insolvency, further sources of information arise. Administrators must be furnished with 
information from the company‟s directors to enable the preparation of a notice of the 
administrator‟s appointment and, on the commencement of the procedure, the 
administrator must provide a statement of affairs to creditors
272
. Where voluntary 
arrangements are made in order to conclude an agreement with creditors, the directors‟ 
proposal and statement of the company‟s affairs will become available to creditors273, 
and when liquidator act they will provide creditors‟ meeting with a body of information. 
Data concerning directorial behaviour may also flow from the creation of contractual 
rights to information
274
. The terms of debentures may provide for the supply of 
information and financial data and detailed figures, for example, may be requested on a 
periodic basis by financial creditors. 
As with shareholders, informal sources of information may assist creditors, and 
major financial creditors will often use their influence to obtain a steady flow of 
information from senior managers. Major creditors may also obtain representation on 
the company‟s board and subsequently will again access to new sources of information. 
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Trade creditors will be less likely to use such sources but if a continuing trading 
relationship has been formed, they may acquire information informally.  
Whether more can be done to inform creditors, it is possible to say that one 
potential response to the “phoenix syndrome” has been put forward by the Federation of 
Small Businesses (FSB), which has argued that the BERR should designate certain 
individuals as provisional directors where they have been at the helm of several failed 
companies. Such directors would then be required to disclose their track records so that 
trade creditors, for instance, would be aware of these. Monthly financial returns for the 
companies of such directors might also be demanded so that creditor monitoring of 
financial health could be facilitated. The FSB argument here is that such steps offer 
smaller creditors lower-cost information sources and help them to assess risks. There 
seems an arguable case for such requirements also on grounds of fairness to unsecured 
creditors. 
Even when creditors possess information, however, they may have problems in 
using it to good effect. The value of information deriving from insolvency-related 
regimes nay be questioned. Creditors may well gain much information only at a very 
late stage in corporate troubles and this tardiness will often rule out actions designed to 
forestall directorial failures or negligence. Creditor expertise, indeed, may vary 
considerably. Financial creditors might be expected to be expert in assessing risks and 
managerial performance, but trade creditors may possess expertise in a particular 
business sector only and may be less able to evaluate directorial performance beyond 
those areas. 
About the commitment to act to enforcing directorial duties, creditors may be 
where they foresee any threat to their prospects of repayment but, in general, they are 
not disposed to review the actions of managers. Factors that might, nevertheless, affect 
the propensity to enforce might be the size of the investment, the nature of any security, 
the type of business and the levels of directorial discretion that are usual in the sector. 
For small trade creditors, such factors may well not come into play unless the debtor is a 
major purchaser of the creditor‟s product. Such creditors will tend to look for supply 
elsewhere rather than to continue a relationship in the hope of recovering from directors 
on the basis of a breach of duty. 
 Indeed, a different behaviour should be mentioned: on the one hand, secured 
creditors will focus on realising their security and only if such realisation fails to meet 
the sum outstanding will such creditors have anything to gain from the contributions of 
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directors. In the case of creditors secured with floating charges, incentives may similarly 
operate only to cover shortfalls (directorial contributions will form part of the 
company‟s assets). On the other hand, ordinary unsecured trade creditors will possess 
questionable incentives to pursue errant directors since they will be paid after floating 
charge holders
275
. 
After a liquidation has been initiated by qualifying creditors, actions may be 
brought by creditors against directors under a number of heads: for example, 
misfeasance actions for breaches of fiduciary or other duties in relation to the company. 
Such duties, however, are owed to the company and contributions obtained from 
directors, as a result, will go to the company assets for the benefit of all creditors. 
Individual creditors may be discouraged from bringing such actions, moreover, because 
the liquidator may proceed similarly on behalf of all creditors and will have 
investigative powers that individual creditors do not possess
276. As for liquidators‟ 
actions, creditors may have to indemnify costs where it is anticipated that there may be 
sufficient assets to support litigation. Section 176ZA of the Insolvency Act 1986 and the 
amended Insolvency Rules have now, however, provided that litigation expenses are 
expenses of the winding up
277
. 
The common law duty offers little to the unsecured creditor since it is owed to 
the general body of creditors rather than unsecured creditors individually or as a class. 
A duty owed directly to individual creditors seems, as already noted, to have been 
denied by Yukong
278
 and would conflict with insolvency‟s collectivist principles, might 
lead to a multiplicity of suits, and could lead individual creditors to place improper 
pressure on directors to settle their particular claims
279
. The alternative may be to place 
directors under a duty to unsecured creditors as a class
280
. Such a class action could 
exceptionally allow unsecured creditors collectively to seek injunctions where necessary 
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to prevent directors from acting in a manner jeopardising the company‟s solvency or to 
ensure the consideration of unsecured creditors‟ interests in circumstances of marginal 
solvency
281
. 
The position of creditors generally might be strengthened by another reform: one 
to allow creditors to take action in the company‟s name in enforcement of directorial 
duties. The Companies Act 2006 sections 260-4 provided a statutory derivative action 
for members but not for creditors
282
. Are there, nevertheless, good reasons for a 
creditors‟ counterpart?283One reason advanced for the inclusion of creditors has been 
that, in some circumstances, creditors might be in receipt of better relevant information 
than is available to “other outsiders”. The opportunity of using creditors as monitors of 
corporate management seems, however, a less convincing argument than the need to 
protect creditor interests. If, as was indicated in Whalley and Gwyer
284
, creditor interests 
become company interests not merely post-insolvency, but also when insolvency 
threatens, then it may be appropriate to allow creditors to act before the liquidator 
comes onto the scene (so as to protect their interests) by injuncting any directorial 
actions that are likely to prejudice solvency severely
285
. 
Enforcement of the statutory controls over such matters as fraudulent or 
wrongful trading, transactions at undervalue and preferences depends on action, not by a 
creditor, but by an office holder of the company.  However, liquidators have 
traditionally faced severe funding problems in resorting to law in order to enforce 
directors‟ duties. Although such practical difficulties have to some extent been 
ameliorated by legislative reform, problems of funding allocation and legal uncertainty 
still remain, particularly in the case of wrongful trading, and to date we have seen an 
accountability regime of seemingly low impact. 
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4.2.4. Liquidator’s duties 
The liquidator may be appointed by the creditors, the company or the court
286
.  
The liquidator is not a trustee for creditors but rather an agent for the company with 
statutory duties which may be enforced by application to the court
287
. He does not in 
general owe any duty to an individual creditor. There are, however, exceptions. The 
liquidator may incur a liability to an individual creditor for loss caused by fraud or other 
personal misconduct, such as breach of fiduciary duty or misfeasance
288
, or for breach 
of contract
289, or for negligently distributing the company‟s assets without taking 
account of a debt which has been or should have been admitted to proof
290
, but in this 
case only where the company has been dissolved, so that the creditor is deprived of his 
ordinary remedy of application to the court. 
On behalf of the creditors the liquidator can bring proceedings in the name of the 
company in respect of causes of action vested in the company but he has no locus standi 
to pursue claims vested in persons qua creditors. So if, for example, a company 
established a subsidiary to carry on the business of deposit-taking and the parent runs 
the subsidiary as its alter ego, effectively depriving the subsidiary‟s directors of any 
management function and using the subsidiary as a façade through which deposited 
funds are transferred to the parent, then if in consequence the subsidiary is driven into 
insolvent liquidation, the liquidator may be able to pursue a claim in the name of the 
subsidiary against its parent but has no standing to assert claims on behalf of the 
subsidiary‟s depositors, who must pursue their own proceedings291. 
 The liquidator‟s powers vary depending on the type of winding up292. Whereas 
in a compulsory winding-up the winding-up order operates to terminate the director‟s 
powers and dismiss them from office, on a voluntary liquidation the powers of the 
directors come to an end only on the appointment of the liquidator, though between the 
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time of passing of the resolution for voluntary winding-up and the appointment of the 
liquidator these powers are severely restricted .  
Moreover, in a creditors‟ voluntary winding-up the liquidator is primarily under the 
control of the creditors rather than of the court and the liquidator can exercise without 
sanction certain powers which in a compulsory winding-up would require the sanction 
of the court or of the liquidation committee
293
. 
 
4.3. Different approaches to protect creditors in troubles companies 
Commentators
294
, inspired by the law and economics movement
295
, have argued 
that the proper function of legal strategies in troubles companies can be seen in terms of 
a single objective: to maximize the collective return to creditors ( that is the so called 
Creditor wealth maximization and the creditors‟ bargain). Thus, according to this 
thought
296, every legal mechanism is best seen as a “collectivized debt collection 
device” and as a response to the “common pool” problem created when diverse “co-
owners” assert rights against a common pool of assets.  Moreover, it has been stated that 
this context should be seen as a system designed to mirror the agreements one would 
expect creditors to arrive at where they able to negotiate such agreements ex ante from 
behind a “veil of ignorance”297. This “creditors‟ bargains” theory is argued to justify the 
compulsory, collectivism regime of insolvency law on the grounds that were company 
creditors free to agree forms of enforcement of their claims on insolvency they would 
agree to collectivist arrangements rather than procedures of individual action or partial 
collectivism. As a consequence, the collectivist, compulsory system is seen as attractive 
to creditors in reducing strategic costs, increasing the aggregate pool of assets, and as 
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administratively efficient. It follows from the above argument that the protection of the 
non-creditor interests of other victims of corporate decline, such as employees, 
managers and members of the community, is not the role of legal strategies. In this 
regard, keeping firms in operation is thus not seen as an independent goal of legislator. 
In the creditor wealth maximization approach all policies and rules are designed to 
ensure that the return to creditors as a group is maximized. Every legal device is thus 
concerned with maximizing the value of a given pool of assets, not with how the law 
should allocate entitlements to the pool. Accordingly, effect should only be given to 
existing pre-insolvency rights, and new rights should not be created. Variation of 
existing rights is only justified when those rights interfere with group advantages 
associated with creditors acting in concert. 
However, the creditor wealth maximization vision has been subject to extensive 
criticism, some of which has been phrased in the strongest terms
298
. Major concerns 
have focused, firstly, on “troubles state” being seen as a debt collection process for the 
benefit of creditors. This, it has been said
299
, fails to recognize the legitimate interests of 
many who are not defined as contract creditors: for instance, managers, suppliers, 
employees, their dependants and the community at large
300
. Creditor wealth 
maximization, moreover, fails to focus on the non-efficiency objectives that are often 
recognized in legislation
301
. To see companies in troubles as in essence a sale of assets 
for creditors (what might be termed a “fire sale” image), moreover, fails both to treat it 
as a problem of business failure and to place value on assisting firms to stay in business. 
Thus, it has been argued that to explain why the law might give firms breathing space or 
reorganize them in order to preserve jobs requires resort to other values in addition to 
economic ones. The economic approach, as exemplified by the same commentators, is 
alleged to demonstrate only that its own economic value is incapable of recognizing 
non-economic values, such as moral, political, social and personal considerations
302
. 
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The idea, moreover, that a troubled company constitutes a mere pool of assets 
can also be criticized. Such a firm can be seen not purely as  a lost cause but as an 
organic enterprise with a degree of residual potential; the rehabilitation of the firm is a 
legitimate factor to take on board in insolvency decision-making
303
. 
The thought that a trouble situation can justify a contractarian fashion with 
reference to a creditors‟ bargain has also come under heavy fire. The creditors‟ bargain 
restricts participation to contract creditors. In this sense, the “veil of ignorance” is 
transparent since the agreeing parties know their status. It is not surprising that in an ex 
ante position such creditors would agree to maximize the value of assets available for 
distribution to themselves. This approach, furthermore, focuses exclusively on 
voluntary and bargaining creditors, while assuming a perfect market, and leaves out of 
account other types of creditor, for whom there is no market at all. The circular nature 
of the bargain has been exposed  by critics. Creditors in the bargain are assumed to be 
de-historicized and equal. In real life, in contrast, creditors differ in their knowledge, 
skill, leverage and costs of litigating. As a consequence, what parties will agree to will 
inevitably mirror those disparities in rights, authority and practical leverage that shape 
their perspectives. A further major weakness of the creditor wealth maximization vision 
is its alleged lack of honesty on distributional issues. The collectivism advocated by 
Jackson is treated as neutral but it begs distributional questions
304
. 
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A vision of legal strategies for troubles companies that attempts to overcome the 
restrictions of creditor wealth maximization is a broader contractarianism
305
. All those 
person who are potentially affected by a company‟s decline, including employees, 
managers, owners, tort claimants, members of the community, etc., choose the 
principles of insolvency law from behind a strict veil, ignorant of their legal status, 
position within the company or other factors that might lead them to advance personal 
interests. They would, however, foresee that the financial distress of companies would 
affect a wide variety of individuals and groups occupying various positions and 
differing in their ability to affect the actions and decisions of the companies in distress. 
According to this points, the parties in such a position of choice would opt for two 
principles to govern insolvencies. First, a “principle of inclusion” would provide that all 
parties affected by financial distress would be eligible to press their demands. Second, a 
principle of “rational planning” would determine whether and to what extent persons 
would be able to enforce legal rights and exert leverage. It would seek to promote the 
greatest part of the most important aims and would involve formulating the most 
rational, long-term plan as a means of realizing the “good” for the business enterprise.  
This approach, however, is open to question on a number of fronts. First, the particular 
choices of principle made from behind the veil of ignorance depend on a particular 
concept of the person
306
. Risk-averse and risk-neutral individuals might produce very 
different principles of justice. It is not clear why an individual behind the veil might not 
prefer a regime marked by low-cost credit and low protection for vulnerable parties to 
one with high costs of credit and high levels of protection. Advocates of creditor wealth 
maximization might object on the grounds that principles of insolvency law designed by 
a veiled and highly inclusive group are liable to be so protective of so many interests, 
and as a result so uncertain, that the effects on the costs of credit would be catastrophic. 
It might be further objected that the contractarian approach fails to explain how 
agreements can be reached behind the veil as to who in a potential insolvency is most 
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vulnerable and thus should enjoy priority of protection over those occupying less 
threatened positions. 
In contrast with the emphasis on private rights contained within the creditor 
wealth maximization approach, the communitarian countervision sees insolvency 
processes as weighing the interests of a broad range of different constituents. It, 
accordingly, countenances the redistribution of values so that, on pre-insolvency and 
insolvency, high-priority claimants may to some extent give way to others, including 
the community at large, in sharing the value of an insolvent firm
307
. A concern to 
protect community interests may, furthermore, militate in favor of insolvency laws that 
compel companies and their creditors to bear the costs of financial failure (for example, 
environmental cleaning costs) rather than shift  those to third parties or taxpayers. 
Communitarianism thus challenges the premise that serves as the basis for the 
traditional economic model, namely that individuals should be seen as selfish, rational 
calculators. An important aspect of communitarianism is the centrality that is given to 
distributional concerns. Redistribution is seen, not as an aberration from the protection 
of creditors‟ rights, but as a core and unavoidable function of insolvency law308. It 
follows from these concerns that insolvency legal remedies should look to the survival 
of organizations as well as to their orderly liquidation. In this respect, the insolvency 
process should preserve viable commercial enterprises capable of contributing to the 
economic life of the country
309
. To creditor wealth maximizers the communitarian 
vision is objectionable in so far as it clouds insolvency law by departing from creditor 
right enforcement and taking on issues which more properly should be dealt with by 
allocating pre-insolvency rights – for example, rights to employment security, fair 
dismissal and compensation on redundancy. In response, communitarians might urge, 
first, that there is no reason why issues arising in insolvency should be governed by 
rules or agreements formulated without regard to insolvency and, second, that it is 
perfectly proper to advert to communitarian issues in both pre-insolvency and 
insolvency law. It may also be objected that corporatist visions of the company have 
difficulty in defining the public good and offer “simply a mask behind which corporate 
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managers exercise unrestrained social and economic power”310. Similarly, 
communitarianism can be said to lack the degree of focus necessary  for the design of 
insolvency law because of the breadth of interests to which it refers. 
Rather than seeing the insolvency process in terms of substantive objectives it 
may be conceptualized in procedural terms, its essence being to establish a forum within 
which all interests affected by business failure, whether directly monetary or not, can be 
voiced
311
. However, such a vision may throw light on an important role to be played by 
legal strategies but it necessarily falls short of offering guidance on matters of 
substance. As, moreover, with other theories of legitimation through providing means of 
representation, difficult issues remain concerning the amount of representation to be 
offered to different parties; the right balance between provisions for representation and 
efficiency in decision- and policy-making; and the extent to which representation should 
be reinforced with legal rights. 
In stark contrast to approaches offering a single, economic rationale, as 
exemplified by the creditor wealth maximization vision, is the notion that remedies for 
troubles companies serve a series of values that cannot be organized into neat priorities. 
Whereas the economic account can explain insolvency law only as a device to 
maximize creditor wealth, not distribute fairly, a value-based account is said to 
understand insolvency law‟s economic and non-economic dimensions and the principle 
of fairness as a moral, political, personal and social value. Multiple values/eclectic 
approaches see insolvency processes as attempting to achieve such ends as distributing 
the consequences of financial failure among a wide range of actors; establishing 
priorities between creditors; protecting the interests of future claimants; offering 
opportunities for continuation, reorganization, rehabilitation; providing time for 
adjustments; serving the interests of those who are not technically creditors but who 
have an interest in continuation of the business; and protecting the investing public, 
jobs, the public and community interests. Such approaches incorporate communitarian 
philosophies and take on board distributive rationales, placing value, for instance, on 
relative ability to bear costs; the incentive effect on pre-insolvency transactions; the 
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need to treat like creditors alike; and the aim of compelling shareholders to bear the 
lion‟s share of the costs of failure. 
 In conclusion, the above visions or approaches to companies in troubles 
emphasize different facets of corporate insolvency strategies‟ role. What fails to emerge 
from the review undertaken, however, is any complete view of the appropriate legal 
measures. Creditor wealth maximization was narrow in its exclusive concerns with 
creditors‟ interests and pre-insolvency rights and in its conception of the insolvent 
company as a pool of assets. The broad-based contractarian approach begged questions 
concerning the nature of persons behind the veil of ignorance and failed to explain 
trade-offs of fairness or justice versus efficiency or between different kinds of interests 
worthy of protection. The communitarian vision escaped the narrowness of creditor 
wealth maximization but encountered problems of indeterminacy. The forum vision 
made much of procedural concerns but shed little light on the substantive ends to be 
pursued by insolvency law or processes. The ethical vision
312
 gave rise to difficulties 
concerning the possibility of locating agreement as to ethical content and to establishing 
the boundaries of relevant ethical concerns. How ethical aspects of decisions on 
insolvency interacted with other, say legal, principles remained in doubt. Finally, the 
eclectic approach, again, gave rise to problems of indeterminacy and of contradictions 
and tensions between different ends. 
Company legal strategies in a physiological situation were said to be about the 
legitimation of corporate managerial power in the hands of directors
313
. The 
phenomenon of companies in troubles is more complex because, according to the 
economic theory of distribution of power connected with agency problem solutions, the 
power is taken out of the hands of management and is placed, depending on various 
circumstances, with different parties such as creditors, insolvency practitioners and the 
courts themselves. It is thus broad regulatory insolvency process in all its dimensions 
and with its variety of actors that requires legitimation. A second issue concerns the 
basis for requiring legitimation. It cannot be assumed that since corporate managerial 
power in a  going concern requires legitimation, insolvency regimes and powers 
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automatically require legitimation. Regulatory processes do, however, impinge strongly 
upon the public interest in so far as decisions are made about the lives or deaths of 
enterprises and those decisions affect livelihoods and communities. Insolvency 
processes also have dramatic import for private rights in so far as, for instance, pre-
insolvency property rights and securities can be frozen and individual efforts to enforce 
other legal rights constrained. On both public and private interest grounds, accordingly, 
the powers involved in insolvency processes can be seen as calling for strong 
justification. How tension and trade-offs between different legitimating rationales can 
be resolved remains, of course, an issue connected with the different strategies adopted 
in the U.K. 
As for the array of rationales that can be used to legitimate powers impinging 
upon public interests and private rights, these can be described as: firstly, formalist, 
which justifies with reference to the efficient implementation of a statutory or 
shareholders‟ mandate; secondly, expertise-based, which sees managers as worthy of 
trust due to their expertise and professionalism: thirdly, control-based, which looks to 
the restrictions imposed on discretions by courts, markets and others; and, fourthly, 
pluralist, which adverts to the degree of amenability of processes to representations 
from the public about how corporate affairs should be conducted
314
.  
The justifications of legal insolvency processes can similarly be seen as 
dependent not merely on the efficient pursuit of mandates but also on the degree of 
expertise exercised by relevant actors, the adequacy of control and accountability 
schemes and the procedural fairness that is shown in dealing with affected parties‟ 
interests. 
It is possible to outline four key values: thus efficiency looks to the securing of 
democratically mandated ends at lowest cost; expertise refers to the allocation of 
decision and policy functions to properly competent persons; accountability looks to the 
control of insolvency participants by democratic bodies  or courts or though the 
openness of processes and their amenability to representations; and fairness considers 
issues of justice and propensities to respect the interests of affected parties by allowing 
such parties access to, and respect within, decision and policy processes. This approach 
may produce no fine-tuned answers on either procedural or substantive issues; 
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nevertheless, it does have force in identifying the values and rationales that can be 
accorded currency in debates on insolvency law
315
. 
 
4.4. Anticipatory strategies 
The legal responses to companies in troubles are under U.K. jurisdiction the so 
called “rescue strategies” , which deal with informal mechanisms and formal processes. 
In order to assesses the role of rescue procedures, it will begin by considering what 
rescue involves, the reason why rescue may be worth attempting, the different routes to 
rescue and the UK‟s new focus on rescue as an ever-earlier responses to corporate 
troubles.  
It is useful, therefore, to see rescue as „a major intervention necessary to avert 
eventual failure of the company
316
. This allows the exceptional nature of rescue action 
to be captured and it takes on board both governance and regulatory rescue strategies. 
 Central to the notion of rescue is, accordingly, the idea that drastic remedial 
action is taken at a time of corporate troubles
317
. The company, at such a point, may be 
in a state of distress or it may have entered a formal insolvency procedure. Whether or 
not a rescue can be deemed a success raises a further set of issues. Complete success 
might be thought to involve a restoration of the company to its former healthy state but 
in practice this scenario is unlikely. The drastic actions that rescue necessarily involves 
will almost inevitably entail changes in the management, financing, staffing or modus 
operandi of the company and there are likely to be winners and losers in this process
318
. 
 Some visions of insolvency processes and laws are highly unsympathetic to the 
whole notion of corporate rescue
319. The so called „creditor wealth maximisation‟ 
vision, which sees insolvency as a process of collecting debts for creditors, is in tension 
with the notion that keeping firms in operation (and protecting interests beyond those of 
creditors) is an independent goal of insolvency law. It may be the case, in some 
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circumstances, that maximising potential returns to creditors will demand some sort of 
rescue activity but this will not always be the case and a failed rescue may reduce 
creditors‟ returns materially320. On most occasions, those economic theories that focus 
on creditor interests will hold that the collective actions of liquidation will reduce 
transaction costs for individual creditors and make for administratively efficient 
processes. It is efficient, on such a view, to decline to save „hopeless‟ companies and to 
allow the market to redeploy resources swiftly, and at least cost, to more productive 
uses
321
. However, it can be argued that the creditor wealth maximisation vision is 
excessively narrow and (that), in looking at insolvency processes, attention should be 
paid to interests beyond those of creditors: to social and distributional goals; to public as 
well private interests; and to values such as expertise, fairness and accountability. 
Whether existing English rescue procedures perform adequately with regard to these 
factors it will not be  considered in details in this discussion. At this stage it is worth 
noting that an approach going beyond creditor wealth maximisation – in short a „social‟ 
as opposed to an „economic‟ approach – leaves scope for rescue and justifies rescue 
activity with reference to a number of objectives and values. In relation to the 
technically efficient achievement of social and distributional goals, regard can thus be 
had to the potential of a rescue procedure to achieve a number of results. These may 
include the preservation of a business that, in the longer term, is worth saving or is 
worth more as a going concern than if sold piecemeal; the protection of the jobs of a 
workforce; the avoidance of harms to suppliers, customers and state tax collectors; and 
the prevention of damage to the general economy or to business confidence in a 
sector
322
. 
 For its part, the Cork Committee
323
 laid the foundations for a „rescue culture‟ 
and was clear on the legitimacy of considering the broader picture. A good, modern 
system of insolvency law, said Cork, should provide a means for preserving viable 
commercial enterprises capable of making a useful contribution to the economic life of 
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the country. In the period since the Cork Report, the rescue culture has strengthened and 
been endorsed by the judiciary as well as bankers and politicians
324
. 
A key issue in any process that purports to be rescue-orientated is whether it 
provides for intervention at a sufficiently early stage in proceedings and action of a 
sufficiently speedy nature to allow the above ends to be achieved
325
. The trade-offs 
between achieving „social‟ ends and the costs imposed on various parties have, 
moreover, to be taken into account. Many rescue activities will involve the forestalling 
of enforcement actions by certain parties and the use of periods of grace in which 
realignment efforts are made. During these period, certain interests will suffer. 
Creditors, for example, may be prevented from realising their securities. Distributional 
and social goals may demand that creditors make certain concessions for the purpose of 
rescue but considerations of both efficiency and fairness impose limits on the sacrifices 
that can be justified
326
. In assessing such trade-offs, balances have to be drawn between 
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the probabilities of achieving certain desirable ends and the (usually far higher) 
probabilities of imposing costs on parties who are asked to make sacrifices
327
. 
 A final issue to consider under the heading of technical efficiency is whether a 
rescue regime is conducive to low cost and effective coordination between the different 
actors that may be involved in working towards a turnaround
328
. A rescue generally 
involves a number of parties who carry out a variety of roles and tasks and the 
challenges of co-ordinating roles and actions vary across such tasks. What is clear is 
that if such involved parties do not work together harmoniously, a considerable amount 
of  unproductive friction will result and this will stand in the way of completing such 
tasks as collecting the data relevant to the rescue and the taking of timely actions and 
decisions. These matters are taken in special consideration in looking at the 
administrative procedure. 
 Moreover, attention should also be paid to the propensity of any given rescue 
procedure to allow business judgements to be taken by experts. The argument for expert 
decision-making may, like those for fairness and accountability, be the more important 
where democratically established goals for rescue are difficult to identify
329
.  
 Rescue procedures also stand to be judged according to their fairness. Issues 
here are whether those processes allow equal weight to be given to the voices of various 
affected parties; whether the processes are open to self-interested manipulation by 
certain individuals or groups; and whether those administering the processes are (and 
can be seen to be) operating even-handedly. 
 Finally, considerations of accountability are relevant. Acceptable levels of 
supervision and approval should be instituted so that opportunities for opportunistic 
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behaviour are curtailed and regimes are not only fair but also capable of generating the 
degree of consent that is necessary for effective rescues to be achieved. This, in turn, 
demands that supervisory functions are not allocated in a way that itself allows 
manipulation. The transparency and accessibility of processes must also be sufficient to 
allow affected parties to apprise themselves of relevant facts and to ensure that such 
parties „representations are considered. Again, however, the costs of supervision and 
access have to be borne in mind and the pitfalls of excessively legalistic procedures and 
undue levels of court supervision should be avoided
330
. 
 In relation to issues of both fairness and accountability it should be emphasised 
that different groupings may possess widely divergent interests and incentives when the 
company meets troubled times
331
. Shareholders and directors will tend to favour 
ensuring that the company continues to operate for as long as possible. The former are 
residual claimants in insolvency and have little to lose by trading on. The directors may 
wish to prolong operations in order to eke out or stabilise their employment. They may 
not bear the financial risks of continued trading but their inclination to trade on should 
be constrained by fears of personal liability for wrongful trading, fraudulent trading, 
breach of duty or of disqualification. Both shareholders and directors will thus tend to 
gamble on further business activity since they will enjoy whatever gains result. 
Corporate creditors, in contrast, will tend to favour ceasing operations sooner rather 
than later since they will bear the losses that result from any continued trading
332
. 
Employees, again, will tend to favour continuing trading in the hope of securing their 
jobs and in the knowledge that further losses will be borne by other parties. Insolvency 
practitioners may possess incentives to encourage companies to move towards formal 
insolvency procedures because these are likely to generate fee income. Such acute 
divergences of interests make it especially important that rescue regimes are not only 
fair and accountable but seen to be so. 
 
4.4.1. Informal and formal routes to rescue 
Troubled companies and their directors, creditors or shareholders are able, as 
noted, to take informal as well formal steps in order to effect rescues. Most rescues are, 
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indeed, achieved through informal action
333
.  
Informal actions do not demand any resort to statutory insolvency procedures 
but are contractually based. They are usually instituted by directors or creditors and they 
may involve the use of professional help: where, for instance, a “company doctor” or 
firm of accountants is appointed (usually on a creditor‟s insistence) to investigate the 
company‟s affairs and to make recommendations. Such informal steps may result in the 
kinds of remedial action already referred to, for example: changes in management, 
corporate reorganizations or refinancing. 
Alternatively, under the “London Approach”, co-ordination of a creditors‟ 
agreement in accordance with informal guidelines may be achieved with the Bank of 
England acting as an honest broker in making efforts to persuade reluctant parties to 
pursue such informal settlements
334
. 
Formal arrangements under which rescue may be attempted are provided for the 
Insolvency Act 1986
335
 and include company voluntary arrangements (CVAs)
336
, 
receiverships and administrative receiverships
337
 and administration
338
. 
 From the company management and shareholders‟ point of view, a general 
advantage of informal rescue is that publicity concerning corporate troubles may be 
minimal, the stigma of formal insolvency may be avoided and the goodwill and 
reputation of the company preserved. Avoiding the adverse publicity that would often 
follow the commencement of a formal insolvency proceeding can have a significant 
impact on the ability of a company to survive and on the realizable value of its assets
339
. 
The cost of informal procedures is also likely to be lower than where court proceedings 
are involved. Delays and attendant costs may, furthermore, be reduced where rescues 
are managed without hostile litigation. Informally also ensures flexibility . 
 From the point of view of company directors, a further considerable advantage 
of informality is that this avoid the intervention of an insolvency practitioner in the role 
of a formal scrutiniser of directorial actions, who possess extensive power to investigate 
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corporate affairs together with the duty to report on the conduct of directors
340
. Another 
incentive for management to see that the company remains outside formal insolvency is 
that the latter carry with the stigma of failure, that is particularly relevant in terms of 
external perceptions, such as in employment markets. 
 From the point of view of many banks and secured lenders, informal rescue may 
be attractive in ways that can outweigh attendant risks. It not only offers the prospect of 
repayment in full, if ultimately successful, but also provides an opportunity to acquire a 
fresh injection of funds from other sources (such as shareholders or other banks) and 
allows such well-positioned creditors to extract enhanced or new security, or priority, as 
the price for supplying further funds to the company. A bank, for instance, may improve 
its position by taking a floating charge as security and, even if an informal rescue 
ultimately fails, the bank will often have improved its security position and may then be 
able to appoint an administrator of its choosing out of court
341
. 
 A disadvantage of informal rescue, however, is its potential to prejudice the 
interests of less-well-placed creditors. Informality may be attractive to directors, but, 
from the point of view of certain creditors, a deficiency of informality may be the 
absence of investigative powers and the lack of an inquiry into the role of directors in 
bringing a company to the brink of disaster. A fundamental weakness of informal rescue 
is, furthermore, that the agreement of all parties whose rights are affected will generally 
be required if the rescue is to succeed. Informal rescues demand that parties with 
contractual rights agree to compromise, waive or defer debts, or alter priorities. 
Dissesting creditors, accordingly, have the power to halt informal rescues by triggering 
formal insolvency procedures, including liquidation. This renders the informal rescue a 
fragile device that is dependent on a high degree of co-operation from a range of parties. 
In contrast, a formal procedure such as administration involves a moratorium on the 
enforcement of a wide range of creditors‟ rights and so create a more sustainable space 
within which a rescue can be organized. 
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4.4.2. Formal rescue strategies 
There are four forms of formal insolvency and restructuring procedures for 
English companies: administration, receivership, company voluntary arrangement and 
liquidation (or winding up). In addition a company may propose a scheme of 
arrangement with its creditors and/or members. This procedure is available to 
companies regardless of their solvency under the Companies Act 2006 and is, therefore, 
not a formal insolvency procedure as such
342
. 
Of the above procedures, administration is nowadays the most commonly used. 
English legislation aimed at promoting a corporate rescue culture has sought to phase 
out receivership and make liquidation a last resort. Company voluntary arrangements 
obviously fit within the rescue framework but, other than for a limited period for small 
companies, they lack the flexibility afforded by a moratorium on creditors enforcing 
their contractual rights although, as can be seen below, they may be used in conjunction 
with administration to provide that moratorium protection. These factors mean that 
administration is generally the preferred route for insolvent companies regardless of 
size
343
. Therefore it will look at in greater detail, even with no exhaustive, than the 
alternative procedures. 
Administration involves the appointment of an insolvency practitioner as 
administrator to take control of the company from the directors, while at the same time 
imposing a moratorium on creditors enforcing their rights against the company. This 
moratorium provides the business with a breathing space within which to address its 
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problems. A tight timetable is set down by statute within the administrator must assess 
the company‟s position, formulate a plan and put it to the company‟s creditors for 
approval
344
. 
 The primary purpose of administration is to rescue the company as a going 
concern as this should provide the best outcome for its creditors as a whole. Where the 
company itself cannot be rescued, the administrator may pursue the second objective of 
this procedure, which is to achieve a better outcome for its creditors than if it was 
simply liquidated (for example, by saving the business). Administration may therefore 
be appropriate where a business can be sold as a going concern and this would lead to a 
greater value being available to the company‟s creditors than simply selling its assets. 
The third objective, which will only apply if neither of the other two options is possible, 
is to realize property in order to make a distribution to one or more of the secured or 
preferential creditors but without unnecessarily harming the interests of the unsecured 
creditors. Since the Enterprise Act 2002 came into force
345
, it has become easier for 
either the company itself or a creditor holding a floating charge to appoint an 
administrator and it is no longer always necessary to involve the court in the 
appointment. So an administrator can be appointed without a court order by the 
company, its directors or a creditor who holds a qualifying floating charge. Any of these 
parties may also apply to court for an administration order, and in certain circumstances 
it may be necessary to use the court route, but the cost and delay of a court appointment 
means the out-of-court route will normally be preferable. In comparison, creditors 
(other than those with the benefit of a qualifying floating charge) can only place a 
company in administration by applying to the court. In practice, it is usually the 
directors or a major creditor with a long term business relationship with the company 
that will seek to place it into administration. Creditors who are owed smaller amounts 
will rarely view placing control of the company into the hands of an administrator as 
their best option as it offers no short term prospect of payment.  
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 See Re Atlantic Computer Systems Plc [1992] Ch. 505 and Innovate Logistic Ltd v. Sunberry Properties Ltd 
[2008] EWCA Civ 1261. 
345
 The relevant sections of the Enterprise Act 2002 came into force on 15 September 2003. Certain types of 
companies, primarily those performing a quasi-public function or operating in former state-run sectors, are 
subject to separate or modified administration regimes. These include building societies and companies 
involved in water supply and sewerage, air traffic control, railways and Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs), as 
was the case with the administration of Metronet in 2007. The Basnking Act that came into force on 21 
February 2009 introduced a further insolvency regime in relation to banks, that is a specialized regime which is 
not beyond the scope of this discussion. 
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The objective requirement is that the company must be in troubles in terms of 
“unable, or likely to become unable, to pay its debts as they fall due” and there must 
have been no administrator appointed to the company by the directors or company in 
the last 12 months. 
The out-of-court route was introduced to avoid the costs and time associated 
with the court procedure, allowing a company that is in financial difficulties to obtain 
quickly and cheaply the protection of an administration when the directors (or company 
if done by resolution of shareholders) will be able to select the administrator. In reality 
if the board has been functioning properly, it will have engaged advisors to consult on 
the company‟s financial condition and trading prospects long before an administration is 
in prospect. As conditions become more serious, a licensed insolvency practitioner 
should be brought into this process and when the decision to appoint an administrator is 
reached, that practitioner is therefore already engaged and brings with him prior 
knowledge of the company‟s affairs. 
The company or the directors (as appropriate) must first pass a resolution 
proposing to put the company into administration
346
.  
The holder of a qualifying floating charge may appoint an administrator as long 
as no administrator, administrative receiver, liquidator or provisional liquidator is 
already appointed
347
. No notice of intention to appoint needs to be given to the company 
or its directors, so the first formal notice received by the company and its directors will 
be of the appointment itself. However, in practice, the qualifying floating charge holder 
will invariably have been in discussion with the company about its financial affairs and 
the possible appointment of an administrator, so it is unlikely the appointment will 
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 Five business days‟ notice, in the prescribed form, that is Form 2.8B, Rule 2.28, of the intention to appoint 
an administrator must then be given to: (a) anyone entitled to appoint an administrative receiver: (b) any holder 
of a qualifying floating charge; (c) anyone who has distrained or is charged with executing a judgment against 
the company; (d) the supervisor of any pre-existing CVA; and (e) the company itself (if the appointment is to 
be made by the directors as opposed to the company). This notice of intention to appoint must also be filed at 
court as soon as possible, together with the board minutes or a resolution of the company, as appropriate, 
resolving to put the company into administration. Once the five days‟ notice has expired, or sooner if each 
person served with the notice gives his written consent to the appointment, the administrator may be appointed. 
The appointment must be made within 10 business days of filing the notice of intention to appoint in court. 
Notice of the actual appointment of the administrator must also be filed at court. 
347
 Floating charge is a are a form of security used primarily by banks to take security over a company‟s assets 
without preventing those assets from being used by the company in the ordinary course of business. They can 
therefore cover items such as stock, regardless of the fact that this is a constantly changing pool of assets and 
book debts/receivables. A “qualifying” floating charge is one that covers the whole or substantially the whole 
of the company‟s assets and which states that the holder has the right to appoint an administrator or 
administrative receiver. The floating charge must obviously have become enforceable due to an event of 
default. 
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come out of the blue. The appointment is affected by filing the actual notice of 
appointment in court along with the other documents referred to above. 
Because the holder of a qualifying floating charge must be given five day‟s notice of 
any intention to appoint an administrator by the company or its directors, it will be able 
to pre-empt any such proposed appointment with its own. Unlike the directors or the 
company itself, the holder of a floating charge can also appoint an administrator even if 
a petition to wind the company up has been filed, provided no winding up order has yet 
been made by the court. Any petition to wind the company up is then suspended
348
. 
 Where someone other than the holder of a qualifying floating charge applies to 
the court to appoint an administrator, the holder of a qualifying floating charge can 
apply to nominate its choice of administrator. The court is required to accede to the 
charge holder‟s request unless the particular circumstances of the case dictate otherwise, 
though as with the appointment of all administrators, the administrator must still act in 
the interest of the creditors as a whole, and not just in the interests of the floating charge 
holder
349
. 
Facing on the scope of this strategy, the court must be satisfied that the 
administration is likely to achieve its aims of rescuing the company or giving a better 
outcome to creditors than liquidation. If the court is not satisfied of this, it can make any 
order it sees fit. The court has the power to treat the application as a winding up 
application and order that the company be placed into liquidation. 
 The central provision of the administration regime is that a moratorium is 
imposed, preventing creditors from taking steps to enforce security or repossess goods 
and property
350
.  
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 The court can still appoint an administrator upon the application of any creditor (including a qualifying 
charge holder), the company or its directors provided the company is insolvent or is likely to become so. If the 
application is by the directors, it must be by all the directors acting together or by the board acting on a 
majority resolution. The application must nominate the proposed admini8strator and should be supported by a 
statement from that insolvency practitioner in the prescribed form, stating that the aims of the administration 
are likely to be achieved. An affidavit must also be provided by a director or the company secretary (on behalf 
of the company or the directors, as appropriate) setting out the financial position of the company, a summary of 
its assets and liabilities and a description of any security that exists over its assets. There is also a court filing 
fee to pay. Notice (five days) of the court hearing must be given to, amongst other, any person who has a right 
to appoint an administrative receiver or an administrator under a qualifying floating charge. 
349
 The application will ordinarily be considered at a public hearing where a judge will refer to the statements 
filed and any submissions made by those represented. This will normally be the applicant, the proposed 
administrator and anyone with a relevant interest who wishes to be heard, such as the holder of a qualifying 
floating charge, anybody seeking to have the company wound up or the supervisor of any voluntary 
arrangement to which the company is subject. 
350
 This allows the company breathing space for the best solution to be found, preventing a disorderly series of 
actions by individual creditors that might otherwise destroy any prospect of the company surviving. An interim 
moratorium takes effect as soon as either an administration application has been made  or a notice of intention 
to appoint an administrator has been filed at court. The interim moratorium has largely the same effect as the 
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Once a moratorium is in place, no creditor may commence legal proceedings against the 
company without the permission of the administrator or the court. Creditors are also 
prevented from enforcing security over the company‟s property and repossessing goods 
or premises (including forfeiture by peaceable re-entry) without permission. No 
administrative receiver may be appointed. A secured creditor may apply to court to 
enforce its security, but permission to do so will normally only be given where it is clear 
that the asset over which security is held is not necessary for the ongoing business of the 
company. Allowing security to be exercised, for example, over a trading company‟s 
fleet of delivery vans  would obviously thwart the purpose of the administration and 
would not ordinarily be permitted by the court.  
The moratorium does not prevent certain actions by creditors (self-help remedies which 
do not involve a court process), including exercising rights of set-off and declaring an 
event of default under a contract triggered by the appointment of the administrator. 
 As soon as an administrator is appointed, he takes over the management of the 
company. The directors can only exercise management powers with the consent of the 
administrator and, although the directors remain in office, the administrator effectively 
displaces the directors in running the company
351
.  
Given that creditors‟ substantive rights are put on hold by the company entering 
administration, it is important that the process has a defined and short timetable
352
.  
                                                                                                                                               
full one, but does not prevent an administrative receiver from being appointed or a qualifying floating charge 
holder from appointing an administrator out of court. The full moratorium applies as soon as the appointment 
of the administrator takes effect. In the case of an out of court appointment, this is when the necessary notice of 
appointment and supporting documents are filed at court, while in the case of a court appointment it occurs 
upon the making of an order by the court. 
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 All correspondence for the company, including invoices and orders, must bear the administrator‟s name, 
stating that the affairs, business and property of the company are being managed by him. The administrator will 
inevitably have to delegate certain tasks in order to keep the business in operation, but may set value thresholds 
on any decisions taken without his direct input. The role of the directors now becomes one of assisting the 
administrator; certain specific duties are imposed on directors as a result of the appointment of an administrator 
such as getting in the company‟s statement of affairs and co-operation with the administrator generally. 
352
 An administrator‟s appointment has an initial duration of one year, though this can be extended by consent 
of the creditors or on application to the court. Once an administrator is appointed, he must draw up a list of all 
the company‟s creditors as soon as is practicable and write to each notifying them of his appointment. The 
administrator will also advertise his appointment in the London Gazette and other suitable publications, often 
being the trade press and sometimes local press in areas where the company has a presence. The administrator 
will request that one or more suitable officers or directors of the company draw up a statement of the 
company‟s affairs. The latter must be completed and produced within 11 days of the administrator‟s request 
and needs to be verified by a statement of affairs as is used on a witness statement in court proceedings. The 
statement of affairs is filed with the court and with the Registrar of Companies. It forms part of the basis of the 
administrator‟s analysis of the company‟s problems, though if he has been involved prior to his appointment he 
is likely to have already formed a view as to what can be done with the company. Having reviewed the books 
and records and consulted with the company‟s management, as well as perhaps its key creditors and employee 
representatives, the administrator will them prepare his formal statement of proposals. This statement must be 
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The proposals commonly made by administrators include one or more of the 
following: (a) a period of trading under the moratorium to enable the company to trade 
its way out of difficulties; (b) a restructuring of the company‟s debt financing to make 
its debt burden feasible, possibly involving a debt for equity swap under which the 
lenders will acquire a stake in the company in exchange for writing off debt; (c) the 
injection of new capital to restore the company‟s balance sheet: (d) the sale of the 
business, or part of it, as a going concern; (d) the sale of key assets that may take time to 
sell, while maintaining the moratorium in the interim; and (f) commencing a company 
voluntary arrangement or scheme of arrangement
353
. 
The vote is passed by a simple majority of those voting, by value of debt rather 
than number of creditors. To prevent collusion by parties connected to the company 
(such companies in the same group or directors who have made loans to the company), 
a resolution cannot be validly passed unless more than half, by value of debt, of those 
creditors unconnected to the company vote for it. 
It is open to creditors to propose amendments to the administrator‟s proposals at the 
meeting and these will be put to the vote in the same way at the meeting.  
An administrator enjoys very wide powers in his running of the company and 
may do anything necessary or expedient to manage the company‟s affairs. His full 
powers are set out in the IA 1986, He can, for example, remove existing directors and 
appoint new ones. He is empowered to bring legal proceedings on behalf of the 
company and to compromise the company‟s claims against others in order to realize its 
assets. He may sell property that is subject to a floating charge as though it were not and 
can apply to court for permission to dispose or property subject to other forms of 
security or proprietary agreements, including retention of title provisions, if the 
beneficiary of such rights does not consent. It is normal for an administrator to make 
major changes to the way in which the business is run, for he cannot allow the business 
to continue to incur losses. To allow this to happen would obviously not further the aim 
                                                                                                                                               
sent to every creditor of the company as soon as reasonably possible, but in any event within eight weeks of the 
company entering administration. 
353
 The statement of proposals may offer alternative courses of action for creditors to consider, but it must 
include proposals for how the administration will be conducted and how it is proposed it will be brought to a 
close. The statement of proposals sent to creditors is accompanied by an invitation to a meeting of creditors, to 
be held not less than two weeks‟ later, but no more than ten weeks after the company entered administration. 
Only where the administration has concluded that there are sufficient assets to pay all creditors in full, or that 
there are insufficient assets for there to be any distribution to unsecured creditors, is no creditors‟ meeting 
needed. The purpose of the meeting of creditors is to consider and to vote upon the administrator‟s proposals 
for the company. The administrator chairs the creditors‟ meeting and he may be accompanied by directors of 
the company and legal advisors to assist in answering any questions from creditors. 
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of improving the creditors‟ position compared to a liquidation of the company354. The 
administrator nonetheless works within a strict framework. He must adhere to his stated 
proposals for the company and he must preserve the hierarchy of creditors which allows 
preferential and secured creditors to recover their debts in priority to unsecured 
creditors
355
.  
 There are a number of different ways in which an administration may come to an 
end, which will largely depend on the nature of the company‟s business and financial 
affairs and the proposals which the administrator puts to creditors, and  whether or not 
those proposals are successful. It may be that the company can, with the protection of 
the moratorium, trade out of its difficulties or, more likely, that the administrator having 
restructured its finances (perhaps under the umbrella of a company voluntary 
arrangement or a scheme or arrangement), can return control of the rescued company to 
the directors. If the business or assets of the company have been sold, the administrator 
may seek the leave of the court to make a distribution to creditors, in which case it is 
likely that the company would simply be dissolved thereafter. Alternatively, the 
company may proceed from administration into liquidation thereby enabling the 
liquidator instead to make a distribution to creditors. A simplified process for 
converting from administration into a creditors‟ voluntary liquidation was introduced by 
the Enterprise Act 2002. However, the precise manner in which an exit from 
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 However, as the person charged with seeing through the proposals, the administrator must approve any 
amendments. If the proposals are voted down, the administrator may either adjourn the meeting for up to 14 
days to come up with revised proposals, or otherwise report this to the court, which will ordinarily order that 
his appointment be terminated and that the company be liquidated. The creditors can appoint a creditors‟ 
committee at the meeting of between three and five creditors, including companies but these must be 
represented by a named individual. Members of the creditors‟ committee must be elected at the meeting. The 
purpose of the creditors‟ committee is to assist the administrator in discharging his functions and act in relation 
to him in such manner as may be agreed from time to time. The administrator is required to call a first meeting 
of the committee not later than six weeks after its establishment; thereafter the committee can require the 
administrator to meet with it in order to provide information about the administration. Perhaps the real power 
the creditors‟ committee has is setting the remuneration of the administrator, either as a percentage of assets 
dealt with, or on an hourly fee basis. The administrator may apply to the court to increase his remuneration if 
he is not satisfied with the creditors‟ committee‟s decision. It is by no means inevitable that a creditors‟ 
committee will be formed, as there may be insufficient creditors willing to undertake the role. 
355
 If the administrator wishes to revise his proposals for the company in a substantial way due to developments 
in the course of the administration, he must convene a further creditors‟ meeting to vote upon the revised plan. 
Where property is sold that was subject to a floating charge or, with the creditor or court‟s permission, other 
security, the sale proceeds must be paid to the creditor holding that security. Any shortfall between the price 
achieved and market price must also be made up, through in reality an administrator would rarely sell an asset 
for less than market value. While this may appear to substantially protect the rights of a holder of security, in 
reality it transfers control of the process to the administrator. If the value of the asset in question is volatile or 
cyclical, for example, the holder of the security would ordinarily have the ability to repossess the asset but not 
sell it until its value had risen. Such decisions are not the creditor‟s to take in an administration and the 
administrator is only required to pay over to the creditor the asset‟s market value at the time he sells it. 
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administration may be achieved is still quite technical and will depend very much on the 
facts and circumstances of the case. 
 One consequence of the removal of the requirement for court involvement in the 
appointment of an administrator has been the rise of the “pre-pack” administration, 
which has attracted some controversy. A pre-pack administration is one where a deal to 
sell the company‟s business, or part of it, is arranged before an administrator is 
appointed, though in consultation with the insolvency practitioner who will take this 
role. The administrator is then appointed by the directors and immediately signs the pre-
agreed contract to sell the business or a part of it. 
The advantages of a pre-pack are obvious. There is no drawn out process during which 
the business is subject to doubt as to its future, with the attendant loss of confidence for 
its staff, customers and suppliers. The surviving part of the business is therefore handed 
over to its new owners in a better state than would be possible after an open-ended 
period of administration. This should enable it to attract a better price for the company‟s 
creditors, while hopefully minimizing the size of any part of the business that cannot 
continue. 
The flipside of there being no drawn out process, however, is that pre-pack 
administrations necessarily involve less transparency for creditors
356
. Where creditors 
are exposed to only certain parts of the business, such as one branch, they are also likely 
to find a stark divide between winners and losers. It is common for the business that is 
to be sold to be a “cherry-picked” version of the insolvent company, with less 
successful sites left behind to be closed. Those creditors with contracts relating to a 
surviving part of the business will be in a much better position than those supplying a 
part of the business that is closed down, as contracts will usually be novated to the new 
company. Concerns have been expressed in particular where the buyer of the business is 
in fact related to the owner of the company placed into administration. Many pre-packs 
take this form because it is obviously easier to covertly negotiate a deal to sell part of 
the business to someone who knows it already, such as in the case of a management 
buy-out. While this should still represent the best available deal for creditors (otherwise 
the administrator should not sign the contract), questions are inevitably asked as to 
whether sufficient alternatives were investigated. At their worst, pre-packs can appear 
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 The sale is conducted before any meeting of creditors and, from the creditors‟ perspective, there is 
inevitably the sense of being presented with a fait accompli, although the administrator could still be pursued 
for causing unfair harm to creditors or for misfeasance if the sale was demonstrably not in the best interests of 
creditors. 
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somewhat like “phoenix” companies, leaving creditors to be paid only in part while re-
establishing the same business anew under the same or similar management
357
. 
Focusing on some aspect of the rescue procedures recalled above, it can be said 
that receivership is the most peculiar for several reasons. Firstly, it is not a collective 
insolvency procedure, but rather a strategy by which a secured creditor can enforce its 
security and obtain payment of sums owing to it. It is for this reason that certain 
restrictions have been placed relatively recently on the ability to appoint receivers and 
hence the reason why receivership is not as common as it once was
358
.  
Receivership was once the most common form of insolvency procedure and involves 
the appointment of a receiver by a creditor (often a bank) to take control of the 
company‟s assets, or part of them, usually pursuant to a contractual right contained in 
the creditor‟s security documentation, The security will generally provide for the right 
to appoint a receiver upon an event of default by the company. When a receiver is 
appointed over all or substantially all the assets of a company under security which 
includes a floating charge, he Is deemed an administrative receiver. Hence, only a 
floating charge holder can appoint an administrative receiver, who must be an 
insolvency practitioner. Non-administrative receivers tend to be known as fixed charges 
receivers. 
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 While the courts have considered the issue of an administrator selling a company‟s assets before the 
creditors‟ meeting and found this to be legally acceptable, concern amongst insolvency professionals has led to 
guidance being issued by R3, the Association of Business Recovery Professionals, which became effective on 1 
January 2009. This guidance, Statement of Insolvency Practice 16 (S1P16), is not law, but has been adopted by 
all relevant professional bodies, including the Law Society, the Institute of Chartered Accountants and the 
Insolvency Practitioners‟ Association. Emphasis in SIP16 is on full disclosure to creditors, albeit after the sale 
of the business. It requires disclosure of matters such as how the administrator was introduced to the company 
and any connections between the purchaser and the directors or shareholders of the company in administration. 
Full details should also be given of the reasoning behind the deal and alternative courses of action that were 
considered. Information should be provided on valuations obtained for the company‟s business and assets, 
attempts to seek further financing, marketing of the business to other parties and all details of the actual 
transaction. All this information should  be distributed to creditors as soon as possible to allow it to be 
considered in advance of the first creditors‟ meeting. 
It remains to be seen whether this guidance will quell uneasiness about pre-packs. It should assist and certainly 
should serve as a reminder to insolvency practitioners of the need to satisfy themselves that a proposed pre-
pack genuinely serves the interests of creditors as a whole. 
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 Administrative receivership is no longer so common, as in 2002 the Government curtained the 
circumstances in which this procedure may be appointed, in an attempt to encourage administrations and 
generally promote the corporate rescue culture. Hence in the Enterprise Act 2002, the Government removed the 
right of the holder of any floating charge created on or after 15 September 2003 (see s. 72A of Insolvency Act 
1986) to appoint an administrative receiver other than in limited circumstances relating to large capital markets 
transactions or project finance agreements. Administrative receivers can still be appointed pursuant to security 
created prior to 15 September 2003, but, as many of these security agreements have now have been superseded, 
the number of administrative receiverships is even-diminishing. Moreover, an administrative receiver cannot be 
appointed if an administrator is appointed first (IA 1986 Sch B1 43 (6A) ), though an administrative receiver 
cannot be displaced by a court appointed administrator without the consent of the creditor who appointed the 
administrative receiver (IA 1986 Sch B1 39 (1) ). 
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Characteristic of this strategy is that the administrative receiver should only sell off 
those assets required to satisfy the debt, after which he will vacate office and a 
liquidator will usually be appointed to deal with any residual assets of the company for 
the benefit of creditors generally and to wind up the company. The appointment of the 
administrative receiver is a quick and relatively straight forward process and prevent 
any intervention of  administrators, who cannot be appointed without the consent of the 
administrative receiver. 
The courts are not involved in the process nor is the consent of the directors of the 
company required although, in practice, it would be unusual for the directors not to 
know about the appointment before it is made. 
An administrative receiver has wide powers but they are not as extensive as those of an 
administrator. There is no moratorium on other creditors taking action to enforce their 
rights.  
Finally, this proceeding is not recognized by EU law as a collective insolvency 
procedure, meaning that the appointment of an administrative receiver does not prevent 
other forms of insolvency proceedings commencing elsewhere in Europe where the 
company operates
359
. 
The administrative receiver takes control of all assets subject to the security, so that he 
effectively controls the company and the assets remain in the ownership of the 
company. The directors are divested of their authority. The receiver has broad powers to 
run the company and will usually aim to sell the business or part of it as a going 
concern, as this has the best chance of realizing the whole amount of the debt secured. 
He does not generally deal with the claims of unsecured creditors save for the 
requirement to ring-fence a statutory “prescribed part” of floating charge assets reserved 
for unsecured creditors. When the secured assets have been realized and the proceeds 
paid to the appointing creditor, the company, deprived of the assets that would allow to 
continue to trade, will usually enter into liquidation. 
 A different type of receiver is that appointed under contractual rights granted 
since 15 September 2003 where the security has been granted over specific assets that 
do not constitute the whole or substantially the whole of the company‟s assets. Such a 
receiver would not, by definition, be an administrative receiver, but a receiver appointed 
under a specific fixed. In practice, this figure is most likely to involve real estate, where 
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 R 1346/2000CE in G.U.C.E. 30.6.2000, n. L 160, see art. 2 about definitions. 
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a fixed charge has been granted over a commercial property. The rights of a receiver 
appointed in these circumstances will depend entirely upon what powers he is granted 
by the security document. The default position for real estate is governed by the Law of 
Property Act 1925, which in simple terms allows a receiver only to take steps to secure 
and protect the property (e.g. provide insurance cover at the company‟s expense) and 
receive the rents from the property. Any right to sell the property, carry out works on it, 
or in the case of a development, complete, must be granted in the security document, 
although this is common. A fixed charge receiver is not under a duty to report to other 
creditors and does not have to administer the statutory “prescribed part”360 of assets 
reserved for unsecured creditors, which relates only to assets covered by floating 
charges. 
 
4.4.3. Modes of arrangement and compromise 
Arrangements and compromises may be concluded in one of five ways: 
1. As a compromise or arrangement under s. 425 of the Company Act; 
2. as a company voluntary arrangement (CVA) under Part I of the Insolvency Act; 
3. as an arrangement by way of reconstruction pursuant to s. 110 of the Insolvency 
Act; 
4. as a compromise or arrangement by a liquidator under the Insolvency Act, ss. 
165-167 and Sch. 4, para. 2; 
5. as a non-statutory arrangement or compromise concluded by contract or 
informal arrangement (“restructuring” or “work-out”). 
Section 425 of  the Company Act, which can be invoked whether or not the 
company is in liquidation, involves obtaining the sanction of the court to a scheme 
approved by the requisite majority of creditors of each class at wherever possible. The 
procedure is cumbersome and most things that can be done under s. 425 can be more 
simply and expeditiously achieved by a CVA under Part I of the Insolvency Act, 
particularly since this can (and often will) be effected in the course of administration of 
the company under an administration order, where the administrator has the benefit of a 
statutory freeze on the enforcement of creditors‟ rights. There is, however, one great 
advantage enjoyed by the s. 425 procedure over the CVA, in that once the scheme under 
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 See IA 1986 176. 
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s. 425 has been approved all creditors are bound
361
, whereas a CVA binds only those 
creditors who in accordance with the rules had notice of and were entitled to vote at the 
meeting approving the arrangement
362
, So s. 425, despite its drawbacks, continues to be 
used in a number of cases. Where the compromise or arrangement has been proposed 
for the purposes of or in connection with a scheme for reconstruction of any company or 
companies or any amalgamation the court is given specific powers when sanctioning the 
compromise or arrangement
363
. 
 Section 110 deals with a specific form of arrangement by which the liquidator in 
a voluntary winding up may, with the sanction of the court or the liquidator committee, 
dispose of the company‟s business to another company in exchange of shares, policies 
or other like interests in the  
Transferee company. Sections 165-167 and Sch. 4 to the Insolvency Act deal with the 
liquidator power to make compromises or arrangements with creditors, subject to his 
obtaining the requisite sanction. It has been held that this procedure is not appropriate as 
a means of distributing assets otherwise than in accordance with creditors‟ strict legal 
rights, since the procedure lacks the safeguards for prospective dissentient creditors 
provided by s. 425
364
. Compromises and arrangements under ss. 165-167 and Sch. 4 are 
quite distinct from CVAs, which are governed by Part I of the Insolvency Act 1986 and 
Part I of the Insolvency Rules 1986 and may be made even if the company is not in 
liquidation or administration. By contrast, arrangements under ss. 165-167 and para. 2 
of Sch. 4 are confined to companies in liquidation and may be sanctioned either by the 
liquidation committee or by the court. The provisions relating to such arrangements are 
of long standing
365
  and they are particularly useful in cases where it is impracticable to 
convene meetings of creditors
366
. 
Finally, if creditors are willing a scheme of arrangements, including a 
reconstruction, can be effected by a workout outside the statutory provisions altogether, 
by contract or, in some cases, informal arrangement. The workout has several 
advantages; it avoids the formality, expense and delay of the statutory modes of 
arrangement, is much more flexible and generally leaves a greater degree of control 
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 See British & Commonwealth Holdings plc v. Barclays Bank plc [1995] BCC 19, affirmed [1995] BCC 
1059. 
362
 IA 1986, s. 5 (2) (b). 
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 Company Act 1985, s. 427. 
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 See Re Trix Ltd [1970] 3 All ER 397. 
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 They go back to s. 159 of the Companies Act 1862. 
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 See Re Bank of Credit and Commerce International SA (n. 3) [1993] BLCL 1490. 
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with the management. In addition, it may enable the company to avoid an event of 
default under its loan agreements, and the fact that it is being supported by its major 
creditors helps to reduce in some measure the effect of the damage to its reputation of 
becoming insolvent. The success of a workout does, however, depend on the 
cooperation of all the creditors, which may be difficult to achieve unless they constitute 
a relatively homogeneous group, such as a syndicate of banks
367
.  
 
 
 
Italy 
 
4.5. Creditors’ interests under Italian jurisdiction: three types of creditor control  
As it has been try to justify, the pathologic situation of  indebtedness, which 
define a company in troubles (with no regard to the nature of the crisis) provides the 
basis for a limitation of the shareholders' control power. This connection has been 
demonstrated in economic terms. The starting point is a reading of the insolvency state 
as a discrimen between two different corporate governance distribution of power. 
Following this economic thought, which is an application of the agency problems 
theory, it can be argued that the imbalance between debt and equity may determine an 
imbalance between the distribution of power which characterize a company with an 
equity/debt balance.  As a consequence,  this pathological situation may also arise pre-
insolvency, that is, when a company is in troubles.  
Having said that, even if it is far from easy to define these issues in law, it will be try to 
understand whether that limitation of shareholder control in troubles companies may 
find justifications also under law.  For this purpose, it will be focused on Italian legal 
strategies which, in solving potential agency conflicts between the actors who risk in the 
business, will protect creditors, giving them (some) control power, and, maybe, some 
power control  liability. 
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 In speaking about the issues above, it will not be described specifically the 
strategies and remedies whose it will refers to, being the aim of this discussion far from 
making an exact and precise  presentation of any legal strategies. As a result, it will be 
highlighted only some aspects which may be useful to understand to what extent and in 
what way, that is which legal remedies, creditors protection can be find under Italian 
law of company in troubles. 
According to the severity of the troubles of the company and the consequently 
ability to absorb, internally or externally, the crisis, it is possible identify  three main 
categories 
368
 of out-of-court strategies. These are: control managements, controlled 
liquidations and contractual definitions; remedies which are connected with the almost 
three degrees of the troubles in continuing the activities of the company, that are danger 
of insolvency, insolvency transient, final state of the insolvency.  
In relation to this subdivision, it has been outlined  that the necessary condition 
for the adoption of management control is that the company has good prospects for 
income and that its financial equilibrium, though unstable, can be recovered by means 
coming from outside or self-financing. In economic field, it can be said that the control 
must be implemented by the creditors and this is deemed possible only if the company 
has a profitable, albeit modest, but capable of gradual improvements. Moreover, it can 
be noted that these forms of control unlikely affect the general creditors, since they are 
often concerned about the most important creditors or those with particular skills in the 
administrative or technical staff to monitor the progress of the company to control
369
. 
Controlled liquidation, instead, requires the decision to terminate the company 
and, therefore, it deviates from the forms taken by the company for the maintenance of 
business. It is argued that, in practice, the usefulness of this type of arrangement is to 
ensure effective control to creditors under the liquidation, by inspection, verification, 
and in the frequent statements of checking the final destination of the proceeds. In this 
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case, consequently, creditors do not participate in decisions concerning the winding up 
operations, but check that the results correspond to those planned
370
. 
 Finally, the out-of-court solutions can deal with company in insolvency. The 
peculiarity of this type of remedy, which may be identified in the out-of-court agreed, is 
that the success of the arrangement depends on agreements with each creditor. This does 
not necessarily mean that the arrangement is based on separate negotiations with 
individual creditors. Indeed, it is noted in this connection that a greater guarantee of 
success is found where negotiations will be concluded on the basis of conditions applied 
unitary to everyone, offering a comprehensive description to creditors supported by 
adequate documentation of the reasons and extent of losses, with the means available by 
which to fulfill its commitments to creditors
371
.  
As a result,  it is necessary to establish a program for the realization of the assets, as 
well as an updated situation for guidance in assessing the liquidity of assets. 
The payment terms can then be differentiated with respect to certain categories of 
creditors. This event has given rise to discussions by those who believe that the 
negotiations out of court should respect the principle of par condicio creditorum
372
. 
The brief analysis in economic terms as described above is the confirmation that, 
in relation to the means adopted, the legal effects differ for the debtor company and the 
creditors, depending on the severity of the troubles which involves the company. 
Where, in fact, the company is in a state of temporary crisis, the freedom of the debtor 
to negotiate with his creditors seems to suffer no limitations. Following this though, 
companies who are not insolvent  do not necessarily have to take those precautions 
which the law imposes to an insolvent subject. Indeed, despite having to bear in mind 
the duty  not to aggravate its state of distress to avoid the penalties provided under art. 
217, n. 4 and 216, n. 3, l. fall., which should be applied after a bankrupt declaration, the 
debtor-company cannot be bound also to avoid that acts which will be potentially 
submitted to revoke under art. 64ss. or bottlenecks under article 72 l. fall. Consequently, 
the possible differential treatment carried out to creditors, when the company is in 
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troubles but in substantial solvency, has no legal consequences, in contrast to what 
happens when there is a declared insolvency. It follows that,  when there is a situation 
of insolvency, it rises the most sensitive issues on how make  agreements with creditors, 
lighting particularly the need to respect the discipline of the insolvency law principles, 
that are due to the pari passu. So there are discussions on the validity of that contractual 
remedies, as well as to the lawfulness of the same issues in terms of effectiveness 
against third parties outside that agreements. The starting point for some reflections on 
these issues may be that the loss of the legislative remedy provided for and regulated in 
respect of insolvency can be justified only as a contractual instrument is chosen such as 
to eliminate the state of insolvency
373
.  
Having pointed out that the real boundary (even if not easy to define) of the 
transfer of control power from shareholders to creditors is the “in troubles” company, 
the next step of discussion will be whether in this pathological situation the contractual 
remedies of distribution of power have to respect the principles which come from 
insolvency law, that are connected, in particular, with the par condicio creditorum 
principle. 
 
4.6. Out-of-Court remedies 
4.6.1. Pacta de non petendo 
 One of this contractual remedies is the so called pactum de non petendo
374
, 
Generally, whether the organizational dysfunction or conditions of financial, economic 
or balance sheet instability, as described above, have affected the ability of the company 
(or of the entrepreneur in general), to fulfill her commitments with third parties, she will 
try to avoid the consequences provided by law for the case of full-blown crisis, 
concluding agreements with all or some of her creditors to obtain an extension of 
deadlines or a cut debts.  
                                                 
373
 This is a point of great discussion which will not be treated here. See: Fauceglia, Panzani. 
374
 Cass. 19.9.2000, n. 12405, in Gius., 2001, p. 45; Cass. 19.11.1992, n. 12383, in Fall., 1993, p. 510 and in 
Dir. fall., 1993, II, p. 1084; Cass. 28.10.1992, n. 11722, in Fall., 1993, p. 352; Trib. Palermo 18.9.2000, in 
Fall., 2000, p. 1416. For an historical analysis see: Moschella, Pactum de non petendo, in Diz. prat. dir. priv., 
Milano, V, pp. 18ss.; Burdese, sub patto, in Noviss. Dig. It., Torino, XII, p. 1963; Fragali, sub artt. 1955-1957, 
Fideiussione, mandato di credito, in Commentario Cod. civ., Scialoja-Branca (a cura di), IV, Bologna-Roma, 
pp. 489ss.; Perrone, Insolvenza, op. cit., p. 661. Sargenti, Pactume de non petendo e remissione del debito, in 
Foro pad., 1959, cc. 299; F. Gallo. Sull‟asserita sopravvivenza del factum de non petendo nel diritto civile 
italiano, in Foro It., 1960, IV, c. 129; Ruscello, Pactume de non petendo e vicenda modificativa del rapporto 
obbligatorio, in Riv. Dir. civ., 1976, II, p. 198s.; Scognamiglio, Considerazioni sul factum de non petendo alla 
luce di un rimeditato concetto del patto nell‟ordinamento attuale, in Riv. Not., 1986, I. p. 587ss. 
135 
Under this pactum, creditors undertake not to require payment before a certain 
time; moreover, it can be the case of negotiating a reduction in interest rates, or 
conversion of loans into other property or rights. The company in troubles may also 
obtain new financing from her existing creditors who reserve, in some cases, to agree 
with the entrepreneur's strategic plan to help restore solvency. This is what happens, for 
example, in the complex agreements between the creditor bank and the contractor-
company in crisis to support the attempt to restructure the company itself. Through this 
remedy the contractor may try to restore the lost equilibrium or even close down the 
business without incurring liability to the insolvency proceedings. These remedies are 
recognized in law provided that they do not violate the creditor interests. In this regard, 
the Insolvency Law also provides specific agreed solutions to the company troubles, 
that is, according to the provision under Italian Insolvency Law, when the company 
enter in a crisis. It is the case of art.182-bis l. fall.,which states debt restructuring 
agreements, and art. 67, c. 3, let. d), l. fall., which sets up recovery plans.  
However, when the crisis is not overcome by these strategies, or when there has 
been no attempt in this direction, the conditions for the application of specific 
obligations and legal duties arise, providing  the protection of the interests involved in 
the company. Even in this case, the system favors solutions that enable the preservation 
of the business activities. The focus on the contractual remedies to the crisis of the 
company is one of four main directives provided by the reformer  Legislator that are: to 
protect the interests of creditors by giving them more powers; to provide sanctions for 
failure proportionate and sustainable for the debtor; finally, to evaluate the company 
itself, understood as a business organization with its intrinsic value.  
In this context it is possible to understand the importance of alternative remedies 
(alternative to winding up) which one designed to allow agreed definitions between 
company and creditors, such as the already mentioned art. 182-bis l. fall. The initiative 
is entirely up to the debtor
375
. Creditors have no voice at this step, while the agreement, 
under the supervision of the judicial authority, will be concluded whether creditors 
approve the content of the debtor proposal. As I have already specified, it is out of the 
purpose of this discussion a description of the proceeding. Here it can be outlined, in 
order to understand the distribution of power between shareholders and creditors, that 
under art. 160ss (and the same for concordato fallimentare), if on the one hand, in 
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accordance with the  pari passu principle, creditors have the veto power, on the other 
hand, creditors power can be limited by a court decision. Indeed, the latter will prevail 
on dissenting creditors if, in making a business decision on behalf of them, the test of 
“the best interest for creditors” is respected. This is a discretionary decision, albeit 
constrained to choose the alternative that best meets creditors‟ interest. The pari passu 
principle seems have less power also according to other provisions. In particular, having 
regards  to the contents of the agreement, linked to a possible subdivision  of creditors 
into classes with different treatment; moreover it seems outline importance of  other 
interests, such as the rescue of the business and the value of the firms as a business 
organization. The same recue issue can be find under art. 182-bis and under the special 
proceeding reserved for special and with  large dimension (in terms of employees and 
level of indebtedness), that are L. 270/99 and 39/2004 as modified in 2009 to overcome 
the “Alitalia crisis”.  
Finally, the law provides plans to enable consolidation, reorganization or 
restructuring in the context of established procedure, groped to make an accommodation 
crisis that gives the maximum possible survival of the business organization. The 
importance of the latter is outlined  in the fact that, also whether there are no reasonable 
perspectives to save the company, neither the contractual remedies have any successful 
results, the (only) liquidation solution is a mechanism which try to evaluate the business 
organization, for instance, facilitating by the default rule under art. 104, c. 4, l. fall.
376
, 
the continuation of the temporary business activities even when there is the state of 
insolvency.  
 
4.6.2. The role of the bank creditor 
Regarding the adoption of contractual solutions, the role of the banks is 
extremely important in terms of the manner of participation in the “rescue” of the 
business of company and also in  the identification of a possible liability in the 
financing transaction of the company, then declared bankrupt. The bank is defined 
sometimes as a “victim” and sometimes  as a “partner” with reference to the insolvency. 
Indeed, on the one hand, there are known the adverse effects linked to some aspects of 
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the role of the bank. This is the case of the granting credit in two respects: that of illegal 
granting and that the sudden and unjustified termination or restriction of the 
exposure
377
. 
As to the second profile, detrimental situations to the firm in troubles may arise even in 
the event of breach by the bank of an out-of-court  agreement between the company and 
the bank. This is the case, generally, of covenants tending to delay the performances of 
the parties or of a contract with clauses providing the funds needed to satisfy creditors 
not participating in the agreement. The effect that is linked to such agreements, 
classified according to the law as a real form of lending, is the removal of the state of 
insolvency by restoring liquidity. Consequently, non-compliance of the agreement may 
be an unexpected and unjustified termination of the credit. As a result, the possible 
discharge by breach of the bank overwhelms any possible effects of restoring liquidity 
positively evaluated for  removing  insolvency
378
. 
 In addition to the above assumptions that traditionally constitute criminal 
liability of banks, it can be also made considerations regarding civil liability profiles. 
The theme is closely linked to the bank's role in “managing” the company. This occurs 
both through consultancy on financial strategies, both with the opportunity to participate 
within the limits set by law in the assets of the company. Consequently, banks become  
joint operators of  companies in troubles
379
. 
Regarding the first type of bank participation in the management of the company
380
, that 
is a control strategy, usually the company appoints an advisor who can be  a single 
professional connected to the bank or a bank holding company or a bank financial 
company
381
.  
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In alternative, there can be an agreement concluded between the company and one or 
more banks in order to establish a plan to rescue the company
382
. These agreements are 
structured in various ways, which may include the sale of the whole assets to another 
company, or to the members (separately or together), or finally, the access to an 
insolvency  procedure. The agreement may also regulate the relationship of other 
subjects, such as subsidiary companies, members and creditors in various ways
383
.  
While not addressing here the problem of the nature of these conventions, it can 
be shown the variety of the content of these. It is the case, for instance, of the situations 
in which the intervention of banks provides for the waiver of credit (that is, part of the 
interest or part of the capital); or for a reassessment of the terms of debt (lengthening of 
repayment terms and interest payment); or moreover and peculiarly, for a 
recapitalization, which consists of a subscription by banks of all or part of the capital of 
the company in troubles, through conversion of loans into equity or fresh funds.  
 Furthermore, in this context, it is necessary a distinction between situations in which 
the ratio can be interpreted as an expression of general advice, for which eligibility is 
also provided between the extra credit activities, from other situations where, instead, 
banks control the funding for the recovery of their claims. In this last case, 
commentators have been set up banks  as de facto managers of companies in troubles
384
. 
 
4.7.  Standard strategies: managers’ duties  to creditors 
When liquidators are unable to pay creditors it should be distinguished: if the 
company is in the state of insolvency, the liquidator has the duty to conduct a procedure 
according to the pari passu principle. By contrast, if there is not a situation of 
insolvency, the liquidator has the freedom to “manage” the company. The point in the 
latter case is to what extent the liquidator can  continue “to do the liquidator” according 
to the discipline under art. 2487 ss. c.c.. In particular, the question is whether he can or 
has to apply the pari passu rules if he has considered not possible to satisfy all creditors. 
From an abstract point of view, it can be argued that the liquidator does not have the 
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mandatory duty to follow the insolvency rules at least when insolvency procedures 
cannot be opened, that is, those assumptions which can be derived under art. 1 l. fall.  
One solution could be found trying to extrapolate from the Italian law a principle that 
seems to have a general application.  
Indeed, the Legislator when there is a  distribution of the control under contract 
strategies between company (her members) in troubles and its creditors, when 
management is legally entrusted to a third party, namely the liquidator, the solution 
seems to be one for which that subject has the freedom to manage and choose the 
remedies which he considers appropriate, providing that, concretely, there are no more 
favorable alternatives to creditors protection. This ratio, as it has been mentioned above, 
is expressed in different provisions, for example, under art. 180 l. fall.,  in connection 
with the power of courts to make business decision opposed to (a class of) creditors, if 
she considers that in this way, these creditors can be satisfied at not less than the other 
concrete possible alternatives"
385
. It can be called the “best interest of creditor test”386. 
Directors, as well as being potentially liable for the same offenses as described 
above (Sections 224 and 223 l. fall.), when the risk of default is rising, become subject 
to new obligations and additional to those which they are normally subject to. The law 
makes them civilly liable for the damage caused to creditors through an administration 
that in the new context, does not take into account also the creditors‟ interests. The 
techniques by which this result is achieved are indirect remedies
387
, such as art. 2394 
c.c. , which sets up directors' liability to creditors for the social obligations regarding the 
preservation of assets and art. 2485 c.c., which states liability for compliance failure 
caused by the occurrence of a ground for dissolution; finally art.  2486, c. 2, concerning 
the liability for non-conservative managing in the assets after the dissolution of the 
company. Although the first and the second rules cover  the violation of specific 
obligations and the third is connected with the violation of the obligation to preserve 
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heritage waiting for the appointment of liquidators, the result is that directors, when the 
asset is not enough  and the business activities are continued, answerable for the caused 
losses
388
. 
Creditors‟ protection cannot stop at this step. If the standards of criminal liability 
and liability actions are a deterrent, especially an ex post remedy, it is not indeed 
conceivable that creditors have to settle for the fact that the same directors, appointed by 
the shareholders and often closely linked, change their role and become now the 
“managers” of the company in the creditors‟ interest. The company law rules are in fact 
operating, and the members are still entitled of the appointment and removal rights of 
directors
389
. 
The simplest and general solution would be to stop the further activities of the company. 
Consequently, the assets and the debt situation will be crystallized, and creditors would 
satisfy themselves with what is left in the debtor's assets. This solution, however, could 
be very detrimental to creditors too. The same result would vacate the individual 
creditors to recover what they are entitled. Their precautionary or executive actions 
would have the same destructive effect on the values of the company
390
. 
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Understanding the “value” of the company as an organization, an entity capable of productive assessment, as 
distinct from the assets of the entrepreneur entity, depends on its ability to produce more wealth than that which 
it employs. It therefore has the same value regardless the financial structure of the  company. So a company 
may be worth the same $ 100 is that the entrepreneur has failed to debts, or he has debts amounting to $ 200.  
The possibility that the assets has a positive value even if the company is in troubles can occur for several 
reasons.  
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So, firstly, the firm may have a positive value.
391
 Secondly, the company may 
miss today as a result of bad business decisions, but may be able to return to producing 
value through disposals of non-strategic assets, changes in strategies, etc.. that is, using 
the cd. turnaround.  Obviously, if there is a possibility that the firm now in crisis “return 
to the value”, the assessment will take account of that point. The assessments are in fact  
prospective and it is in the interest of the creditors recover a today lost business which 
tomorrow  can go back to produce. Third, the crisis may be due to bad financial choices. 
For example, there are sectors of market (such as high technology) where it can take 
years of investment before they produce a useful result. A good contractor should plan 
the flow of funds to make sure you can build a bridge between monetization of costs 
and revenues, but the fact that there is an incorrect programming activities does not 
mean that the company is worthless and that, therefore, creditors have no interest in 
continuing activities
392
. Finally, the assets of the entrepreneur may be composed of 
business units that create wealth on the one hand and, on the other, of  business units 
which  are destroying and not restructured. The latter may have produced losses that 
might kill the first, and it is evidently in the interest of creditors to separate the good 
from the bad ones.  
As a consequence, it can be deduced that the existence of troubles for a company 
is not a sign of health of the company, but neither it is a clear signal of the opportunity 
to discontinue the business activities. It would be equally wrong, however, say that the 
failing enterprise must always be saved. There are companies unrestructurable except 
with costs that exceed the benefits, there are whole areas in decline due to the 
emergence of alternative technologies or  changing consumer preferences, and so on. 
The aggressive treatment to the company in crisis can be devastating to the interests of 
creditors. 
                                                 
391
This is the scholar example reported in D. Baird, The element of Bankruptcy, III ed., The Foundation Press, 
Westbury NY, 2001, 63.  Polaroid co. was in a serious crisis in the summer of 2001 partly because of 
accumulated debt for having pursued an unsuccessful attempt to expand the field of image for medical use. 
This does not mean that all assets were worthless. 
However, it is lower than was expected when the investment was made. For example, if the company filed for 
investments, stranded, for 1.000.000 euro and provides a steady MOL equal to Euro 20,000(ie formance annual 
rate of 2 percent of invested capital, clearly less than the cost of debt), it is likely that it is in crisis. This does 
not mean that it has a value of zero. In other words, it has cost too much, but still it has a positive value that is 
in the interest of creditors to keep. A very similar case and perhaps more frequent is that in which the company 
is burdened by the financial burden due to a mistaken investment (for example, attempts at expansion or 
diversification which are not going to succeed), which left the company with the same margins gain, but with 
many more debts 
392
 See R. C. Higgins, Analysis for Financial Management, 5 Irwin McGraw-Hill, Boston, 1998, 120. 
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The onset of the crisis therefore requires a choice about the fate of the company. From a 
creditors point of view, a flexible procedure should be necessary. Central importance in 
this context is the distinction between the “value of the company” as a business 
organization and the “value of the assets” of that company393. Creditors may have an 
interest in the continuation of the activities, because only through the latter operation, 
they may realize their value, recovering at least part of their credits. The death of the 
company so is not necessarily a solution that serves the interests of creditors. After all, 
no tool replacement ordinarily provided by law - such as a subrogation action under Art. 
2900 cc, clearly unsuited to the case of defendant who neglects to manage a company 
well - allows them to avoid the debtor destroy wealth on which they could satisfy.  
 As a result it is showed that the transfer of control to creditors does not solve all 
problems because it needs to be supported by structures and rules which organize the 
control head to creditors and which have regard also to “other interests” (with no 
valuation about which one may be the prevalent), in particular the value of the 
continuation of the business activities. 
 
4.8. Different interests and approaches to protect creditors in troubles companies 
In this regard, some reflections should be useful. First it may be noted that 
creditors as a whole have a clear common objective: the greatest value of their 
(common) debtor assets, in whatever way it can be implemented and to the extent 
permitted total amount of their claims. So whether the company produces wealth or 
otherwise has a positive value (also with a view to restructuring), it is in the interest of 
the creditor group (not necessarily the individual creditor) in continuing business, but, 
whether the business destroys wealth and it is not susceptible to back to produce, it is in 
their interest ceases any activities. In general terms, they have an interest in each asset 
that  is valued at the best way: e.g. credits should be monetized quickly and to the 
maximum extent achievable, non-productive property should be disposed of to the best 
buyer, and so on. One can say that the creditors have the interest that each asset  is as 
useful as possible, that is specified in the continuation or termination of the business of 
the company depending on whether it is worth more as a going concern (complex of 
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 If the company is worth 100 and the assets  are burdened with debts that  absorb (or negative exceed) the 
asset value, there is no longer interest in continuing the activities (except for groped a stroke of  fortune at the 
expense of creditors ), because, anyway the owner of the company can no longer deal with the positive results 
of the activities which, on the contrary, will end up in the pockets of the creditors. So it is possible that a 
company that has a positive value, however, entirely absorbed by the debts, is left to die by her members, that 
is a quite rational decision  for them, but that destroys wealth. 
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assets in assets) or as a set of disaggregated goods. However, the commonality of 
interests between creditors is not enough to make a cohesive group and able to exercise 
effective control. So, for instance, the large creditor secured by a mortgage is 
completely indifferent to the fate of the rest of the assets as its sole purpose is the rapid 
clearance of the object of his guarantee, even if this could damage others creditors. 
Moreover, the rules on business struggling firms  are not certain in advance.  
As a result, creditors, sharing the same aim, that is the maximum achievable 
satisfaction of their claims, are not part of an organized and well-functioning group or 
class, which are members, as they are weak controllers.  
The systems provide different remedies in order to give answers to the problems 
described above when there is an insolvency. A first measure is that the debtor is 
deprived of the possession of his assets, an effect linked to the prohibition of individual 
enforcement actions on the part of creditors (art. 51, 168 Insolvency Law). The pari 
passu principle arises in the formal sense and substantial. It is created between the 
creditors a commonality of interests that did not exist. It is created between the creditors 
a trade association providing for the appointment of one or more individuals 
representing them (although with different functions and variously referred to as 
“curator”, as Italian practitioner or “commissario straordinario” as a kind of 
administrative receiver) by providing various forms of direct consultation and voting on 
certain types of decisions. It provides a framework of legal certainty, resolving conflicts 
between different creditors with different interests, for example, attributing the decision 
to approve a contractual solution of the crisis (concordato fallimentare) only to greater 
and / or class of creditors (127 and 177) or by attributing to the pledge, for example, the 
right to sell the thing given as security, unless the right to regain possession of the 
liquidator pays the creditor (53 l. fall.).The relation between the transfer of control and 
the organization of creditors vary in different insolvency procedures: sometimes 
decisions are made not by the creditors, but by third parties in the interest of creditors in 
other respects the decisions are taken directly from them. For instance, the special 
administration of large firms in crisis (amministrazione straordinaria delle grandi 
imprese in crisi, ex d. lgs. 8.7.1999, n. 270) produces an almost complete transfer of 
control to creditors, but it does not organize the category. Vice versa, the arrangement 
called “concordato preventivo” ex art. 160 ss., l. fall., produces a transfer attenuated but 
it is provided for a stronger organization. 
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 The transfer of control meets several major obstacle
394
. When troubles arise, 
companies need a wealth of knowledge and information which are not always easily 
transferable (eg relating to the know-out, the market situation, etc.). Moreover, 
management is in possession of this information and should disclose to creditors, that 
are their “successor” in managing the crisis of the company. This step necessarily 
involves the emergence of agency problems. So, on the one hand, managers or members  
may not be able to properly manage the enterprise, since the crisis led to or may not 
have sufficient incentives; on the other hand, they may have incentives other than 
maximizing the satisfaction of creditors (for instance, they may prefer to transfer 
information outside of the company in view of their own direct or indirect benefit. 
There is uncertainty on the decisions to be taken (what can be done with the 
assets of the debtor), on who should make such decisions (only creditors, and which of 
them, or even the borrower), and whether reallocate the rights to the debtor's assets 
(only among the creditors, all or a portion, or even by the debtor). Thus, for example, 
asset values are often uncertain and the present values of flows decisions making during 
a procedure may benefit one group or another. Moreover, it is necessary  then to decide 
whether and how is it financed the cost of the business activities. Even if it is clear that 
there is goodwill to be saved, may be needed in the immediate liquidity of which the 
company does not hold. The same guidelines that must be followed in this twilight 
phase are partly uncertain: although in theory, it is scheduled to be assured that the art. 
2740 and art. 2741 c.c., it seems inevitable raises the possibility for the debtor to save 
something, and this in the creditors‟ interest. The main goal is to manage the uncertainty 
in step to the achievement of the interest protected by law. It is however not unique as it 
is that interest or, more precisely, if the protected interest is only the creditors‟ one or 
whether the latter is just one of the protected interests.  
 
4.9. “Other different interests” 
There are several clues which can show that “others” than creditors‟ interests 
arise and whose the law give some protection. For instance, assuming that the 
negotiation is the starting point for defining the powers of the creditors, in this 
discussion I will try to understand to what extent can one speak of effective constructive 
in the sense of operating a power add-in-chief to the creditors in order to ensure an 
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 As it has been already said, the first one is to define clearly when the “troubles” of a company become crisis 
situations. 
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distribuite the powers of the shareholders. The art. 2409 c.c. seems to be a possibility in 
this regard, providing the business administration of the company by a person appointed 
by the court where, under the provision referred to, there has been a complaint for 
serious misconduct. It is considered that the scope of this rule also covers problems 
connected with capital operations. 
In another context, it can be mentioned art. 90 Insolvency Law, which seems a 
clear index of the importance that the Legislator gives to the continuity  of the business 
activities and, consequently, to the value of the company as an organization.  
Moreover, art. 63 d.l.gs. 270/1999 deals with the necessity to take into account, 
as reductive part of the sale price, the negative profitability due to the maintenance of 
jobs partly or wholly unproductive. As a consequence, it can be argued that the creditor 
interests are postponed by a mandatory rule which states a specific behavior they have 
to attempt.  
For this analysis it is essential to ascertain what are the appropriate goals. Based 
on the model of control of a solvent company, the law, as it has been seen, allows 
shareholders to establish general guidelines for the management and to choose those 
who will actually implement such guidelines. This is on account of their status as 
providers of risk capital, or residual claimants, justifying the allocation of power. It is 
on this system that is based, for better or for worse, the market economy that is a 
constituent element of private enterprise and constitutionally recognized (Article 41 
Constitution). This does not mean that there is no room for different interests to those of 
shareholders and directors must pursue them to the detriment of any other interests: 
research interests other than profit are presented as the outer limit to that of shareholders 
in the sense that there is no profit without good relations with employees, suppliers, 
customer, ie the so-called stakeholders, or to persons who have an interest to the smooth 
operation of the enterprise. There are also those who believe that directors should be 
pushed further, mediating the interests of various stakeholders. Again, other people talk 
about corporate social responsibility, the subject of increasing attention in the EU 
framework, where he emphasizes the impact with the company
395
. 
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 Commission Communication  COM/2002/347. 
The potential of the so called “CSR” (that is company social responsibility) policies to strengthen the symbiotic 
relationship between enterprises and society has already been demonstrated in areas such as sustainable growth, 
education and social cohesion. CSR can support the creation of an atmosphere of trust within companies, which 
leads to a stronger commitment of employees and higher innovation performance. A similar atmosphere of 
trust in cooperation among other stakeholders (business partners, suppliers, and consumers) can increase the 
external innovation performance. Consumer confidence fostered through CSR can be a major contributor to 
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 This framework of values for the company in normal operation and solvent 
cannot be arbitrarily altered when the company becomes insolvent. According to 
legislation, under articles 2484, n. 6, 2485, 2486, 2487 and 2489,  members may at any 
time decide to put the company into liquidation, with the associated effect of the rise of 
a limitation on the powers of directors, which is required to preserve the heritage, and 
the rise of the bonds appointment of liquidators, which is required to liquidate. If 
therefore the decision to stop a business which can no longer survive belongs to those 
who have voluntarily provide risk capital, it is unthinkable that this decision is 
precluded from creditors, that are involuntary suppliers of venture capital. 
System consistency wants therefore creditors as operators. However, as in most cases 
they are not an organized group in advance (it may be a consortium of banks, but not 
representative of all creditors), it is necessary to appoint a “manager”. The appointment 
in the UK lies with the creditors themselves. In Italy to a judicial or administrative 
authority (receivers or other manager). 
Insolvency state certifies that the financial market no longer believes the ability of the 
debtor to repay the debt already accumulated, and then refuses to provide new credit. 
The insolvency manifestation in terms of financial flows is a clue, imperfect but 
significant, of the existence of a lack of assets, connected to which the legislator made 
an external intervention in the management of the company. The insolvent company is 
therefore a company whose real shareholders, as residual claimants, are the creditors. 
The consistency of the system, as mentioned above, requires that, where possible, the 
same rights and the same protections enjoyed by the shareholders of a solvent company 
may be given to the creditors of a company in troubles and that they are subject to the 
same constraints restricting the action of the first one. 
 
Concluding remarks 
Italian insolvency procedures do not fully respond to this model, indeed: 
                                                                                                                                               
economic growth. CSR policies can also boost the societal benefit that enterprises create with regard to 
innovation. Indeed, the desire of enterprises to improve their risk management is a powerful factor behind CSR. 
Enterprises generally agree that CSR helps them in managing their risks, their intangible assets, their internal 
processes, and their relations with internal and external stakeholders.  It has also been argued that opportunities 
and advantages for enterprises stemming from complying with international social and environmental 
conventions, norms or "soft law " instruments can outweigh costs. Although most businesses support the 
assumption of a positive impact of CSR on competitiveness, particularly in the long term, they are however not 
able to quantify this effect”. 
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- in some cases the protection of creditors is weakened by the protection of other 
interests (such as those of employees or the value of the business activities), whose cost 
is attributed to the creditors, rather than the community as a social safety net;  
- creditors have no power to choose and appoint their representative, that is the one who 
shall manage the assets of the insolvent debtor in their interest (consider the 
appointment of the liquidator or the practitioner), neither have the power to appoint 
other experts who may be useful during the insolvency proceeding; 
- creditors have no voice in deciding alternative views to the liquidation of assets if no 
agreements with the debtor are made (moreover also see the limits of 182-bis 
Insolvency Law  and the agreement under art. 160 ss., called “concordato preventivo”, 
where the initiative is entirely up to the debtor, not to the creditors). An exception to 
this principle can be found in the discipline under art. 78 l. 270/1999, which provides 
the possibility for a third party to present the proposal for the agreement (this is the case 
of a transfer of the assets to a third party, that is an alternative, even if more efficient, to 
the winding up); finally, under art. 4-bis, c. 1, l. 39/2004
396
 the practitioner may propose 
an agreed solution in terms of debt restructuring or satisfaction of claims  by any forms. 
In this context, it can be also outlined that the content of the covenant may provide the 
allocation of shares to creditors, or bonds or  convertible bonds to shares or other 
securities.   As a result, by law it is allowed to propose to creditors to convert  debt into 
equity of the debtor company
397
. 
- creditors have no possibility to influence the management of the property even when 
they represent a majority of the claims, except the weak instrument of claim against the 
acts of the practitioner and the special practitioner (art 36 l. fall. and 65, d. lgs. 270 / 
99
398
); during an insolvency procedure every expert or practitioner is appointed and 
chosen by the court or by other juridical authority or by an administrative authority;  
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 It is the so called “Decreto Marzano”: D. L. 23.12.2003, n. 347 – Misure urgent per la ristrutturazione 
industrial di grandi imprese in stato di insolvenza, in G.U. 24.12.2003, n. 298, conv. In l. 18.2.2004, n. 39, in 
G.U. 20.2.2004, n. 42. 
397
 This is a legal strategy which requires the cancellation of previous shares and the issuance of new shares in 
favor of the creditors, assuming the allocation of powers to the practitioner instead of the shareholders in 
special meeting. That is why this remedy was discussed and, according to some commentators, reserved to s.r.l. 
and avoided for s.p.a. This last assertion was supported by the fact that this capital increase without a previous 
shareholder decision should be inconsistent with the EC Guideline requires, according to which the capital 
increases have to be deliberated by the shareholders; see: Pafitis v. Banca Trapeza Kentriks Ellandos AE, CE 
Court of Justice, 12.3.1993, C-4491/93, in Società, 1996, p. 977; in Giust. civ., 1996, I, p. 2773; in Foro it., 
1997, IV, p. 131, in accordance with the  art. 25 of the 2nd Commercial Law Directive 77/91/CEE. 
398
 D. lgs. 8.7.1999, n. 270 – Nuova disciplina dell‟amministrazione straordinaria delle grandi imprese in stato 
di insolvenza, a norma dell‟articolo 1 della legge 30 luglio 1998, n. 274, in G.U. 9.9.1999, n. 185, called 
“Prodi bis”, which has repealed the “Prodi” law, that is D.L. 30.5.1979, n. 26- Provvedimenti urgenti per 
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- a positive side is that creditors bound by the editor for selected determinants (Article 
90ss.), but there are also several areas in which their opinion is not binding; it is the new 
Insolvency Law, as has been reformed, that has reformed the previous approach in 
favor, nowadays, of a stronger power of the Creditor committee to make the main 
important decisions during an insolvency procedure.  
- Creditors  cannot bring the action of proportional liability  to remove the practitioner, 
chance that is only  allowed to the new practitioner appointed by the court, and only at 
the end of this procedure individual creditors can take that action, with problems of 
rational apathy for small creditors (who would spend to take more than they can 
expected); 
- receiver‟s point of view does not necessarily coincide with those of creditors. Creditor 
rights in different areas are recessive with respect to the conservation of business as a 
means of wealth for the community. A peculiar example in this sense  is the l. 39/2004 
already as modified in 2008
399
, which gives evidence to the new approach of the 
Legislator. That intent  is no longer to maintain the integrity of the assets as a source of 
employment and wealth for the community, but the aim is to allow the continuation of 
the activities considered in the public interest, which has held the company in that 
procedure of special administration and which will take place by the newco using only 
the purchaser of goods and contracts to enrich those already held
400
. 
As a result, if one of the purposes of company law is to reduce the agency costs 
arising from potential non-coincidence of research interests between shareholders and 
directors, when troubles arise, reading creditors as residual claimants (bearers of risk 
capital) constitutes the triumph of those costs.  These are costs of control (supported by 
the principal), warranty costs (supported by the agent, who shall return them to the 
principal) and residual loss not avoided
401
. At the time of onset of insolvency the 
directors appointed by  the shareholders (which, even if in an imperfect way, have the 
tools of corporate governance which protect them) there is the transition of management 
on the part of the manager appointed by an external authority. Creditors, who are in the 
                                                                                                                                               
l‟amministrazione straordinaria delle grandi imprese in crisi, in G.U. 6.2.1979, n. 36, conv. in l. 3.4.1979, n. 
95, in G.U. 4.4.1979, n. 94. 
399
 It is the so called “Decreto Alitalia”:  D. L. 28.8.2008, n. 134, in G.U. 28.8.2008 n. 210, conv. In l. 
27.10.2008, n. 166, in G.U. 27.10.2008, n. 252.  
400
 V. Zanichelli, Amministrazione straordinaria, in G. Fauceglia and L. Panzani, Fallimento e altre procedure 
concorsuali, Torino, 2009, 3, pp. 2013ss.  
401
 See M. C. Jensen, W. H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership 
Structure, in Journal of Financial Economics, 1976 (3), 305ss. 
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middle, have no power in appointing the liquidator, and they are held just as passive 
recipients and away during the time in which he works. 
- Directors may have specific duties to protect creditors when a threat is looming for the 
satisfaction of their reasons, regardless of a loss of social capital. so as to strengthen 
their control on the basis of guidance from the English model, and above all, prevent the 
damage that creditors may suffer in the twilight phase of the undertaking (Articles 2484 
as we have seen are inadequate for that purpose). The goal should be, on the one hand, 
to avoid insolvency solutions do not agree with the creditors, by the other to give 
certainty and stability of these solutions even in case of possible failure in the rescue 
attempt.  
Having said that, some remedies should be proposed, which deal with the U.K. 
experience, that are; firstly, it should be indicated clearer under law that creditors can 
replace the shareholders in the event of the insolvency of the company.  
The benefit of limited liability has, as a necessary pendant, the fact that the shareholder 
who (legitimately) decide not to recapitalize the insolvent firm, has changed hands to 
creditors. It is therefore quite proper to provide tools which, in substance, permit (but 
not compulsory) the creditors to replace the old shareholders compulsively, acquiring 
shares of a company's financed rebalanced capital structure precisely because all the 
credit, or a substantial part, has been converted into shares (l. 39/2004). 
Moreover, another strategy should be to allow creditors to choose and control 
their representative. In this sense the U.K. procedures are an example worthy of great 
attention. Indeed even after the Enterprise Act 2002 which reduced the administrative 
receivership, creditor  usually directly appoint their representative (sometimes it is the 
company or the court to appoint an interim representative, being increasingly replaced 
by creditors, usually selected after informal consultation with major creditors). For 
instance, in the administration proceeding (in which the activities of businesses continue 
without permitting any actions of creditors, in order to seek an agreement with its 
creditors), the creditors' meeting has the power to replace an administrator appointed by 
the company (ex par . 97 (1) of Schedule B1 of the Insolvency Act 1986, introduced by 
the Act Enterprise 2002), and in fact often the power to appoint directly accruing to the 
creditor holding a general privilege on the property of the company or floating charge 
(section 14 (1) of Schedule B1 above), as finally the power to appoint a liquidator under 
Art. 100 Insolvency Act 1986.  
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Finally, it should be useful to provide an organic restructurated financial process. 
In the few cases where there is an asset to manage (cases which are nevertheless often 
economically and socially relevant) should be given to creditors  chance to participate in 
a real restructuring program. This requires the establishment of market mechanisms 
aimed at the alienation of assets and the company in business without the pressure of 
liquidation.
402
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 In this regard, M. J. Roe, Chapter 11 and the Market,  7.6.2002 discussion in Florence. 
151 
 
 
 
ENGLISH   BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
Beauchamp and N. E. Bowie (eds), Ethical Theory and Business, 5
th
 edn (Upper Saddle 
River NJ: Prentice Hall, 1997) Chapter 2. 
Berle Jr and G. C. Means in The Modern Corporation and Private Property, New York, 
1932, p 46.  
Brealey, Richard A. & Myers, Stuart C., Principles of Corporate Finance, 4
th
 ed. 1991, 
703. 
Brudney, Victor & Chirelstein, Marvin A., Fair Shares in Corporate Mergers and 
Takeovers, 88 Harv. L. Rew. 1974, 297. 
Cheffins, Dividends as a Substitute for Corporate Law: the separation of ownership and 
control in the United Kingdom, (2006) 63 Washington and Lee Law Review, pp. 
1273. 
Cheffins, Corporate Ownership and Control: British business transformed (OUP, 
2008). 
Chew, S. L. Gillan, Global corporate governance, Columbia Business School, New 
York, 2009, pp. 7ss. 
Coates IV, Jhon C., “Fair value” as an avoidable rule of corporate law: minority 
discounts in conflict transactions, 147 U. P. L. Rev. 1999, 1251. 
Cyert and J G March, A Behavioral Theory of the Firm, 2
nd
 edn (Cambridge, Mass: 
Blackwell, 1992), p 31. 
Davies, Gower and Davies‟ principles of Modern Company Law, 2008,p. 83. 
Davies, Introduction to Company Law, (2002), Oxford University Press, p 5. 
152 
Davis, Penny A., Fletcher Cyclopedia of the Law of Corporations by W. M. Fletcher, 
voice Equity (database updated in September 2008). 
Fama, Eugene F., Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work, 
25 J. Fin. 1970, 383. 
Fama, Eugene F., Random Walks in Stock Market Prices, Fin. Analysts J., Sept.-Oct. 
1965, 55. 
Fama, Eugene F., The Behavior of Stock Market Prices, 38 J. Bus. 1965, 90;  
Fischel, Daniel R., The Appraisal Remedy in Corporate Law, Am. B. Found. Res. J. 
1983, 876. 
Friedman Lawrence M., American law in the 20
th
 century, Yale University press, New 
Haven and London, 2002, 572 ss. 
Goldenberg, IALS Company Law Lecture-shareholders v stakeholders: the bogus 
argumen (1998) 19 Co Law 34. 
Goldstein, Privatization in Italy: goals, institutions, outcomes and outstanding issues, 
CESifo Working Paper, Munich, 2006, 16ss. 
Kahan, Marcel & Kamar, Ehud, The myth of state competition in corporate law, 
Stanford Law Rev. 2002, I, 678. 
Kaplow, Rules versus Standards: an economic analysis, in Duke Law Review, (1992), 
42, p. 557. 
Keay, Commercial Law, Oxford, 2009, pp. 145ss. 
Khutorsky, Alexander, Coming from the cold: reforming shareholders' appraisal rights 
in freeze-out transactions, Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 133 (1997). 
Kleinberger, Daniel S., Why Not Good Faith? The Foibles of Fairness in the Law of 
Close Corporations, 16 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 1990, 1143. 
Letsou, Peter V. & Haas, Steven M., The dilemma that should never have been: 
Minority freeze outs in Delaware; 61 Bus. Law. 2005, 25. 
153 
Manne, Mengers and the market of corporate control, (1965) 73 J Pol Econ 110. 
Mayson, D. French, C. Ryan, Company Law, Oxford Press, 2009-2010, pp. 7ss. 
Milgrom and J. Roberts, Economics, Organization and Management, 1992. 
Mitchell, Groundwork of the metaphysics of corporate law (1993) 50 Wash and Lee L 
Rev 1477. 
Mitchell, „Cooperation and constraint in the modern corporation: an inquiry into the 
causes of corporate immorality‟ (1995) 73 Tex L Rev 477. 
Manning, Bayless, The Shareholder's Appraisal Remedy: An Essay for Frank Coker, 72 
Yale L.J. 1962, 223.  
Moll, Douglas K., Shareholder oppression and “fair value”: of discounts, dates, and 
dastardly deeds in the close corporation, 54 Duke L.J. 2004, 293. 
Palmiter, Alan R., Corporation, Aspem publishers, 5
th
 ed. 2006. 
Prasch, Robert E., Economics and Merger Mania: A Critique of Efficient Markets 
Theory, 26 J. Econ. Issues 1992, 635. 
Ratway, David J., Delaware stock market exception to appraisal rights: dissenting 
minority stockholders of Warner Communications, Inc. are market out of luck, 
28 U. Tol. L. Rev. 1996, 179; 
Servidio-Delabre, Common law: introduction to the English and American legal 
systems, Paris, 2004. 
Siegel, Mary, Back to the Future: Appraisal Rights in the Twenty-First Century, 32 
Harv. J. Review 1995, 224 
Thompson, Robert B., Exit, Liquidity, and Majority Rule: Appraisal's Role in Corporate 
Law, 84 Geo. L.J. 1995, 372. 
Thompson, Robert B., The Shareholder's Cause of Action for Oppression, 48 Bus. Law. 
1993, 699. 
154 
Wachter, Michael L., in Takeover Defense When Financial Markets Are (Only) 
Relatively Efficient, 151 U. Pa. L. Rev. 2003, 787  
Weiss, Elliot J., The Law of Take Out Mergers: A Historical Perspective, 56 N.Y.U. L. 
Rev. 1981, 624. 
Wertheimer, Barry M., The purpose of the shareholders appraisal remedy,  65 Tenn. L. 
Rev. 1998, 661. 
Woo, Angie, Appraisal rights in mergers of publicly-held Delaware corporations: 
something old, something new, something borrowed and something B.L.U.E., 68 
South Cal. Law Rev. 1995, 719. 
 
 
155 
 
 
ITALIAN BIBLIOGRAPHY 
A.A. V.V., Il nuovo diritto delle società, liber amicorum Gian Franco Campobasso, 
diretto da P. Abbadessa e G. B. Portale, vol. 4°, Scioglimento, trasformazione, 
fusione, scissione, società cooperativa, ed. Utet, Torino, 2007. 
Abbadessa, in Giur. comm., 2003, I, p. 542s. 
Alberti, (ed.), Commentario breve al diritto delle società, Padova, 2009. 
Ambrosiani, Fabio, Modernizzazione del diritto societario e Società Europea, in Dir. 
Del Comm. Internaz. 2003, ed. Giuffré, Milano, 689. 
Ambrosiani, Fabio, Società Europea e fusione internazionale, in Le Soc. 2002, ed. 
Ipsoa, 1351. 
Baudisch, Mattias, From Status to contract? An American perspective in recent 
developments in European company law, in The European Union and 
governance, Bruylant, Bruxelles, 2003, 22 ss. 
Behrens P., SEVIC Case in ECMR 2006, 1669. 
Bouloukos, Marios, The European Company (SE) as a vehicle for corporate mobility 
within EU: a breakthrough in European Corporate law?, in EBLR 2007, 535. 
Bouloukos, Marios, The legal status of the European Company (SE): Towards a 
European Company “à la carte”?, Int. Bus. Law J. 2004, 489. 
Bortolotti, Italy‟s privatization process and its implications for China, consultant report 
for the World Bank, 2005, pp. 193ss. 
 
156 
Carbone, Sergio M., Corporate governance, internazionalizzazione dei rapporti 
economici e accuntability dell'impresa, in Dir. Del Comm. Internaz. 2005, ed. 
Giuffré, Milano, 311. 
Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, 
Modernizing Company Law and Enhancing Corporate Governance in the 
European Union – A Plan to Move Forward, 21.05.2003, COM/2003/0284, not 
published in the Official Journal, par. 3.4. 
Decher, Christian E., Cross Border Mergers: traditional structures and SE-Merger 
structures, in ECFR 2007, 5.. 
Doralt, Maria, Cross-Border Mergers: a glimpse into the future, in ECFR 2007, 17. 
Drury, Robert, The “Delaware Syndrome”: European fears and reactions, in JBL 2005, 
London, ed. Sweet and Maxwell, 709.  
Enriques Luca, L'irrilevanze del diritto comunitario derivato in materia di società, in 
NGCC 2005, II, ed. Cedam, Padova, 380. 
Enriques, Luca, Diritto societario statunitense a diritto societario italiano: in weiter 
Ferne, so nah, in Giur. Comm. 2007, I, ed. Giuffré, Milano, 274. 
Gonzalez Diaz, Francisco, The reform of European merger control: Quid novi sub 
sole?, in World Competition 2004, 177. 
Guaccero, Andrea, Libertà di stabilimento e diritto societario degli Stati Membri: 
Europa vs. USA, in Eur. e Dir. Priv. 2007, ed. Giuffré, Milano, 133. 
Gurrado, Marianna, Via libera alle fusioni transfrontaliere, in Dir. Del Comm. Internaz. 
2006, ed. Giuffré, Milano, 353. 
Hansen, Lone L., Merger, moving and divisionacross national borders – when case law 
breaks through barriers and overtakes directives, in EBLR 2007, 181. 
Hasenauer, Clemens & Killer, Peter, The new legal regime in Austria on EU/EEA cross-
border merger, in ECL 2008, 185. 
157 
Hinds, Anna-Louise, The new EC Merger Regulation – The more things change the 
more they stay the same?, in EBLR 2006, 1964. 
Hopt Klaus J., Company law modernization: transatlantic perspectives, in Riv. delle 
Soc. 2006, ed. Giuffré, Milano, 908. 
Lenoir, Noelle, The SE or Societas Europaea – A European citizenship for 
corporations, in ECL 2007, 116. 
Levy, Nicholas, EU merger control: from birth to adolescence, in World Competition 
2003, 195. 
Maffei Alberti, Alberto, Commentario breve al diritto delle società, artt. 2437 et 2473, 
2007, ed. Cedam, Padova. 
Mucciarelli, Federico M., Fusioni transfrontaliere e libertà di stabilimento delle società 
nell'Unione Europea: il caso SEVIC, in Giur. Comm. 2006, II, ed. Giuffré, 
Milano, 417. 
Pereira Montiero, Tiago, Report on the CECL Conference on companies crossing 
borders within Europe, in ECL 2008, 145. 
Pernazza, Federico & Scarchillo, Gianluca, La Società Europea: un'esperienza 
scientifico-didattica transfrontaliera, in Riv. Dir. Comm. 2006, ed. Dr. 
Francesco Vallardi, 591. 
Portale, Giuseppe B., La riforma delle società di capitali tra diritto comunitario e 
diritto internazionale privato, in Eur. e Dir. Priv. 2004, ed. Giuffré, 101. 
Sarcina, Antonio, La societas Europaea e il consolidamento del sistema societario 
europeo, Eur. e Dir. Priv. 2006, ed. Giuffré, Milano 729. 
Soresen, Karsten E., Corporate migration in the European Union, in Columb. J. Eur. 
Law 2000, 181. 
Ugliano, Anna, The new Cross-border merger Directive: harmonization of European 
company law and free movement, in EBLR 2007, 585. 
158 
Venturozzo, Marco, Cross-border mergers, change of  applicable corporate laws and 
protection of dissenting shareholders: withdrawal rights under Italian law, 
ECFR 2007, 47. 
Werlauff, Eric, Relocating a company within the EU, in ECL 2008, 136. 
Werlauff, Eric, The SE Company-A new common European company from 8 October 
2004, EBLR 2003, 85. 
Williamson, The Economic Institutions of Capitalism, 1985, pp. 47-49. 
Wolfe, The modern corporation: private agent or public actor? (1993) 50 Wash and 
Lee L Rev 1673. 
Wycheart, Marie & Geens, Koen, Cross-border mergers and minority protection, an 
open-ended harmonization, in Utrecht L. Rev. 2008, 40. 
